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Dissertation

HOCKING'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN SELF

by

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

1. The statement of the problem.

This is a dissertation on the concept of the human self in the philosophy of William Ernest Hocking. The problem may be thought of as an interpretation[1] and evaluation of Hocking's view of the human self: an interpretation of its meaning, its relation with the body, its freedom, its relations in society, and its place in the cosmos.

2. Self as synonymous with mind.

In Hocking's thought, self is a synonym for mind, consciousness, soul, person, and vice versa. There is a practical advantage in having synonyms. One will not have to use the same word so often. But there are also two disadvantages. First, there is the danger that the multiplicity

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1. Hocking regards one of his outstanding books, Human Nature and Its Remaking, as "an experiment in interpretation". (HNR, xi) Interpretation is obviously more than factual description.

(Note: The first reference to a book in each chapter will appear as a footnote. Thereafter, if only page references are to be given, the symbols for the book and the page numbers will appear within parentheses in the text. This practice will be followed only for books written by Professor Hocking. References to all other writings will appear in footnotes.)

of synonyms will allow for, or will lead to, circular definitions and generalizations. This makes for ambiguity, because at best, any word is a leaky vessel for conveying concrete thought. In the second place these terms are distinguished usually in philosophy. Consequently, before Hocking can read other writings, or before the uninitiated can read Hocking, each must accustom himself to differences in terminology.

In spite of the usual practice of emphasizing the slight distinction between the terms self, soul, mind, and person, many follow the practice of Hocking and identify them. An outstanding example is John Laird in his Problems of the Self. He writes that "the word, 'self' . . . includes what these other words include, and is preferable because it does not dictate the road which the discussion must follow."[2] The connotation of the word "soul", for example, involves theological speculation and may give rise to the untenable soul-substance theory; "mind" suggests primarily intellect; and "person" implies stress on ethical and legal considerations.[3] Yet each of these represents but an aspect of the

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2. Laird, PS, 8.

3. Hocking professes a dislike for the term personality, especially as applied to God, for this reason. (Cf. MGHE, 335-336.)

whole self. Thus the term "self" is self-justifying.

3. Other studies of this problem.

The problem of the human self is as old as human association. Politics is one of the oldest of the sciences; its concern is with the facts of human interest and passion. Long before Plato and Aristotle brought politics into the field of philosophy, Chinese and Egyptian sages mingled their statecraft with education and religion. Politics involves psychology, ethics, and metaphysics, because there is needed a science of human nature, a science of right and justice, and a view of man's place in, or significance for, the cosmos. Looked at in this light, studies in politics are studies of the problem of the human self.

Man has been more interested in himself than in any other one thing. Yet man is still his own greatest mystery. He seeks for whatever light he can find wherever he can find it. A significant contribution in this search has been made by Professor Hocking.[4] And his interpretation of the self is made more readily available through this dissertation.

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4. William Adams Brown in his review of Hocking's most celebrated book, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, writes as follows: "We need, in short, a philosophy which shall make personality in the sense in which we know it in ourselves, and which is presupposed in the great spiritual experiences of mankind, the most real thing in the world, the standard by which everything that deserves to be called reality must be tested." Professor Brown writes further that Hocking has not only pointed out this need, but that he has made a "distinct contribution toward meeting it." (Brown, Art.(1913), 250-251)

Other studies of this particular problem are not to be found.[5] Any number of reviews of Hocking's books have been written, but few of these represent discussions of his view of the self; for the most part the reviews are paeans of praise and commendation.[6] There are two French followers of Hocking, Gabriel Marcel and Louis Dallière, who have sought to introduce him to French readers.[7] These works are referred to in the text, and bibliographical data are given in the bibliography.

4. Sources of data.

The sources of data for this dissertation, for the most part, have been the writings of Professor Hocking. Particular ideas have been studied in their historical setting. Thilly's History of Philosophy, and Lange's History of Materialism have been helpful; but in almost every case reference has been made to the writings of the philosopher concerned. Chief among those whose writings have been

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5. In a dissertation, entitled An Analysis of the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead and William Ernest Hocking Concerning Good and Evil, Edmund Jobey Thompson insists that the terms "good" and "evil" are adjectives and that Whitehead and Hocking are wrong in their use of the terms as nouns. (ATWH, 103ff.)

6. Rees Griffiths, a British writer, develops a position similar to that of Hocking, in his book, God in Idea and Experience. He appeals to Hocking as an authority in support of his view. (Cf. Griffiths, GIE, 189-196.)

7. Both writers emphasize Hocking's kinship to the late French philosopher, Henri Bergson.

consulted are Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Bradley, Royce, Dewey, Bergson, Alexander, Perry and Brightman. The purpose of such references has been to illustrate and emphasize Hocking's position, or else to challenge, and perhaps refute, his view.

5. Method of procedure.

This dissertation is first a study of the human self; and second, a study which is based on the thought of William Ernest Hocking. Therefore, it is not a mere exposition of Professor Hocking's view, but rather a critical interpretation involving contrasts and comparisons with other positions.

The presentation, though chronological, as in the life of the individual self, has also a logical emphasis. Should the meaning of the self be discussed first or last? To discuss it first might seem to preclude the rest of the study; yet it seems necessary to state at the beginning some idea of what the topic means. Selfhood is accepted as the basic category. To say that the category of selfhood is basic means that the self is a principle by means of which the world can be best understood, and without which the world is unthinkable. The self is the most concrete principle, or entity, which can be discovered. It represents the alpha and the omega of philosophy. Consequently, Chapter II is a treatment of possible ways in which the self may be viewed, of the meaning of the self, and of the basis for self-identity.

"For psychology as well as for metaphysics the will must be identified with a persistent principle of preference."[8]

Chapter III is a study of the development of the self, and its relations to the body. What is the natural endowment of the self? And what place does the body have in the life of the self? Ready acceptance is accorded findings in the fields of biology and physiology because such information is necessary for any adequate understanding of the self.

The question in Chapter IV is the freedom of the self. After recognizing the metaphysical nature of the problem, such questions are raised as: What does freedom of the self mean? What obligations are involved in freedom? What is the source of this obligation? And what privileges, if any, correspond to these obligations? Suggestions as to answers for these questions are given.

As a study of the problem of communication, Chapter V is something of an interlude, and is the least integral part of a dissertation on the human self. Yet it is integral as proving the incompleteness of the self apart from its fellows; frequent reference is made to this chapter. Hocking's treatment of social experience is one of his most significant contributions to idealistic philosophy. Sections four and six in this chapter are more nearly expositions of Hocking's

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8. Hocking, Art.(1916)^2, 502.

own view than is the situation in any other part of the study.

The question was raised above as to where the treatment of the meaning of the self should be placed, first or last. The suggestion as to the meaning which is given in Chapter II is developed throughout the text; it finds its completion in Chapter VI, which is a study of "The Cosmic Significance of the Self." What is the basis for the self's claim that it is cosmically significant? God is the being who insures the objectivity of man's ideals and his values, and who makes it possible for man to achieve immortality.

Hocking's thought is interpreted critically throughout; yet it has seemed advisable to give a summary statement of criticism. This appears in Chapter VII, which is an "Evaluation of Hocking's Concept of the Human Self."

CHAPTER II

THE MEANING OF THE SELF

1. Two ways of viewing the self.

The self may be viewed in two ways. To view the self internally, it is that continuous self-consciousness which accompanies the awareness of other things; it is mind and stands over against nature as the field of its objects. It is "the counterpart of the whole of the observed world. . . . ego and non-ego are on a par with each other. . . . the self is half of the world it perceives."[1] But to view the self externally is to reduce these proportions. The self is viewed as body, as a small part of nature, along with the other selves or bodies. This external view is scientific and objective, whereas the internal view is subjective.

The meanings of these views are as different as are the proportions involved. In the external view the self, as an object in nature, becomes a natural object and is studied in terms of cause and effect. But the criminal's plea that "nature did it" has no meaning in a court of law. The internal view means that the self is more than an object of nature; the basis for this subjective importance is negative:

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1. Hocking, SIBF, 7.

The self simply cannot be explained as an object of nature and nothing more. (SIBF, 14) The evidence as regards these views seems to be in favor of the self as body. "From every salient angle of his being evolution ties man with silken threads back into the embroidery of nature." (SIBF, 16) The same type of evidence comes from psychology, the science of the mind. Psychologists have gained most of their information about the human self through a study of the human body, or physiology. Descartes differentiated the natural sciences and the science of mind. Just after Descartes, theories in these two sciences, psychology and physiology, began to overlap. Lamettrie, who wrote L'homme machine, was influenced by Descartes's mechanical interpretation of animal life. If the animal is a machine, then man, who is also an animal, is a machine.[2] Whitehead says that "the effect of physiology was to put mind back into nature."[3] But it would hardly be possible for the psychologists, as natural scientists, to deal with the self as other than an object of nature.[4]

But in spite of this evidence it is not possible to abandon the internal view of the self. "To identify any

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2. Cf. Thilly, HP, 288, 387f. Cf. Lange, GM, Book I, Section 4, Chapter 2.

3. Whitehead, SMW, 206.

4. Hocking, TDL, 64.

state of mind with a state of matter in motion is the sort of proposition one can make only when he has renounced the meaning of words and stopped thinking." (SIBF, 22) The relation between nervous energy and mental energy cannot be stated in terms of the laws of physics. There is no intermediate term between a physical event and an idea. There still exists a chasm between the physical object and the mental image. Even though the self be explained it is still "that which" is explained, and is thus more than the explanation. "The mind with which natural science can deal is but a Near-mind."[5] "No physical explanation of the self can alter the fact that <u>the self is what it appears to itself</u> to be." (SIBF, 28)

It remains to clarify the position of the internal view, and to show why the self should be regarded as more than a thing of nature. In the first place, if the self is body then the self is spatial, and all its relations are spatial relations. But this is not so with the mind because the mind is space-free: there are several space worlds for the mind, neither of which interferes with any other. The same is true in regard to time. It is true, however, that the mind is less time-free than it is space-free. It cannot escape the actuality of a <u>now</u> in time; and all the activities of the

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5. Hocking, P6IC, 209.

mind take time. Be that as it may the time-spans for physical events and mental events are different time-spans. Although both series of events are in time and take time, the physical event is altogether in the present; all the facts pertaining to it are present facts.[6] The mind, on the other hand, retains the past through memory, and anticipates the future. "It has its whole history in its field of time vision." (SIBF, 32) These contrasts become clearer when the body is recognized as a set of facts and the mind is viewed as a set of meanings. It is true that meaning does exist in the body; it exists but merely as a stimulus-response connection, or at best as a stimulus-conditioned-response connection.

In defending the external view of the self much stress is laid upon the place of habit, which is apparently a physical connection in the brain. Yet the formation of habit is possible only with the consent of the self. Regardless of how strong the habit may be, the self must own it. While if the self desires some new and different end the physical connection in the brain may be broken. This connection is in the brain, and it remains only a connection until the self, as mind, is present to read meaning into it.

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6. Hocking, HNR, 128.

The self as body is meaningless until the self as mind brings meaning into it. (SIBF, 38f.) Since the self as body is meaningless it is lacking in value also. It is determined according to cause and effect; and is thus without moral quality. It is morally neutral until the self as mind appears. At this moment the self begins to enjoy value and also to make plans for achieving more value.

From this it may be said that the external view of the self though inhospitable to the internal view is nevertheless meaningless without it. Indeed the external view is established by assuming the internal view. In order to establish their position naturalists and psychologists take the internal view for granted; then they forget the initial assumption; and come later to deny it. If they are pressed hard, however, these traitors-to-consciousness will admit that they themselves are minds. If they are, why is not every self mind as well as body? Man is unwilling, somehow, to accept a naturalistic portrait of himself, i.e., as meaningless, lacking in value, and moral quality, as a true account. He insists that the self must mean what it is experienced as being. (SIBF, 46) Man refuses to accept the view that he is body only. He is also mind. Both must be considered if any true account of the self is to be given. The relationship between these two, body and mind, will be discussed in Chapter Three.

2. The twofold nature of the self.

This is a discussion of three ways in which the nature of the self may be said to be twofold.

(1) The self as within the world; the world as within the self. Physicalists view the self as within the world. Idealists view the world as within the self. (TDL, 51-85) The former begin and end with physical objects; they find no real place for the self or mind. (The self just makes its own place.) The idealists begin with sense data, and have difficulty in accounting for the real physical objects, the physical world.

The two statements, "The self is within the world", and "The world is within the self", appear to be contradictory. The actual differences involved in the positions seem to justify this appearance. As within the world the self is finite in space and time. Death becomes the concluding event, the time-boundary, of the self. On the other hand, as containing the world, the world becomes a finite aspect of experience: there may be other worlds for the self. In this case death as a world-event is not a time-boundary of the self, because it transcends time.

Neither the disinterested scientist nor the logician will decide which statement is true. So far as they are concerned either one is admissible. But if both are admissible the contradiction must be only apparent, and both views must

be true. The self is within the world, yet the world is also within the self. The self may be defined as the taker of the world in experience.

How can this be? The self comes out of the physical world, and draws its reality from it. The flickering self is continuously dependent upon the natural world. Thus the self is within the world and is only as real as its world is real. On the other hand the standard of truth and reality is found in thought and feeling. The reality of a thing depends upon its inner nature, "the way it feels to itself." (TDL, 59) A thing without feeling is an empty sort of being. Then the physical world, unless it is self-conscious, is not as real as the experience of pleasure or pain. In contrast to the subjective philosophy of Kant, the reality of a thing is not the thing apart from knowledge, but the thing conceived as fully known. "Things are as they reveal themselves in their fullness to the knowing mind."[7]

Pascal wrote that even if an unconscious universe were to destroy man, man would still be greater, more real, because the universe would not know what it was doing but man would know that he was dying.[8] From this standard one

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7. Pringle-Pattison, IGRP, 130.

8. Pascal, PEN, 49.

reckons that the world is only as real as the self is real, because the self bestows reality upon the physical world by being conscious of it. Pringle-Pattison is of this view. He thinks that the world was made real by the advent of consciousness. Man is integral to the world as the means whereby its self-consciousness, and thus its reality, is achieved. It is through intelligent man that the world beholds and enjoys itself.[9]

Accordingly, both statements are true. They are judged true by a dialectical standard. The dialectic leads from an empty physical object to a self-conscious subject, and thence to a consciousness of the object. The final truth, reality, must include both of these statements.

To select one of these statements as true is to be dogmatic; and to face the impossible task of overcoming the view represented by the other statement. Either one represents a thesis; the other an antithesis. Unless a synthesis is reached the views are forever irreconcilable. The dialectic leads naturally to a synthesis. The synthesis might read, "The self arises from, and depends upon, the natural world, yet the world depends upon the self for its self-consciousness." Dewey refuses to follow the dialectic all the way through. He has a dogmatic thesis. He simply stops short;

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9. Pringle-Pattison, IGRP, 110, 190.

he calls a halt to the process. This accounts for his naturalism and for his antipathy to the self or mind.

Dewey's error may be due to his unexamined assumptions. There are three of these. The first, that there is a natural world which exists independently of and prior to the organism[10], is the basis for his naturalism. This is his metaphysics as nearly as he has one. Nature is one interacting system. Anything not related in this is imaginary. He insists that "there is no breach of continuity between operations of inquiry and biological operations and physical operations."[11] Thus arises his view that the self, if there is such a thing, is within the world.

The second assumption, based on the first, is that life is; and that life is spontaneous and habitual until a problematic situation arises. Mind appears as a <u>function</u> to set things right when it is experienced that something is wrong.[12] For Dewey, this is added emphasis that the self is within the world. It does seem though that a self or mind which can initiate changes, and reorganize nature, should be accorded some status of reality. This seems all the more proper as

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10. Dewey, LOG, 23, 33.

11. Ibid., 19.

12. Dewey, RIP, 88; QC, 187; EAN, 245; LOG, 172.

Dewey admits that

> the constancy and pervasiveness of the operative presence of the self as a determining factor in all situations . . . is more intimate and omnipresent in experience than the air we breathe.[13]

The third unexamined assumption actually represents the synthesis suggested above, but not so for Dewey. He assumes that there are other persons with whom the self has experience, i.e., environment is cultural as well as physical.[14]

The synthesis, that the self, contained in the world, also contains the world, is grasped through an understanding of the principle of empirical duality. This principle develops out of self-consciousness: the self is represented in a twofold relationship to things and other selves. The apparent contradiction between the statements: the self is within the world, and the world is within the self, resolves itself into a complexity of human nature. The self becomes a twofold being, the observer and the observed. The self which contains the world contains the self because the world contains all selves and their relations with each other. The observing self becomes an observed fact within its own world. These two selves, within the same human self, shall be called the reflective self and the excursive self.

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13. Dewey, EAN, 246.

14. Dewey, LOG, 42. If environment is cultural, it is mental. Thus the self or mind includes the world.

(2) The excursive self and the reflective self. The excursive self is the self as within the world. As the word excursive implies, it "is a self of behavior, entangled in affairs . . . these affairs have the values of excursions." (TDL, 72) William James spoke of the stream of consciousness. Now if consciousness were only a stream there could not be excursions, there would be only one excursion with no attachment, and no accumulation of meaning. One is reminded of the difficulty which Hume had in accounting for the stability of consciousness or the identity of the self.[15]

The reflective self, on the other hand, is back of the excursive self as the promoter and judge of the excursive activity. It is akin to the intellect for Leibniz. In reply to Locke's theory, that the mind to begin with is as white paper void of all characters,[16] Leibniz said that "there is nothing in the mind save the intellect itself."[17]

An excursion is the realization of a decision; it has a certain unity which is more significant than a mere sensation

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15. For Hume the self is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." (Hume, THN, I, 534)

16. Locke, ECHU, Book II, Chapter 1.

17. Leibniz, NEHU, 111. "There is nothing in the soul which does not come from the senses. But you must except the soul and its affections. Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensa, excipe: Nisi ipse intellectus."

or feeling. Both of these may be, and usually are, involved in an excursion. "It constitutes a paragraph of personal history, with an integral time-epoch of its own, long or short." (TDL, 73)

The self represents a union of opposites. The self may be called a reflective-excursive system. (TDL, 74) In the following discussion this uniting of opposing qualities may become more explicit. By way of outline, it may be stated that the excursive self is an actual, finite, limited and discontinuous creature or creation; and that the reflective self is a potential, infinite, and continuous creator.

The excursive self is actual in that it represents an excursion, the realization of a decision. The reflective self is potential in that some other decision might have been made. In the same way the excursive self is finite because it represents the finitude of a realized decision. The reflective self, on the other hand, as facing a multitude of possibilities is unaware of limit, and is thus relatively infinite in potentiality. The excursive self is dated; excursions are made at particular times; thus the excursive self is limited and discontinuous. But the reflective self, although its excursions are temporal, includes the time-order as an unbounded whole within which the excursions take place. Again, unless the self were both inclusive and continuous as regards time there could be no experience of succession but

only a succession of experiences or excursions. It is the reflective self which gives meaning to, or reads the meaning of, time. Bowne writes concerning this creativity of mind that "the essential relation of antecedence and sequence is established by the mind itself, and only thus does it become a relation for mind."[18] Apart from the self time is pure time, past is pure past, future is pure future, and nothing more; the deposits in nature have temporal quality only for the reflective self. Because the excursive self is dated the reflective self also has a temporal character; it continues through time; it is eternal in the sense that eternal is the "essence of the time order." (TDL, 77) Yet it observes the temporal flow, and is thus distinguished from it, because the self which is able to observe its own lapses must somehow continue through them.[19]

These selves are creature and creator; but in order to avoid the implication of the soul as a substance, and the transcendental ego, it should be noted that the excursive self and the reflective self are inextricably united in life. The human self is a nest of potentialities, and a capacity for realizing them. The excursive self is empirical; it is the organization of the potentialities which are actually realized.

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18. Bowne, TTK, 68.

19. This raises the problem of personal identity, which is discussed elsewhere. Cf. section five below.

This represents what has been created or is the creation. Yet the true self is not just what has been achieved or created; it is all this and more. It involves also the reflective self which, as the promoter, guide and judge of this achievement (the excursive self) is its creator.

(3) The self and the subconscious. In discussing the relation of the subconscious to the self, it is necessary first to make mention of the language commonly used in discussing subconsciousness. It is tragically misleading. The language used gives rise to the idea of a false division, or one that does not exist. Also, a superhuman resource is suggested while the real source is one's own waking self. There is no subconsciousness which is out of consciousness; subconsciousness is a division within consciousness. For once Alexander and Hocking are in agreement. Alexander writes of this matter as follows: "Under consciousness I include . . . those vague and indistinct mental processes on the extreme margin of consciousness which are sometimes described as subconscious."[20] The real contrast is not between the conscious and the subconscious, but between the central or artificial self and the subconscious self. The subconscious is not a distinct gland of psychical life, which accumulates its own

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20. Alexander, STD, II, 4.

stores and occasionally overflows into the central self; rather, it

> is the deposit of our own logical sense, our own value-consciousness and moral judgment, our own metaphysical instinct, in short of our own whole-idea in its unceasing criticism upon the judgments of our partial, strenuous, and artificial self. It contains the opposite, or antithesis, which our artificial self at any moment needs to justify it and make it completely true; it contains, therefore, the next turn in the dialectic of experience. (MGHE, 538)

This serves to correct also the second misconception, i.e., that in the subconscious the self has a mysterious and superhuman resource. The subconscious does have infinite resources, but they belong to the self; even in normal waking capacity the self rightfully possesses these resources, and some day it will learn to command them.[21]

i. The subconscious is usually viewed as a sort of cellar which is a storehouse for rejected states of mind; repressed memories reside in it; and it is the source of unorthodox impulses, offshoots of an animal inheritance, which strive for expression. It is a cauldron of negations or repressions.

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21. Although he is not concerned with this matter of the subconscious, James writes in his essay on "Energies of Man", that "few men live at their maximum of energy . . . anyone may be in vital equilibrium at very different rates of energizing." The individual lives usually "far within his limits; he possesses powers of various sorts which he habitually fails to use. He energizes below his <u>maximum</u>, and he behaves below his <u>optimum</u>." (James, SPP, 42, 44, Italics his.)

But the subconscious contains also imprints of all past experiences, whether they are forgotten, or remembered and not referred to. These imprints may represent marginal learnings. This content is called the apperceptive mass. Although the self may not think of it, it is that with which the self does think. The self changes constantly because of new experiences; it is never the same after another experience, and each experience helps to determine, although the self may not be aware of it at any particular time, the attitude toward all future experiences.[22] The subconscious is intimately related to, if not identical with, the self.

ii. This relationship is seen more clearly perhaps in considering the negative content of the subconscious, the repressions. The term, repression, implies conscious activity. How do repressions come about? The self is its own censor. Suppose an undesirable idea arises; the self evaluates the idea, rejects it, and represses it. The repression, a conscious act, will remain repressed only as the self continues to repress it. There is no such thing as an unconscious impulse. The subconscious impulse must be lighted by conscious attention before the self can recognize the impulse as its own.

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22. This is a big order for the subconscious, but it would be true from either side of the subconscious, i.e., as a storehouse of conscious repressions, for these have to be repressed continuously, or as a body of marginal learnings accumulated unawares.

iii. Another area in which the self and the subconscious are intimately related is what may be called the "undefined possibilities" of the self. (TDL, 67) As integral to itself the self is conscious of undefined possibilities or indefinite powers. They can hardly be defined, because their limits are learned in experience. The self, as a conscious agent, involves a sense of power. The self is not normally conscious of definite limits; the only explicit consciousness is that this power belongs to oneself, in fact that this power makes the agency of the self real. The quality of this power is subconscious. It gives rise to the general sense of potentiality with which the self faces each new situation. It belongs to the apperceptive mass which was spoken of as the content of the subconscious.

It follows, therefore, that the contents of the subconscious are a part of the self. From this point of view it may be said that the self, as a felt organization of powers which evaluates, selects, or rejects among its objects and its impulses toward these objects, is subconscious to itself. The subconscious, "so far from being a sort of mental sub-basement, is at the center of selfhood." (TDL, 71)

3. The self as a will to power.

(1) The notion of will to power. The will to power is the undiscovered unity in the entire life of instinct. It is assumed to be an actual unity, not only because it is necessary for the concept of selfhood but also because it is recognizable in the life of the self.

Allport refuses to identify the cardinal trait with the personality, yet he admits that the unity of the self depends upon the presence of this ruling passion.[23] Hocking does identify the two. In doing so he has an advantage. He is freed from the task of relating this master sentiment, this supreme ideal, to the self, because it is the self. And all minor traits or interests are subordinated to, and get their significance from their relation to, this central interest or instinct. This accounts for the fact that instincts are relatively few in man. There is only one which represents the life program. This one, called here the will to power, includes the others; and through it the minor ones find vicarious expression and satisfaction. This will to power may be described as a craving for potency. Life may be viewed as a process in which man seeks to satisfy and to understand the meaning of this craving, or will to power, as it relates to daily living.

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23. Allport, PER, 338. Cf. the section on "The theory of instincts".

It was noted in the preceding section that selfhood involves unity. There must be an identical concern in fortune which successive experiences, however different in content, affect for better or for worse. This identical concern is the self.[24] To view this situation from the other side, it may be said that "wherever there is a self, there all experiences are referred to a common interest."[25] Thus it may be assumed that the many impulses or instincts have a common source. All of them arise from the striving of the will to power. The self is that which causes this striving, and directs it.

The self experiences want, but it does not know in advance just what will bring satisfaction. Experience reveals those ways in which satisfaction may be had.[26] First, the self learns through experience what goods are to be had. (HNR, 91) Until the self has experienced hunger it cannot desire good in the form of food; until it has experienced, or learned from the experience of others, that the stove is hot, the self cannot desire good in the form of avoiding contact with the hot stove.

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24. Cf. section five below.

25. Hocking, HNR, 90. Italics his.

26. An experience of nature, and the bodily organism, which makes this experience possible, are necessary for the realization of satisfaction. The term experience means either the whole of experience or particular experiences.

In the second place, it is in experience that the self learns to choose between concrete goods. This one is selected in preference to that. And this preference implies the existence of some standard, or of one motive. The individual's concept of his own good becomes increasingly distinct in the course of life. The self perceives good and evil; and it builds out of many partial goods a conception of good which is regarded as its own good; this is its ideal. (P6IC, 212) This ideal determines the self's policy which is applied in future experiencing.[27] The application of this policy represents the will of the self. Will comes into being whenever the self begins to control instinctive impulses according to its policy. The will to power represents the self's struggle to achieve potency and reality. There are several distinct stages in the dialectical development of this will to power. It remains to point out these stages, and to call attention to the need or impulse characteristic of each particular period.[28]

(2) Stages in the development of the will to power.

i. The will to power during the stage of infancy expresses itself in the building of primary biological habits. The outer world is assumed as an addressable servant.

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27. The ideal may change continuously.

28. Cf. Hocking, MAS, 312-322.

External reality is commanded, and used, in the development of organic capacity. Because of the submissive response the initial assumptions are affirmed and encouraged.

ii. The period of childhood represents an era of violence. Obstacles are met, but the will to power, unused to detours or negatives, or conflicts with other wills, fights. The impulse in this stage is that of self-assertion and pugnacity.

iii. The next stage of the dialectic may be called an era of ambition; it occurs in adolescence. Self-assertiveness has reached, in its trial and error process, a coöperative mode of expression, or at least a non-competitive one. But there is still competition in that each will assumes for itself the outstanding or commanding role.[29] The impulse or desire is to show oneself superior over his fellows; this can be done best by a subordination of other wills. The conceit of boys is paralleled by the vanity of girls.

iv. After adolescence the frustrated impulse to subordinate becomes a desire to nurture, to help. This desire has been dimly but increasingly present for a long while. As it increases, selfishness becomes colored with altruism. The former craving to achieve power <u>over</u> others dies and rises as a longing to have power <u>for</u> others.

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29. The "inferiority complex" is most prevalent, and most dangerous, in this period.

v. The last stage into which the human will emerges, but one that is never completed, is that of maturity. As the will reaches this level, it becomes self-conscious. This is the Begriff stage of the dialectic of the will to power. The will has come into a world of ideas, and it comes to recognize that "all forms of power are subject to the power of ideas." (MAS, 316) The will to power is transformed into a will to power through ideas. Competitive power is exclusive: the more power one has the less there is for others. Power through ideas, on the other hand, is universal, because the more one has, the more there is for everyone.

(3) Problems met and attitudes assumed by the will to power. The world of ideas has to be thought in order to be lived in. The newcomer rethinks the world, and as he does so, he has ideas of his own; individuals come to have their own attitudes. Defects are noted, which lead to proposals for alteration. It becomes the task of the will to power to rebuild the world, in order to incorporate its ideas into it.

In this process of rebuilding the world, even as in the development of the will to power, individuals suffer disillusionment, and often have to undergo complete transformation.[30] Not alone must the individual meet and settle conflicts with the ideas of others, which sometime oppose his ideal good

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30. This may well be considered as another statement of that development.

with actual evil, but he must reckon also with the chance and hard fact of the world. Another problem which must be considered, and which often proves to be the most difficult task of all, is the fact of one's own limitation. It is far more difficult for one to realize that he may be limited in ability than to see that he has erred in judgment or technique. Man is frequently unwilling, or unable, to learn this lesson; a cruel and heartless world has to force it upon him.

Individuals vary; they vary in their experiences, and in their attitudes toward life and the world. The various attitudes, though, may be classified.[31] There are those who, sincere in their position, become tasters of pleasure and glory in individual expression. Others go to a different extreme; because the world is too much with them they retreat into subjectivity. Theirs is a melancholy aloofness. It is not in our power, they reason, to remake the world. We must rule our own spirits, and take the world as it comes. Still others make a triangle of the extremes; they abandon worldly ambition in order to turn their hearts and minds heavenward. Power there will be guaranteed by sacrifice here. A fourth class is composed of those in whom the dialectic of the will reaches the stage of maturity. These are they who reject the conception of power because of its contamination with

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31. Illustrations will be cited in the following discussion of "Satisfaction for the will to power."

self-assertion in favor of the conception of service. This latter is associated with the will to power through ideas.

(4) Satisfaction for the will to power. Regardless of the stages in the dialectic or the attitudes toward life and the world, there is still the fact of the will to power. What is its aim? And how can satisfaction be achieved?

i. The will to power is a hunger for a feeling of present worth as a person among persons. Whiting Williams has a chapter in his book, Mainsprings of Men, on "The Mainspring: The Wish for Worth." He makes the statement that "the prime influence on all of us . . . is our wish to enjoy the feeling of our worth as persons among other persons."[32] The feeling of worth is the honest man's excuse for existence. Integral to every philosophy is the desire to make the world conscious of this particular system of thought, or to establish it in the self-consciousness of the world. The will to power may be refined; it is never surrendered. The satisfaction of the will depends upon the universalizing of its effect.

The tasters of pleasure come to admit qualitative differences, and to recommend the higher as better and more

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32. Williams, MOM, 147. Italics his. Cf. pp. 139-157.

lasting.[33] The subjectivist, whose attitude is akin to that of the Stoic, recommends his view as the way to happiness.[34] The builder-up of heaven tries to formulate his ideas so that they will be acceptable to his earthly fellows.[35] The mature person finds his satisfactions, and his sorrow, in trying to help his immature brothers achieve maturity.[36]

ii. Satisfaction for the will to power involves more than a feeling of present worth; there is also the hope that the exerted influence will be permanent. The satisfaction realized by the will to power as its effect is

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33. For example, Epicurus. In a letter to Menoeceus on the conduct of life, Epicurus begins by recognizing the necessity of seeking wisdom. It is never too early nor too late. The youth needs wisdom in order thathe may be mature; the old man in order that he may be youthful. When Epicurus says that pleasure should be the aim of life he does "not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality." By pleasure he means "the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul". (Laertius, LEP, II, 657) Diogenes Laertius writes that Epicurus recognized mental pleasure as above bodily pleasure, and pains of the mind as worse than pains of the body. (LEP, II, 661) Cf. also Mill, UTI, 11.

34. Epictetus, DIS, 3ff., 44ff., 84ff., et passim; Aurelius, THO, passim. The wise Stoic distinguishes between the things which are in his power and those which are not in his power. The former he must use as best he can; the latter he must use according to their nature. (Epictetus, DIS, 5) All things considered critically, the law of life is to "act conformably to nature." (DIS, 84)

35. The most ardent evangelists are the heaven-bound travelers.

36. Cf. the story of Edward Rowland Sill in Royce, SMP, 465-467.

universalized is temporary. Happiness comes only as this effect is lasting; it depends upon at least an immortality of influences. The hunger for a present feeling of worth is paralleled by the desire that this worth, if not the feeling, will last forever.

> In some degree of clarity, a concrete or historic immortality is the unabandonable goal of the will: it is what all men most deeply desire, so far as the will can be fulfilled in human existence.[37]

Thus the self as a will to power becomes the self as a hope.

(5) A note on various interpretations of the will to power. Hocking is not the only one to speak of the will to power as the ruling instinct of man. It is necessary to mention and to compare some of these theories with Hocking's interpretation. The main comparison will be with Nietzsche, whose use of the phrase, the will to power, is the most widely known.

McDougall is in agreement with Hocking as he suggests that the many instincts may be regarded as channels through which the vital energy, i.e., "some primordial undifferentiated capacity to strive",[38] is expressed in or through the organism.[39] The phrase, vital energy, suggests Bergson with

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37. Hocking, MAS, 320.

38. McDougall, OP, 113.

39. C. G. Jung thinks that the basis of this unity is a primitive libido. For Jung this term is so general that

his l'élan vital.[40] Life is a kind of mechanism, but it is a mechanism of the whole: there is an indivisible continuity.[41] Bergson's view is akin to finalism, as opposed to mechanism. The impetus or urge of each species is a universal vital impulsion. In each species this vital energy is used in the interest of adaptation. In his theory of adaptation Bergson is close to Hocking's view of mastery and achievement by the will to power. Adaptation does not mean merely elimination of the unadapted; it is a reply, a response, which effects changes in the organism due to the positive influence of outer conditions.[42] Evolution proceeds in many directions because of resistance in the environment but also because of the explosive or ongoing force which life bears within itself.[43] The impetus of life consists in a need of creation.[44] This is akin to the creative activity of the will to power, yet the élan vital is metaphysical and universal, not psychological. The will to power is also metaphysical, but it gives more prominence to the empirical self.

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39. (continued)
it might be replaced by "interest" (Jung, AP, 347, 348) For Freud this libido has specific reference to sex. Jung's view is more nearly satisfactory; Freud takes what is but an aspect, and mistakes it for the whole.

40. Bergson, EC, 54ff.

41. Ibid., 33.

42. Ibid., 62ff.

43. Ibid., 105ff.

44. Ibid., 273.

Schopenhauer referred to the instinct of man as "the will to live."[45] This phrase, while being both metaphysical and psychological, implies that the impulse is directed primarily inward, toward self-preservation. In so doing the phrase fails to account for the outward direction of the drive. The instinct is to achieve, and to master. Although in his exposition of the will to live Schopenhauer gives some place to this expansiveness, the phrase does not imply it. The will to power escapes this defect; and this is the phrase which Hocking uses to describe the unitary or unified basis of man's striving.

Nietzsche, however, used this particular phrase before Hocking did. Since the meanings attributed to it are not exactly the same, their expositions of the will to power will be compared in more detail. According to Nietzsche this expression is completely adequate as a description of the basic urge in human nature.

> The triumphant concept "energy", with which our physicists created God and the world, needs yet to be completed: it must be given an inner will which I characterize as the "Will to power" - that is to say, as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or the application and exercise of power as a creative instinct. . . . It is possible to trace all the instincts of an animal to the will

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45. Schopenhauer, WWV, sections 21, 23, 60. There is a certain relation between his view and the view of Buddha, for whom the basis of all suffering was desire, and desire arose from the single craving for individuality. Salvation, in each case, involves an escape from this innate striving.

> to power; as also all the functions of organic life to this one source.[46]

Hocking does not "regard the will to power as an adequate name for the central instinct". (HNR, 97) It is more suggestive, and more nearly adequate, than such expressions as will to live or will to reality. But there is no name that "will be found wholly satisfactory". (HNR, 476)

Nietzsche's regard for the adequacy of this phrase led to a more important defect in his theory. "He thought of power as intrinsically competitive, a good which can be gained by one only at the expense of another."[47] Hocking rejects the implication of competition in the concept of power. Power over nature is a common aim. But in social relations power over may be also a power for, for example, the teacher and a student, or the parent and a child. "The rightful position of one man toward others cannot be described

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46. Nietzsche, WP, II, section 619. Italics in text. Cf. Nietzsche, WM, II, 104.

47. Hocking, HNR, 17. Hocking does not point out the relation between these two defects. But to regard the name as adequate is to narrow the impulse which it describes. The power becomes exclusive, and so competitive. It is a terrible mistake, Nietzsche claims, "to regard the herd as an aim instead of the individual. The herd is only a means. . . . The individual is something quite new, and capable of creating new things. He is something absolute, and all his actions are quite his own. . . . The 'ego' oppresses and kills. . . It would fain give birth to its God and see all mankind at its feet. . . . Every living organism gropes around as far as its power permits, and overcomes all that is weaker than itself." (Nietzsche, WP, II, sections 766-769. Cf. Nietzsche, WM, II, 203-204.)

without this conception." (HNR, 97) Sociability is included along with curiosity among the necessary interests of man. (HNR, 85) Since the will to power describes only the "common and uniting element of instinct" (HNR, 476), the unity which it represents may include a number of drives or interests. According to Hocking, the will to power achieves its satisfaction, amid changing conditions, through the controlled expression of these several minor instincts. If the will to power is hindered by hunger, the food-getting instinct, with whatever it involves, is brought into play. A sense of mastery is present in that the will makes something its own, and in that it controls its own future. If hindered by ignorance the mechanisms involved in curiosity enable the will to achieve mastery through knowledge or understanding. Pugnacity arises in the fact of opposition or antagonism. Fear is a negative expression; it arises if and as the will is unable to bring about conditions making for mastery. When lonely the instinct of sociability effects a readiness for social intercourse. Sex-love is explained according to the will to power as "potency in search of a sanction". It belongs to the stage of physical and mental maturity. It represents a "quest for a missing element in one's own self-confidence", which involves a "readiness to assume responsibility for the welfare of another human being." (HNR, 96)

Nietzsche and Hocking are closer together than has

appeared so far. In his insistence that power should involve a sense of responsibility Hocking goes out of the natural world into the realm of ethics.[48] If the craving for mastery were paralleled by a longing to serve unselfishly there would be less strife and more coöperation in the world. Nietzsche's view that the will to power is basically selfish and competitive may be more profound than Hocking's.

The condemnation of Nietzsche arises out of a misunderstanding of his philosophy, even as his own condemnation of Christianity arose from a misunderstanding of Jesus Christ. Nietzsche is usually misinterpreted.[49] His philosophy is a mass of paradoxes, for example, the half-title of Also sprach Zarathustra may be translated as: A Book for Everybody and

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48. What Nietzsche's theory lacks in sociability is more than made up in his ethical demands. This will be pointed out in what follows.

49. Even as capable a thinker as George T. W. Patrick writes of him as follows:

> In Nietzsche, the "Yes-sayer", it [the philosophy of energy and affirmation] appears in its extreme form. Let us say "Yes" to our desires, to our instincts, to our natural passions, to our inner needs. Let us say "Yes" to our longings for empire, to our Kultur. Let us say "Yes" to our political, economic, and commercial ambitions. Let us say "Yes" to our individual traits, to our budding genius, to our personality, to our need of self-expression. (IP, 181)

Patrick goes on to say that the Great War was the fruit of this philosophy of expansion and affirmation. Doubtless the present conflict could be blamed on it with equal right. But is such the case? It may be that the accepted interpretation of Nietzsche has helped to engender strife and war. But could not the interpretation be wrong?

Nobody. There is grave danger in paradoxes. They lend themselves to multiple interpretations. Leighton defends Nietzsche as follows:

> He did not glorify brute strength in itself, nor did he intend to glorify war in itself. Nietzsche's chief significance consists in the vigor and persistence of his assaults on the leveling, vulgarizing tendencies of modern society.[50]

Nietzsche's doctrine of the Superman, Uebermensch, is his own highest and most noble thought. Yet this represents the basis for his ostracism. As Brightman interprets it, the Uebermensch "is an idealized picture of a being who wills most powerfully the highest possibilities."[51] Nietzsche sought to create the idea of something better. He is an ethical perfectionist. The combat is not military, nor physical; it is spiritual.[52] The Superman scorns consequences, i.e., he is not defeated regardless of what happens. Traditional neighbor-love is selfish: the love of the nearest should be abandoned in behalf of a love of the furthest, Fernstenliebe.[53] The future and the furthest should be the motive of every today. Man is his own worst enemy; he must

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50. Leighton, ISO, 196.

51. Brightman, ML, 166.

52. "What Nietzsche would have the permanent standard is spiritual power, power of will and mind, intellectual and aesthetic power." (Leighton, ISO, 201)

53. Nietzsche, ASZ, 88-90.

<u>become</u> willing to suffer and to die in order to rise: he cannot become new until he has first put off the old man.[54] As for Hegel, and for Jesus, man must die and rise again. And of those who would marry and bring children into the world, Nietzsche would demand: Are you entitled to desire a child?[55] The idea of the Superman implies the love of the furthest; and demands that propagation shall be not only onward but also upward.

The relationship between Hocking and Nietzsche, in their expositions of the will to power, is not so distant as it first seemed to be. Indeed their interpretations are intimately akin, perhaps more so than either of them would admit.

4. <u>The self as a hope</u>.

The self may be a system of behavior. But the essence of the self is hope. It is a purposing system of behavior which develops as a persistent hope is realized. Hope is the mother of this purposive activity. Every experience adds color to this hope which is the one object of all activities. Particular experiences are meaningful in terms of their relation to this central and dynamic source.

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54. Nietzsche, ASZ, 91-94.

55. Ibid., 102-104. Cf. above, and Hocking, HNR, 96.

What is this hope which is the essence of the self? It is an actual hold on a possible good. Royce attempts to define the self as "a Meaning embodied in a conscious life".[56] Hocking agrees with Royce, but he insists that "the primitive background of self is rather of the nature of hope." (P6IC, 212)

> Existence, to a self, means a perception of good and evil as possibilities; and a building, out of many partial goods, of a conception of good which, as related specifically to my capacity for enjoyment, is <u>my good</u>.[57]

The self is sustained in life by the good which it actually enjoys, but also by the conviction that some higher good is possible, and will be realized.

Both the possible good and the self's relation to it are non-empirical. Neither of them is subject to any empirical measure or laboratory test. "The object of this hope simply cannot be discovered in the present world of facts." (SIBF, 46) It represents a possible good, and the possible does not mean the actual. The essential activity of the self is to realize this possible good.

This possible good may be defined a little more clearly. Possible should be distinguished from the necessary, i.e., the determined, and also from the purely unreal. If the possible is, the possible must be something, and must

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56. Royce, WI, II, 269.

57. Hocking, P6IC, 212. Italics his.

have some relation to actuality. The possible is an essence which has been conceived as desirable by some mind. This is the means whereby an essence becomes a possible, and a possible tends to become actualized. As a promise of value the self seeks to realize the possible good. "Mind is the only organ for making future possibility actual." (P6IC, 211) And on the other hand it is characteristic of mind to conceive of possibilities and to actualize them.

The self's relation to this possible good is also non-empirical. The actual hold upon it is variable. The intensity of this hold, which may be called the tension of hope, represents the depth of the self; and thus represents its freedom.[58] This tension gives rise to initiative and resourcefulness. The activity inspired by this tension of hope "eludes scientific measure, because it lies not within the world of nature, but plies between nature and the world of actual possibility." (P6IC, 213)

Although this activity cannot be measured in science it does make the world different. In its activity the mind adds first to the possible, then to the actual. And as the possible is actualized there is a contribution to the realm of being.

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58. Cf. the sections, "Freedom a matter of degree" and "The meaning of life."

5. The basis for self-identity.

The human self is a union of opposites. It combines change and identity. "The self spans past and future." (TP, 442) The immediate task is to point out the basis for the identity of the self within its dialectical development. The self suffers lapses of consciousness; it flickers; it is transitory. Whitehead refuses to admit the self as real for this reason. Personal identity can be recognized in only one way, according to John Laird; that is, by "a judgment of comparison."[59] But then the task is to find the basis for the comparison.

The self is usually identified by the environment, by the surrounding physical objects. Yet the identity cannot be proven in that way, because it is the persistent self which recognizes the physical objects as the same from day to day.[60] The self remembers the objects. Then is not self-identity based on memory? Memory is helpful, but "the continuity of memory does not itself constitute the identity of selfhood, but the pertinence of the contents of memory to its continued questions." (TDL, 200)

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59. Laird, PS, 245.

60. Yet self-identity and world-identity go hand in hand. Unless there were a permanent frame of change in the world the self would be unable to find itself at home in the world. (Cf. Hocking, MGHE, 186-187.)

Personal identity is constituted by the identity of questions over the lapses of consciousness. "For psychology as well as for metaphysics the will must be identified with a persistent principle of preference."[61] The identity must be presupposed in order that the questions may be recognized. According to Hocking the most persistent aspect of the self is a feeling of value-strain. The world is recognized as not being what it ought to be. The feeling of strain is between what is recognized as actual and the ideal which is desired. As a hope, the self is this persistent value strain. The self's experience of time is the experience of this value-strain. Its failures and successes are recognized and owned. This feeling of strain is itself the comparison of which Laird speaks. And the continuity of the self depends upon the identity of its feeling of restlessness.[62]

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61. Hocking, Art.(1916)^2, 502.

62. (Cf. Hocking, Phil 9, 12/14/39.) In identifying the self and the feeling of value-strain, Hocking seems only to have translated the problem into another language. There are lapses in the "feeling"; then how is the feeling of strain recognized as identical with the feeling of yesterday? It seems that memory is the basis for personal identity. Because it is through memory that the self relates what was to what is, as well as what is to what was and what will be. In so doing the self combines past and future, and attains its identity.

6. The category of selfhood.[63]

Selfhood is the basic category in the thought of Hocking. Selfhood represents perhaps the most fundamental problem in metaphysics.[64] In his emphasis upon the reality and importance of the self Hocking is at variance with the outstanding metaphysician, and idealist, F. H. Bradley. After finding that his ideas "as to the nature of things . . . were in their essence indefensible",[65] Bradley says that he turned to the self, hoping to find in it a principle with which the world might be comprehended.[66] He admits readily that the self exists. It is recognized as an

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63. Hocking does not make specific use of the phrase, "the category of selfhood"; he speaks of the "concept" of self or selfhood (Art.(1928)[1], 146), yet the term "concept" is so freighted with meaning that "category" is a better word.

A category may be defined as that without which a given universe of discourse is impossible. But without selfhood no given universe of discourse is possible. To try to get behind or beyond the self (or mind) is futile. The self as mind is the most concrete entity which can be discovered; the discoverer is more concrete than his discovery. (P6IC, 215) The self might well say, "When me they fly, I am the wings." (TP, 264; Cf. 427, 441.) Thus the term "category" is not only justified, but is required in order to interpret the true meaning of Hocking's thought.

64. Cf. Laird, PS, 3. "If and so far as metaphysical problems are really felt and correctly attacked, the problems of the self deserve to take precedence of all others."

65. Bradley, AR, 101.

66. Ibid., 75.

empirical fact. But the vital point for metaphysics is to find out what the self is. Through his investigation of the self Bradley comes to the conclusion that the concept of selfhood is "too full of contradictions to be the genuine fact."[67] "Self . . . turned out to mean so many things, to mean them so ambiguously, and to be so wavering in its applications",[68] that it must be regarded as appearance rather than as reality. This is just the reverse of Hocking's view. He believes that the sharp contrast between the living and the non-living, the animate and the inanimate, is best described by the term self. Selfhood is the outstanding characteristic of animate things.[69] Empirical selfhood is the only certainty that can be had. There is nothing in all the world which is more profound or higher than selfhood. (TP, 441) "Mind is the most concrete entity we can ever discover, for the discovery of an entity supposedly more concrete would reveal the

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67. Bradley, AR, 75. He considers seven possible meanings of the self: as total contents of experience at one moment; as average contents of experience; as elements making for personal identity; as monad; as what interests; as opposed to not-self; as mere self. (AR, 77-101) In the end he is tempted to imitate the Preacher and cry: "Appearance of appearances; all is appearance."

68. Bradley, AR, 101.

69. Hocking, TP, 52.

discoverer as one stage more concrete still." (P6IC, 215)

Bradley admits that

> The self is . . . the highest form of experience which we have, but, for all that, is not a true form. It does not give us the facts as they are in reality; and, as it gives them, they are appearances, appearances and error.[70]

Bradley's criterion of reality is coherence.[71] The self is simply unable to harmonize and understand chaotic experience.[72] Some principle higher than the self is needed in order to achieve the end of metaphysics, which is "to understand the universe, to find a way of thinking about facts in general which is free from contradiction."[73]

There is support for Hocking, in contrast to Bradley, in the thought of Borden Parker Bowne. Bowne insists that reason can find no equilibrium "until it elevates itself above the mechanical categories and rises to the conception of self-determining and intelligent personality as the supreme category in being and causation."[74] According to Bowne the category of selfhood is that for which Bradley seeks in this principle higher than the self.

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70. Bradley, AR, 119.

71. Ibid., 136, 147.

72. Ibid., 115.

73. Ibid., 120.

74. Bowne, TTK, 106.

> An ultimate ground of things . . . can be found only in free intelligence. This is the only simplicity which can originate complexity; the only unity which can produce plurality; the only universal which can specify itself into particulars; the only real explanation of anything.[75]

In Bradley's view, it takes the Absolute to hold "all possible content in an individual experience where no contradiction can exist."[76] Now the Absolute is not a self.[77] The Absolute is the Whole of sentient experience conceived as a non-relational unity.[78] It is not personal in the ordinary meaning of the term. "It is personal but more. It is . . . super-personal."[79]

But to go into the realm of the Absolute and the Super-personal is to go beyond the category of selfhood as applied to the human being. The Absolute was brought into the discussion because the dialectic of Bradley's thought demands it; and also, in order to show the more significant kinship between the cosmic Self and the human self, in the thought

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75. Bowne, TTK, 233.

76. Bradley, AR, 147.

77. Ibid., 529.

78. Ibid., 530.

79. Ibid., 531. Cf. 531-533. Super-personal means having aspects of experience which man cannot have but which are suggested by the limitations of finite experience as being necessary to a living Whole. For Hocking God is personality, perfectly conceived. (MGHE, 336)

of Hocking.[80] Meanings apart from understanding and appreciation are abstractions. That there is some kind of mental life at the core of reality is implied by the existence of objective meaning in the world. From this, it may be said that the world is a self. It is not a graspable being; it is infinite in depth and mystery. To say that the world is a self means "that the mental life within the world has its unity, and that all the meanings of things cohere in a single will." (TP, 441) The human self is an imperfect image of the cosmic self. The category of selfhood is necessary for an understanding of either. This category is the most meaningful of all concepts. Selfhood is the perfect example of a class of concepts which applies to a part of the world and also to the whole of it.[81]

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80. The cosmic Self for Hocking is the equivalent of Bradley's Absolute. The two thinkers do not mean the same by the term "Absolute". Bradley means by it something which is more than, and includes God. "God is but an aspect, and that must mean but an appearance, of the Absolute." (AR, 448) Hocking writes as follows: "I do not say that the Absolute is equivalent to God; I say that God, whatever else he may be, must needs also be the Absolute." (MGHE, 206) Hocking is speaking of an Absolute Being. Bradley's use of the term, as "all there is", is more accurate.

81. Hocking, Art.(1928)[1], 146. In answer to the question, "May not all the selfhood in the world be a manifestation of something more profound or higher?", Hocking writes: "No. For there is nothing higher than selfhood, and nothing more profound. Spinoza's substance, with an infinitude of other attributes, unless it were conscious and self-conscious, would be lower in being than the simplest of mankind." (TP, 441)

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF AND THE BODY

1. The natural endowment of the self.

What is meant by "natural endowment"? This phrase has reference to the original properties of human nature; it has to do with what may be called the "potentialities of heredity". Potentiality is a good word in this connection because these qualities or properties become evident only in the course of the self's development: not all of them are observable in the infant. Then why can it not be said that heredity is of little importance, and that the active environment is all but omnipotent in determining what the organism shall become? Such a statement is not true. The fact remains that "human babies are born with dispositions which fit them to become men rather than pigs or ostriches, and a psychology which cannot duly estimate that fact is truncated at the start."[1]

In order to discern the natural endowment of the self it is necessary to study the mature person, and to deduce what he was originally from what he now is; and also, to study the development of the individual from infancy to maturity. This is the procedure which is followed. The immediate concern is

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1. Hocking, HNR, 47.

simply to point out the initial properties, and to make a preliminary statement about them. Each of them will be discussed in a separate section. In fact they are the basis for the whole dissertation.

There are three elementary aspects of the self.[2] First, and perhaps most tangible,[3] there is the body as a storehouse of energy, of impulses to act, a mass of instincts. To be alive is to act. The impulses determining or motivating the activity are variously described. John B. Watson, a behaviorist, denies the existence of instincts, yet he goes on to proclaim the same thing under a different name; he calls them "unlearned responses".[4] John Dewey sponsors the notion of generalized habits, in which "habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections or aversions."[5] Perhaps Hocking's theory of instincts can be described best by likening it to Allport's theory of biophysical traits.[6]

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2. These are reckoned as basic because they play such fundamental roles in the life of the normal person.

3. The body is the only tangible feature. The rest of this chapter is concerned with the relation between the self and the body.

4. Watson, BEH, 90ff.

5. Dewey, HNC, 42.

6. Cf. Allport, PER, Ch. XI, and also the following section in which the two theories are contrasted.

The second basic characteristic of the self is conscious will. This element is not so obvious as the first, yet it is nevertheless present. Allport is convinced that behind the confusion of terms and failures of empirical observation "there are . . . bona fide mental structures in each personality that account for the consistency of its behavior."[7] Allport points out further that there is usually a master quality or cardinal trait by which the individual is known.[8] This cardinal trait, for Hocking, is the conscious will. It represents the necessary interest of the self by which unity of life is possible. "This central and original impulse is simply that vital push by which the human being strives forward into the business of living." (HNR, 48) This cardinal trait as the conscious will is, or becomes, the self as a will to power.[9]

The third, and most debatable, of these initial properties is conscience or moral sensitivity.[10] Conscience is a

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7. Allport, PER, 289.

8. Ibid., 337-338.

9. Cf. the section on "The self as a will to power". Hocking identifies the conscious will as a will to power and the self, but Allport denies that the cardinal trait is ever identical with the personality. Cf. Hocking, HNR, Chapters X, XI; Allport, PER, 338.

10. Cf. the section on "The source of obligation, and conscience". Cf. Hocking, HNR, Pt. III, especially Chapters XII-XV.

principle of judgment, and also a principle of self-judgment. Hocking writes that the traits of the individual human mind give some such picture as follows:

> Every man, in acting, is aware not only of the specific act, but also (more or less dimly) of the principle on which he acts, - this awareness is what makes him a 'rational' being. He is aware, further, of the moral quality of this principle: i.e., he feels the difference between the kind of act that is worth following up and recommending, and the kind that is not worth recommending.[11]

The particular evidence for holding that conscience is native to the self arises from the impossibility of importing a sense of ought, or obligation, apart from an innate capacity for the ought. "Pressure from outside is alien to the nature of conscience: if I adopt a suggestion from outside and confirm it, as an obligation of mine, it is by an original discovery and a free act." (HNR, 109) Yet it must be admitted that conscience is capable of varying development; the development depends upon the active environment and the conscious will of the self involved.[12] But this does not refute the claim that conscience is a natural endowment of the human self.

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11. Hocking, MAS, 155.

12. Cf. the section on "The remaking of the self." Cf. also Hocking, HNR, 421f.

2. The theory of instincts.

(1) The notion of instinct. Instinct has served as a name for all the elements of heredity, particularly the unexplainable ones. An instinct is a non-isolable, hypothetical ingredient of human nature. The concept has had a long, hard road, with varying degrees of acceptability. It has served to distinguish animal and human powers, and at the same time to suggest traits common to man and the other animals. It has been indispensable as a haven of refuge for man's ignorance in his endeavor to understand himself. Instinct remains, however, as the most concrete and ultimate unit of description in the analysis of original human nature. (HNR, 49-51)

Hocking accepts the naturalistic view of man, and follows it as far as it will go. There is much to be gained from a biological understanding of human nature. In this way the naturalistic view proves its worth, but also shows its limitations. According to the biologists, instincts are inherited with the body as a set of dispositions to reflexive activity. These reflexive acts follow something of a serial order toward a significant conclusion. One is the stimulus for the other, and so on in turn. The end or conclusion is the survival of the organism or of the species.

Instincts as dispositions to typical reflex actions often become habitual modes of response to stimuli. In becoming

habits instincts are shaped by the experience of the organism. Each of the major instincts involves the whole organism, so that the organism must give its consent as it turns from one activity to another. This suggests that the nervous circuit involved in instinctive activity is not entirely mechanical but is subject to the conscious supervision of the organism. Such is indeed the case. "An instinct is an element of consciousness as well as of sub-consciousness." (HNR, 55) Instinct may be defined as "any specific form of the will-to-power which reaches its end by the use of innate motor mechanisms, common to the species." (HNR, 476-477)[13] This is especially true in the human organism. The nervous circuit represents the physical link between the stimulus and the response to it; but desire or aversion represents the conscious link between the stimulus and the response, and tends to determine the latter. Consciously the stimulus represents some intrinsic value because of what it involves or means. As a fact of consciousness instinct involves an idea-content as well as a tendency-to-action; instinct intensifies (or lessens) the intensity of stimuli as it "endows them with a meaning to be worked out in a course of conduct." (HNR, 60)

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13. Cf. Chapter II, section 3, "The self as a will to power."

(2) The range of instinct in man. Accepting as the definition of instinct: any innate, untaught or unreasoned skill, what is the range of instinct in man? Hobbes taught that the natural state of man is bellum omnium contra omnes,[14] while Grotius thought of man as "dominantly amicable." (HNR, 65) In contrast to these views, Hocking favors the position of Montesquieu for whom man is a generalized creature.[15] The human infant seems to be relatively free of any such specific skills. He is dependent for a longer time than are other animals upon his parents. Bergson is of the opinion that man has either gone beyond or else has rejected instinct in favor of intellect. This reference to intellect might be called the central instinct of man, at least for Bergson: instinct being the faculty of using or constructing organized instruments, whereas intelligence is the faculty of making and using unorganized instruments.[16]

Instinct in man is inconspicuous because of the supplementary functions and artificial interests which tend to balance it. This seeming paucity of instincts in man is

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14. Hobbes, Works, II, 2-6, 11; III, 110-113.

15. Montesquieu, OCM, III, 89-100.

16. Bergson, EC, 148ff. The tendency of intellect is to analyze and then synthesize, to dissect and then to reconstruct, into a practical system. (Cf. EC, 162, 167f.) Hocking does not accept Bergson's position as regards the central instinct of man. (Cf. HNR, 63, 68, 80.)

intensified because of the variety of response of which he is capable, and because of the coalescence of instincts through vicarious expression and satisfaction. Yet instincts are present in man in no small proportion; "he is the field of their conflict and adjustment." (HNR, 66) Regardless of the shape of stimuli or responses instinct is "a something which demands a hearing and finds it."[17] Instinct does not require a stimulus because it is itself the stimulus. The existence of instinct cannot be denied simply because it cannot be understood, or because it varies in expression.

Hocking despairs of making any satisfactory list of instincts; the impulses in man are so mixed and fused that listing is arbitrary.[18] He is convinced, however, that there are units of behavior in the human organism, which are used in various combinations; they do not appear as so many specific instincts, but rather as general ones. As one general instinct is expressed several apparently specific instincts may gain satisfaction. E.g., food-getting involves biting, chewing and swallowing. Essentially there are two highly generalized groups of instincts: the positive instincts are expressed in terms of assertive activity and expansion; the negative, in retraction and aversion. (HNR, 72)

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17. Hocking, MAS, 214. Italics his.

18. Hocking, MGHE, 25.

Rather than speak of them as instincts, Hocking prefers the qualifying term "central" instincts, or better, a different phrase, constitutionally "necessary interests". (HNR, 83) If one is to get beyond the trivial, i.e., reflexive activity, the term instinct becomes strained. These central instincts or necessary interests, which include curiosity and sociability, represent the most significant tendencies in human nature. Yet at the same time they are the most elusive to observation and experiment. Effort to assimilate them has led to confusion and to the downfall of the theory of instincts. (HNR, 86)

i. The dilemma in the conception of instincts. There is an inescapable dilemma in the conception of instinct as it is applied to human psychology. The meaning of the term is unavoidably hybrid, involving both physical behavior and conscious interests. But this duality which obtains in practice must be rejected if a technical definition is to be given. It involves a choice between the two aspects. (HNR, 441)

The primitive realm of instinctive activity was animal behavior. Thus the psychologist rejects the conscious aspect, and thinks of instinct as an innate behavior pattern, which makes for adaptiveness and provides unlearned skills. This gains added weight from the fact that to define instinct from the side of experience is awkward. Instinctive activity

is embarrassing to the conscious self; instinct comes to mean natural aptitude, while so-called instinctive activities are rationalized as interests, such that fear becomes a rational response to objective conditions.

Instinctive activities are not merely uncanny tricks. The whole normal round of animal life, breeding, food-getting, nest-building, and migrating, is governed or determined by instincts. These same categories of interest are found in human life, as love, hunger, and self-defense. These represent the basic interests of man; and all his activity may be explained in terms of them. These interests, however, are ultimate facts which cannot be explained in terms of instinctive modes of motion, or in terms of behavior mechanisms. (HNR, 446) To define an interest in terms of a mode of action is to leave a chasm between the behavior mechanism and those acts which are determined by the interests involved.[19] The mechanical operations, which the psychologist attributes to instinct, may explain the activity but they leave untouched or unexplained the basis or reason for the activity.

The physiological explanation of instinct decreases the usefulness of the explanation. Unless instinct is to be restricted to the trivial in human life there is a mental ingredient which must be recognized. There are behavior

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19. Hocking, SIBF, 22.

patterns or physiological dispositions which attend or correspond to particular nervous processes. But this does not explain the process itself or the cause for it. To explain a thing as instinctive seems only to postpone the problem because instinct itself is an enigma.

ii. The solution of the dilemma. The case for the physiologist becomes more difficult still as he tries to account for the "instinctive regulation of instinct."[20] Instincts are adjustable; but to call the adjustments instinctive also merely postpones the problem. A better course, and perhaps a solution to the dilemma, is to try to interpret the instinct-aim.[21] The instinct-aim, if anything is, is the constant nucleus of instinct. The physiologists have been looking for something which isn't there, or at least, which cannot be found through physiological investigation. Any adjustment of instincts is effected by higher or more fundamental instincts.[21] The secondary instincts, which regulate

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20. Hocking, HNR, 461. Italics his. He suggests elsewhere that the instinct of man is "an instinct to reflect upon instinct and supersede it." (MAS, 147. Italics his.) This is paralleled by Bradley, who, after defining metaphysics as "the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct", goes on to add that "to find these reasons is no less an instinct." (Bradley, AR, xiv.) It is akin to Bergson's view noted above, i.e., that the central instinct of man is to refer to intellect.

21. Cf. note above.

the others, have as their stimuli "finely differentiated conditions of the central nervous current."[22] Reactions to such complex situations making for adjustment and regulation cannot be explained apart from central or internal stimuli. These secondary or regulative instincts may be called general instincts, in that they are more general than the primary ones. The general instincts tend to unify the particular ones, and to use the specific mechanisms as means to an end.[23]

This integration, or this organizing, does not stop at ordering the particulars in terms of the general; it continues, tending to unify the entire life of instinct. It is true that whenever the organism acts, whether instinctively or not, it acts as a whole. In the course of development the number of stimuli increase to such an extent that response to all of them is impossible. The stimuli become candidates for response. The organism must then select and give its consent to the stimuli to which it shall respond. As this situation arrives all instinctive activity becomes subject to a still more general instinct which represents "the persistent but unspecified craving, or ambition, or wish of the entire creature." (HNR, 470)

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22. Hocking, HNR, 466. Italics his.

23. For example, the general instinct of food-getting involves biting, chewing and swallowing.

The object of this unspecified craving which tends to unify the entire life of instinct becomes more definite as maturity is reached. The physiologist is unable to discern the nature of this object according to any laboratory technique. He must depend for his chief data on introspection.[24] This dominant instinct or persistent craving represents a value-trend which can be understood better through experience of it (and reflection on the experience) than through any classification of physiological dispositions attending it.

The experiencing of value can never be explained by instinctive activity; but instinctive activity can be understood best in terms of value. The human self is not possible apart from a unity of instinct because such unity is a condition of selfhood. A person must be willing to own, and be able to justify his deeds. If conduct is to be referred to value there must be a single standard of value which is above the competing impulses. This standard in human life does not, and should not, become static. There should be growth toward a single value. There is always a plurality of impulses, and so of values, but there is an assumed discoverable unity of

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24. Gordon W. Allport refuses to join the discrediting chorus of the behaviorists, logical positivists, and psychoanalysts concerning the evidence of immediate experience. They propose "the Unconscious or the physico-chemical Bodily Constitution . . . as the true matrix of personality, the only region worth exploring." In spite of their contention Allport insists that "the core of the objective method is still the reliance each scientist places upon the testimony of his own fugitive and overlapping conscious states." (PER, 159. Italics his.)

values. This is in fact one version of the problem of the many and the One. The stumbling block preventing a concise list of instincts or impulses is not their mechanistic nature, but is "the fact that they are not distinct and separable entities. They are in reality various aspects of one fundamental instinct or necessary interest."[25]

The recognition that instinct are aspects of one necessary interest is the first step in the interpretation of the instinct-aim. To seek to interpret this aim is to go beyond the realm of physiology, but this must be done if the dilemma is to be resolved. To interpret the instinct-aim is extremely important for man because he, most of all, lives under artificial conditions. If it be interpreted, and the several instincts become organized around this aim, it is not necessary that each instinct be expressed in and for itself. All of them are aspects of the individual's unitary purpose; the unused instincts achieve at least a vicarious expression or satisfaction; to achieve the one purpose brings satisfaction to all the instincts as parts of the organic whole.

Interpreting the instinct-aim is a process of learning what one wants. And because "one's values tend to become 'reasonable'," (MAS, 216), it is also a process of learning why one wants what he wants. The dialectic never ends

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25. Hocking, HNR, 87. Italics his.

because there are always new whats, and thus new whys. In the process, however, instincts come to be looked upon as a part of the self, not merely as a part of its inheritance. And behavior, instead of being effected by ancient causes, becomes a process of achieving rational purposes.

The process of interpreting the instinct-aim begins in experience. Instinct initiates behavior, but then by use of memory the behavior is reviewed; and the next experience is thereby determined to be different.[26] In the dialectic of experience the instinct-aim comes to be recognized as the self. Henceforth, the self acts, and directs the acting. In time there is no instinct which remains outside the self's conscious aim or purpose, for nothing endures without the sanction of the self. Only that is secure in instinct which is secure also in conscious will. Instinct is a non-rational aspect of human nature. It is not an irrational part because it is potentially rational. Hocking appeals to Hegel to defend the view that instinct is an early stage of reason. Reason, or Vernunft, is explicit not at the beginning but at the end of history. Thus Hocking states that, for Hegel,

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26. The reality of time is a guarantee that no two experiences can ever be the same, but the memory of the first act colors the second.

"Vernunft is instinct becoming self-conscious".[27]

(3) Hocking and Allport: instincts and traits. Gordon W. Allport develops essentially this position in his recent psychological interpretation of personality; his theory of traits represents what Hocking has in mind in his view of instincts. There is only a slight difference in terminology.[28] Allport calls his a biophysical in contrast to a biosocial theory of traits.[29] It is held in the view that traits are more than mere names, yet every trait-name would not necessarily imply a trait. However, back of the multiplicity of names "there are none the less bona fide mental structures in each personality that account for the consistency of its behavior".[30] Psychologists are unable to study human nature without assuming these traits or tendencies. They cannot discover instincts or traits in the laboratory or by

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27. Hocking, MAS, 218. Italics his. Mere instinct represents the sein stage of the dialectic. The term, becoming, is appropriate because the dialectic only moves toward truth; it never does reach truth completely. Each new synthesis brings a broader grasp of the truth, and although the truth which is discovered is eternal, the truth is never known completely.

28. Hocking is more philosophical, and recognizes the metaphysical implications of his views, whereas Allport desires to dispose of the metaphysical question. (PER, 287) The differences in their very similar interpretations will become evident in the course of the discussion.

29. The term biophysical does not connote sufficiently the important role of consciousness.

30. Allport, PER, 289. Italics his.

deductive reasoning. They are derived by inference from observed consistency of behavior.

"The doctrine of traits emphasizes concrete individuality."[31] This is the reverse of the theory of instincts in which stress is laid upon the common element or that which is universal. That was pointed out above, however, as Hocking's objection to the term instinct. The term becomes strained if one goes beyond the merely trivial in human nature.[32] Hocking prefers the term interest, or value-strain, rather than instinct. It is more characteristic of the human self.[33] Likewise Allport writes that traits have "less to do with fleeting mental sets than with lasting mental structures such as interests, tastes, complexes, sentiments, ideals, and the like."[34] A trait is defined as

> a generalized and focalized neuropsychic system (peculiar to the individual), with the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide consistent (equivalent) forms of adaptive and expressive behavior.[35]

Allport goes on to say, however, that this is not a novel

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31. Allport, PER, 340.

32. Cf. HNR, 83, 477.

33. It was noted that Hocking accepts the biological or natural theory of human nature in order to gain what it has to offer, to use it as a basis, but he does not stop there. In following it he finds its source, and its limitation, and is thus more able to correct natural theory.

34. Allport, PER, 290.

35. Ibid., 295. Italics his.

conception, and points out a number of concepts proposed by other authors which are intimately related to his own view. Three of the kindred concepts are used by Hocking: ideal, interest, and subjective value. (Hocking calls the last value-strain.)

There is agreement then in the fact that the traits or interests are unique, individual, or personal. Such a statement as the following might be made by either writer. "What motivates each person is not some element common to all individuals, but his <u>own</u> <u>particular</u> <u>pattern</u> of tensions."[36] Hocking, in fact, defines the self as a hope; it is a system of purposive behavior which emerges from a persistent hope. (SIBF, 46) And the self's <u>tension</u> toward this hope determines its depth of selfhood, its freedom, and its reality.[37]

As was noted, instincts or traits are not identifiable according to boundary (HNR, 87); they can be identified as aspects of the whole, and by their focus or meaning in the whole. Allport writes as follows: "This focus is essentially the <u>telic</u> significance of the trait, that is to say, its meaning to the individual as a mode of survival and mastery."[38]

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36. Allport, PER, 321. Cf. Hocking, SIBF, 46, 64ff., 161 ff., P6IC, 212-215.

37. Hocking, SIBF, 169; P6IC, 213; HNR, 166; MGHE, 141, 541; TP, 450; TDL, 106-109.

38. Allport, PER, 327. Italics his. Cf. Hocking, HNR, 55ff., in which he speaks of desire as "the <u>conscious</u> link between a particular perception and a particular action." (HNR, 56. Italics his.)

"The consistency of a trait is entirely a matter of degree."[39] Since the trait is personal it depends for its consistency upon the person whose trait it is, or upon the whole of which it is a part.

Both Hocking and Allport recognize the necessity for unity in the self or personality. It is a "condition of selfhood".[40] There is "the assumption of a discoverable unity."[41] It is assumed because it is recognizable amid the multiplicity of traits and desires. Both men would accept Stern's apt description of personality as "a multiform dynamic unity." Personality is a unitas multiplex.[42]

In discussing this unity, however, there comes to light the difference between Hocking and Allport, between the metaphysical and the psychological interpretations of personality. In both theories the unity depends upon the presence of some eminent or cardinal trait, of some general instinct, or of some supreme interest or ideal. In Allport's theory this cardinal trait, "though pervasive and pivotal . . . still remains within the personality; it never coincides with it."[43]

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39. Allport, PER, 332.

40. Hocking, HNR, 475. Cf. Allport, PER, Ch. XIII.

41. Hocking, HNR, 475. Italics his.

42. Stern, PS, I, 161-165; II, 4-5.

43. Allport, PER, 338.

But for Hocking this persistent craving or hope, which once might have appeared to be a stranger, becomes, or is, the self.[44]

3. The moment of selfhood, and of self-consciousness.

The moment of selfhood represents a lower level than self-consciousness. The former means simple awareness, or consciousness, whereas the latter involves a consciousness of the self, a turning of consciousness within. The moment of selfhood cannot be an object of experience, but the moment of self-consciousness is, necessarily.[45]

According to Royce the self is a product of social life. Its origin is in time; its development is such that it depends upon nature and the social order for both its content and character. Even the reflective side of life is a social product. "Where the analogy of our relations to our fellows ceases, reflection ceases also." Indeed all self-conscious functions are, "in their finite, human and primary aspect, social functions, due to the habits of human intercourse."[46]

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44. Cf. Hocking, HNR, 58; SIBF, 110ff.

45. Hocking, SIBF, 120. "The very conception of a beginning of conscious life carries with a paradoxical reference to something prior to that beginning." Hocking would identify the moment of selfhood and the moment of self-consciousness. (Cf. MAS, 237)

46. Royce, SGE, 194, 196.

Royce insists that the individual comes to be self-conscious through the persistent influence of other individuals. The child is more aware of the conscious acts of someone else than of his own acts. His self-consciousness really feeds upon his relations with those about him.[47] Hocking would accept this theory, in principle. Instead of beginning as solitary beings and acquiring community, "we begin as social products, and acquire the arts of solitude".[48] Yet he insists that self-consciousness is not a product of society. Contacts and criticisms sharpen self-consciousness, but they would have no meaning for an individual unless he were already self-conscious. "The measurement of self presupposes the intuition of self." (MAS, 237) If the self is nothing without society how can it be anything with it? There is a gradual increasing in sensitivity and discrimination. Men become self-conscious by degrees; and men become individual persons by degrees.

> History proceeds under a veil of semi-consciousness . . . the human mind is never fully awake. To be sure, it always fancies itself in possession of the full day of "consciousness"; its present degree of awakeness is felt as standard.[49]

Perry and Alexander identify the mind with its neural

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47. Royce, WI, II, 170ff.; SGE, 201.

48. Hocking, MGHE, 299. Italics his.

49. Hocking, PLR, 39.

basis. But in both instances the effort to escape the problem leads to more questions than answers. Perry states that as property of the physical organism, "elements become mental content when reacted to in the specific manner characteristic of the central nervous system."[50] Alexander writes with equal illumination that "a neural process of a certain level of development possesses the quality of consciousness and is thereby a mental process."[51] At best these statements serve only to postpone the problem, because the question arises immediately as to what this specific manner is which characterizes the central nervous system, and as to the level of development necessary for a neural process to become a mental one. And a more difficult problem is to give the reason for the development, whereby elements may become mental content, and whereby a neural process can become a mental one.[52] But the question may come into the mind of the reader, "Well, what better solution can be given?" A more direct solution is that of going immediately to the point to which Perry and Alexander finally would be driven, and to recognize that in the permanent form of life there must be the possibility of

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50. Perry, PPT, 298-299. Italics his.

51. Alexander, STD, II, 5. Cf. pp. 3-30.

52. This whole matter will be discussed more fully in section five below.

mind or consciousness.[53] Based on this recognition the advent of selfhood is not inexplicable.[54]

John Dewey offers approximately the same answer as do Perry and Alexander. But for Dewey there is no such thing as mind; there is mind-as-function in the control of environment. Dewey attributes the appearance of this mind-as-function to natural events. Under certain conditions, i.e., problematic situations, the mental emerges. The organic emerges from the physical; and later the mental emerges from the organic. These three terms denote "levels of increasing complexity and intimacy among natural events."[55] According to Dewey, "Mind is primarily a verb. It denotes all the ways in which we deal consciously and expressly with the situations in which we find ourselves."[56] Yet in another place he recognizes the causal status of the self. "The constancy and pervasiveness of the operative presence of the self as a determining factor in all situations . . . is more intimate and omnipresent in experience than the air we breathe."[57] If Dewey

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53. Cf. Chapter VI, 5, (1), (2).

54. It may be said that this "recognition" is itself the problem. Nevertheless it is the most coherent solution, in fact the only one which is not self-contradictory.

55. Dewey, EAN, 261.

56. Dewey, AE, 263.

57. Dewey, EAN, 246.

would only be true to the implications of this statement his position would be almost identical with that of Hocking.

But the problem remains of pointing out specifically the moment of selfhood, and of self-consciousness. The moment of selfhood represents that period in the life of the organism when focus of attention becomes possible, when a unity of apperception is exercised. The moment of self-consciousness comes later in the development of the organism.[58] It represents that period when the self can focus its attention upon its own self. Self-consciousness is realized with the appearance of memory, when the self becomes able to relate what was to what is, or to relate what is to what was and to what will be.[59] Instinct initiates behavior; memory supervenes; and future acts are carried out differently. Instinct gives place to or becomes the self which acts and directs the action.[60] The self has become able to recognize states of mind as its own; it has become able to reflect on its acts, and to judge them. The role of self-conscious mind as judge is evident in the normal development of an

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58. It is doubtful whether Hocking is right in identifying these two moments. (Cf. MAS, 237.)

59. Cf. Hocking, TDL, 17-18.

60. Hocking, MAS, 216ff. Thus the self becomes the "determining factor in all situations" which was mentioned above. (Cf. Dewey, EAN, 246.)

emotion.[61] There are seven steps:

1. The exciting idea in the mind;

2. Beginnings of disturbance in skeletal muscles and viscera, with increased adrenal flow;

3. The mind becomes aware of these changes (an incipient James-Lange effect);

4. The mind consents, or does not consent, to the further development of these expressive changes in the muscles under its control. Then if consent is given;

5. Increased muscular activity and increased adrenal secretion;

6. Mental awareness of these changes (full James-Lange effect);

7. Development and exhaustion of the emotion. (SIBF, 64)

There are two divisions in this outline. One through three is preliminary; four through seven is the full-fledged emotion. Point four is the most critical of all; its importance can hardly be over-emphasized. It may be called the <u>threshold of consent</u>. It is determined at this point the degree to which the whole organism shall be involved. The authority of the self-conscious mind is not complete, however, but is determined by the degree of unity already achieved in the total life of instinct.[62]

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61. "That which in human nature is fundamental, intimate, genuine, private, and wholly owned, is feeling." (MGHE, 44) Feeling represents an "instability in consciousness" (MGHE, 65); it is e-motion; it is akin to instinct, mentioned above as initiating behavior; feeling sets the organism in motion.

62. Cf. the section of "Freedom a matter of degree".

The theories of Perry and Alexander concerning the origin of mind were rejected, but the fact remains that there is a neural basis for the self's life. It is absurd to deny that the body has a place in the development of the self. It remains to point out the self's dependence upon the body.

4. The place of the body in the development of the self.[63]

The body is an integral part of the mind or self. It enters into the experience of the mind as a visible, spatial object to which is referred certain needs and wants, certain powers and capacities, as well as the mind's steady sense of being. The body is not merely an additional fact to the mind, it "is required by the mind as a part of its own being." (SIBF, 80) The mind could not be itself without its body. The mind, as a system of meanings, involves facts as well. The mind is a hope; it is a hold on possibility, but it involves also a present actuality; it is an actual holding of possibility. The mind is an achiever, a worker for ends; as purposive it must work as causal in the midst of causal relations. The body is an inseparable organ of the mind; all its categories are necessary for the mind's structure.[64]

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63. Cf. the sections, "The natural endowment of the self" and "Social experience and experience of nature."

64. The following discussion belongs also to part 5(2) below, a treatment of the mind problem in which the body is considered as language of the self.

In the first place, mind needs a body because to be a person or self requires "a clear distinction between thought and deed." (SIBF, 81) The transition from thought to actuality is a mystery. It is the body in which, and by means of which, that thought first becomes actuality. Emotion is the concretion of thought, displaying meaning in the body, and preparing for actualization through bodily activity. There is not a time-sequence between the will-to-act and the action. The act is contemporaneous with the fiat. There may be a long period of tentativeness, of contemplation, but the moment of decision is the moment of action. The muscular movement is the will in action. Will is the stamp of approval for objectification, saying to the thought: "Be thou actual." The self without a body would be without a will, and so without an actualizing capacity. The will-to-be is far more constant than is the will-to-do. It is impossible to separate or distinguish immediate existence and particular existence. And the body is to the mind that sphere of existence which is completely particularized. (SIBF, 83-85)

The mind requires a body, in the second place, because it requires an accumulation of power or capacity behind its deeds. As the mind passes from one act to another it keeps something permanently. It remembers the act, but it also knows how or is able to perform the act again; it has acquired

a skill, or formed a habit. Yet a habit is a creation of the mind; it becomes an artificial law of nature. (SIBF, 90) The body takes care of the physical detail; the mind is thus freed from the routine. Habits are kept in mind, although unattended; they reside in the allied or friendly subconscious. Reside is the proper word, because each habit is a kind of self, with its own meaning and body.[65] The self of the habit is its motive or meaning, not its body, and each habit has a will to live and seeks its reincarnation. In new situations familiar or time-worn approaches, or habits of response, come to mind and so vie with each other in seeking to be tried, to be reincarnated. The mind builds itself through creating and using its habits.

But in the building of itself, the mind must have something to begin with. The mind cannot create, nor can it understand its sources. For it, to be is to accept being. Apparently, the body is the first agent. It seems that the body is continuous while the mind is discontinuous and completely new, and only gradually supervenes. Yet are there not also hereditary determinants of character? The new mind is a new will to power, "embodied in a few elementary dispositions to action." (SIBF, 120) At first these dispositions, or instincts,

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65. Viewed in this light the real self becomes a group of latent selves. Each habit is a product of the self, and is its usable property. (SIBF, 90-93)

are as a stranger in the house; but the stranger is really the host.[66] These dispositions constitute an initial technique, a mental endowment of the new mind. And the self has some understanding of this endowment, of its meaning. This insight is possible through the overlapping of selves, and through the fact that there are mental as well as physical endowments in heredity.[67] There is evidence against the view that the mental life experiences a bodily sojourn in reproduction. There is continuity in both mind and body. And this continuity provides that with which the new mind begins its building of itself.

There is a third, and perhaps more evident, reason that the mind needs the body. The body serves as an instrument of give and take with the world beyond. The mind is a system of purposive behavior; and behavior requires a space-time world. The mind must live in this world, from which it receives the material and themes for its activity. To make intercourse possible there must be a kinship of structure; if the world is bodily the mind must be bodily. The mind interacts with the world by way of its body: it could not "give and take" with the world except for its bodily appearance in nature. (SIBF, 94-95)

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66. Cf. the sections, "The self as a will to power" and "The theory of instincts".

67. Cf. preceding note, and also the section, "The natural endowment of the self."

This may mean, and must mean, one of two things: if all parts of the interacting system must be alike, then they must be either physical or else mental. Either the body goes back to nature, and the self's reality becomes nil, or nature is brought along with the body into the realm of the self.[68] The body is a part of physical nature. Now if the self's need of the body makes it a part of the self, nature must also be a part of the self. But this would be solipsism, and that is an untenable position.

As the self is in interaction with the physical world, it is apparently in contact with a not-self, yet at the same time it is creating after the pattern of what it has perceived. Nature is material-for-experience, i.e., it is something for the self, but at the same time it appears to be something on its own account. This self-sufficiency or independence of nature must be examined.

There are three distinct marks of nature's otherness. (SIBF, 126ff.) First, the givenness of sense-data: They are not invented, nor are they deduced by reason; sense data are discovered and known only in the actual experiencing of them. These data are the original stuff of the experience of nature. The physicists insist that these qualities, colors, sounds,

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68. Cf. Chapter II, 1, 2 (1).

smells, tastes, are not in the self, but in the objective world. They are ingredients of nature, of the space-time world. If sense-data are of nature then surely they are not caused by nature. To regard nature as their cause is to bifurcate nature and to resign sense-data to the self. Since sense-data are nature, to seek a source beyond them is to go beyond nature, to that upon which nature is itself dependent. And if the self is dependent upon sense-data, nature is also dependent, so that the self is ultimately dependent upon that which supports nature.[69]

The second distinct mark of nature's otherness is its strict orderliness. This, for the Kantian school, is a mark of independence or objectivity. Nature seems to be a continuing series of causal relations. But what initiates the series? The final resort is to the self. The will is an actualizing agency for the self. (SIBF, 83) Will says to a thought, "Be thou actual", and as the thought is actualized, consequences follow from it. Nature draws the consequences, yet the self initiated them. The self does not know all the consequences in advance, but it finds out through the inherent consistency of experience, and thus finds the wider reaches of its own meaning. This is made possible through the

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69. Cf. Chapter V, 4. Cf. also Hocking, MGHE, 285; SIBF, 128, 135.

strict lawfulness and impartiality of nature, which, though seeming to set nature apart from the self, is really necessary in the nature of the self. (SIBF, 130ff.)

In the third place, nature appears as a not-self because it is so public; Nature is a common object; it is property for all selves, and hence private property for none. It is real as over against personal fancy and imagination. It is real in that it serves as the world of common life. The publicity of nature shows the need and the value of its orderliness. To serve well as a common object for many selves its impartiality must be as that of an ideal law.

Nature is other than the self, and was before it; nature does not belong to any single self, but it may be a common object for all selves. In fact, social intercourse, or any conscious enterprise, would be impossible but for some such impassive and impartial base which nature affords.

Nature's independence and objectivity are relative and derivative. Nature is over against each self as an independent realm because all other selves stand over against each particular self; and the distinctness of all other selves lends to nature it objective character. (MGHE, 285) There is nothing about nature which the self cannot adopt and use. The factual, legal, and social evidence for the otherness of nature really shows it as fitted for taking part in the life of the self.

Nature does not belong to finite mind naturally; it must be "possessed". It is other than, and prior to, all finite minds. The search for nature's meaning is an eternal quest. But man has already learned that "nothing in nature is ultimately alien." (SIBF, 142)

Thus nature, along with the body, comes into the fold of the self.[70] This section has been largely an interpretation of Hocking's view. But his theory must be given some sort of historical setting.

5. Theories of the relation between mind and body.

Mind and body seem to be distinct; no observer ever gets both the mental and the physical in the same field at once. The body is present in consciousness in two different ways, as it is felt (here it is as a part of the mind, an indispensible part of experience), and as an object of nature. It is one and the same body, whether present as a part of mind or as object of nature. How is the body related to the mind?

There are two technical theories of this association, the theory of parallelism and the theory of interactionism. (TP, 223-236) In parallelism it is held that brain-events and mind-events correspond to each other exactly.[71] Yet

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70. Cf. Chapter II, 1, 2(1); Chapter V, 6.

71. This is made possible, according to Leibniz, through pre-established harmony. (Cf. Monadology, sections 78ff. (PWL, 321); cf. also PWL, 98-99.)

it is hardly possible that two independent realities, or processes, each going its own way, could be in such complete correspondence. Parallelism is best represented in the thought of Spinoza; according to Spinoza mind and body are but two aspects of one reality, substance.[72] But any dualistic parallelism would be deterministic. Freedom would have to be surrendered. The brain-event, as separate from the mind-event, is determined by the physical order. Since the mind-event is not caught in any such nexus, it must correspond to the brain-event; therefore the mind-event is really determined by the physical order. In parallelism, there is no valid reason for the mind's existing.

Interactionism is truer to the facts of experience; in it the mind is restored to a place of usefulness. In this theory mind-events interact with brain-events. Each is independent of, yet affects, the other. This is apparently a true picture of the situation. The mind devises, and chooses. Then the living body moves toward the attainment of the end. In case obstacles are met other means are invented; the mind persists in its work even after interruption. Also the mind reads between the lines of physical facts; it interprets the meanings of the symbols and responds to them. Ideas, created by the mind, are brought into play. The body represents the

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72. Spinoza, ETH, II, Props. X-XIII.

facts of the situation; the mind grasps the meaning of these facts, and replaces the expected physical or mechanical reaction with an intelligent response.

The interactionist, however, does not explain the interacting, because he cannot. If pushed for an explanation he is lost. Interaction is just assumed, and thus the question is avoided. But the difficulty cannot be escaped so easily. It is the task of the dualistic interactionist to show how mind and body, as independent realities, can affect each other. In the physical world cause and effect are alike in kind and equal in quantity. But in this case a volition is equated in quantity with an energy-change in the cortex. (TP, 231) This problem has been fatal for many dualists. Descartes's attempt to bridge the gap by means of the pineal gland is an instance of unbridled speculation.[73] The dualistic vitalist, Hans Driesch, has developed a more respectable theory. There is, according to Driesch, between the mind and the brain an intermediate, purposive principle, which delays changes in the brain and alters their outcome but does not change their quantity.[74]

Such attempts do not result in solutions; they serve only to postpone and to complicate the problem. Ultimately the

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73. Descartes, Passions, Articles 31, 32, OD.

74. Driesch, SPO, 295.

dualism must be surrendered. Mind and body seem to be distinct, yet the distinction is only seeming. The human self is one. "What my body, as a whole, does, I do."[75] The body and the mind are one in the whole self. It is necessary, therefore, that there be some kind of monism. How is the monism achieved? Is mind a mere product of body? Or can body be viewed as language of mind? The idea that both are expressions of a neutral third postpones the question but does not answer it.[76]

(1) The body problem: Mind as function of body. According to Dewey the most critical need in contemporary thought is a "thoroughgoing revision of ideas of mind and thought and their connection with natural things that were formed before the rise of experimental inquiry."[77] Dewey thinks that the idea of mind is illegitimate. For example, after writing that "Nature is an environment only as involved in interaction with an organism, or self, or whatever name may be used",[78]

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75. Hocking, TP, 234. Italics his.

76. In keeping with his neo-realism, Perry views the duality of mind and body as a difference of organization. In Perry's theory of the neutral entities, "Mind and body are both complexes capable of being analyzed into more primitive terms." (PPT, 310) But there is still the problem of grasping these "more primitive terms". Hocking says that the theory of neutralism is the most empty of hypotheses. (Phil 9, 3/19/40)

77. Dewey, QC, 168.

78. Dewey, LOG, 106.

he adds in a note that the name must not be a "purely mentalistic one, like consciousness."[79] There is no such thing as mind; but there is mind-as-function in the control of environment.

Dewey's professed monism is naturalistic.[80] He rejects the mind-body problem.[81] For him, "There is no breach of continuity between operations of inquiry and biological operations and physical operations."[82] Speaking before the College of Physicians in St. Louis, Dewey said, "We cannot be scientific save as we seek for the physiological, the physical factor in every emotional, intellectual and volitional experience."[83] "It is difficult to state the exact physiological mechanism which is involved. But about the fact there is no doubt."[84]

But the mind-body problem cannot be rejected; it has been clear cut since the time of Descartes.[85] The mystery must be thought through. Lovejoy in his renowned essay on

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79. Dewey, LOG, 106n. Italics his.

80. The title of one of his outstanding books is Experience and Nature. But see Lovejoy, "Pragmatism vs. the Pragmatist." (Drake, ECR, 35-81)

81. Dewey, LOG, 23, but cf. 113, 117, and Ratner, JDP, 829. He admits that the mind-body problem reflects divisions of a more practical kind.

82. Dewey, LOG, 19.

83. Ratner, JDP, 827. From "The Unity of the Human Being", pp. 817-835. This is the first time this article has been published.

84. Dewey, EAN, 179.

85. Hocking, Art.(1940)[1], 239-240.

"Pragmatism vs. the Pragmatist", declares that the only way Dewey can escape dualism (and this enigma of the mind-body relation) is to acknowledge all existents as mental.[86] The body problem resolves itself into a problem of the brain. The contention is that although the brain and mind may be different, mind is a product of the brain, or as Dewey would put it, "Mind is primarily a verb";[87] it is a function of the living organism.[88] In order to show the inherent fallacy in such a theory mention may be made of some specific differences between the brain and the mind.[89]

i. The mind can and does observe itself, while the brain not only does not, it cannot. The self can even think about its own brain.

ii. The brain may be located in space; it is spatial, whereas the mind cannot be definitely located in space. The mind rather includes space.

iii. Temporally, the mind is in the present; but it extends to include the past and the future, while the brain is in the present only.

iv. The brain may be represented as a set of facts, and no more; but the mind is more: it is a set of facts plus their meanings. These meanings for the brain are only

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86. Cf. Drake, ECR, 62.

87. Dewey, AE, 263.

88. Cf. the section on "The moment of selfhood, and of self-consciousness.

89. Cf. Hocking, TP, 98-102. Cf. above, p. 12.

connections, and these connections, to the brain, are meaningless. But to the developing mind every fact, or every connection, has meaning.

v. Furthermore, while the brain is a system of meaningless facts, the mind is a system of meaningful facts; and these meanings represent values. The peculiar concern of the mind is moral values, i.e., judgments of right and wrong. This, perhaps, is the characteristic difference between the mind and the brain. In the system of facts, called the brain, there is no regard for the pleasant or the painful, nor for the right or the wrong. But for the mind this distinction is primary. "We cannot sink mind in the brain without spiritualizing the universe."[90] If there is to be a monism it must be a monism of mind.

(2) The mind problem: Body as language of mind. A monism of the body cannot account for mental activity. If one starts with a physical monism there is no valid reason for the origin of consciousness. But to begin with consciousness the facts of physiology are accepted as necessary ingredients. The self, at first, is identified by the body; but in the process of development there is a shifting of the center of gravity: the body becomes a part, a necessary organ,

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90. Thilly, Art.(1910), 33.

of the self.[91] The ultimate stuff of human nature, Hocking thinks, is more nearly like thought than like physical energy. The body reflects every shade of thought and motive in the life of the self. It presents externally what the mind internally is. (MGHE, 262ff.)

> The body is the symbol of the mind, not the mind of the body. The mind is the substance of which the body and its energies are the visible behavior-language, the accessible and measurable signs, but still, - the shadows. (HNR, 108)

The brain constitutes the point of insertion of mind in matter. "The body is the manifestation in spatial metaphor of the will-to-live as inborn and as modified by experience and choice." (MGHE, 263n) Hocking's theory was not inspired by, but finds historical confirmation in, the philosophy of Schopenhauer. According to Schopenhauer body represents the objectivity of the will.[92]

The body problem was resolved into a problem of the brain, but in the mind problem the proportions increase. It concerns the entire phenomenal world, everything of which the self may be conscious. The brain as a part of the phenomenal world is included also. Physical monism is untenable because no reason can be given for the advent of mind. Unless nature

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91. Cf. the section on "The place of the body in the development of the self", and Chapter V, 4, 6.

92. Schopenhauer, WWV, Sections 18, 60.

can be accounted for, the mental monism must be rejected also.

What is nature, and why does it exist? Nature exists as a world of sense. It represents the field of concrete action in contrast to pure contemplation of abstractions. Nature exists to provide mind with its concrete objects, and its field of concrete action. Without objects mind would be empty, and so could exist only in imagination. (MGHE, 255ff.) Without a field of concrete action willing would be merely the shuffling of abstractions in imaginary contemplation. Either mind or body, apart from the other, is abstract. But the body is abstract and meaningless in any case. The mind is concrete, and can account for the existence of body, whereas body cannot account for mind.[93]

The apparent self-sufficiency of nature has been shown to be illusory; that upon which nature depends is mind. (TP, 248) The human body represents the objectification of the will. In like manner nature represents the objectification of the will of God. The self's discovery of its physical body is a late one, but from the first nature is viewed as the body of the Other.[94] "The . . . individuality and

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93. Cf. the listing of differences between mind and body, above.

94. Cf. the section on "Experience of God as basis for social experience"; cf. also Hocking, Phil 9, 3/19/40.

permanence of Nature implies a corresponding individual permanence in the Subject whose communicated being this Nature is." (MGHE, 293) The human body is viewed as language of the human mind. In like manner nature is viewed as the body of God, and thus as Divine language. (MGHE, 300)

CHAPTER IV

FREEDOM OF THE SELF

1. The problem a metaphysical one.

The problem of freedom is a metaphysical problem. It arises only for beings who act as a result of choices of will; it arises for them only as they begin to consider their relations to the whole in which they are immersed; it arises from a consideration of the parts and the whole.[1] Unless the parts have some metaphysical status, freedom cannot be attributed to them: the parts become caused by the whole and are but links in its chain of causes.

The problem arose in protest, because of man's unwillingness to recognize himself as a mere link in any causal series. The self feels itself the sponsor of its deeds. This sense of sponsorship is inseparable from the concept of selfhood. Sponsorship has both positive and negative implications. It implies that the self is the sponsor; and that no one else is the author of the deed. There was a moment when the act came into being; and the self determined its origin.

Determinism has had support from two fields which are otherwise antagonistic toward each other. Many absolutists

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1. From notes taken in Phil 9, taught by Professor Hocking, Harvard, 1939-1940.

in theology have believed in determinism, at least theoretically, because they believed in predestination.[2] Incidentally, predestination is implied in theological absolutism. Inconsistency becomes a virtue as predestinarians recognize their responsibility to help God answer their deliberated petitions.

In an effort to relieve God of man's crimes, theologians and philosophers have declared that man is somehow free within God's will.[3] Nevertheless, under the influence of Saint Paul, they have added that because of Adam's fall all men sin, and die.[4] Whatever good is accomplished is often attributed to God; whatever evil is done is always attributed to man.[5] These positions are not fully consistent, but they have been accepted by pious individuals on the basis of the inscrutability of God's plan. Divine determinism has thus far outweighed human freedom in their thinking.

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2. Pantheism is not being treated separately because wherever it is relevant to this discussion it appears as absolutism. However, Spinoza, the arch pantheist, is mentioned in the next section. He serves to illustrate extreme determinism coupled with an outstanding emphasis on moral striving.

3. Cf. Josiah Royce, WI, II, 303, 330. Royce seems to be a pantheist despite his claims to the contrary.

4. Paul. Cf. I Corinthians 15:22. Cf. also the reference to the Catechism in the section on "Sin", pp. 122, 123.

5. Paul. Cf. Romans 7.

Especially is this true in the case of Augustine.[6]

The other outstanding support for the deterministic position has come from naturalists.[7] They view nature as the whole in which man is immersed; and they view man as bounded by nature, at the beginning and at the end, a mere link within nature's chain of causes.[8]

Man has rejected this naturalistic determinism even more vigorously than he has the theological type. Although he would not be unwilling to attribute his evil to nature, he protests being determined by an absolute un-intelligence. In the other case God represents absolute intelligence, and man could take refuge in his own ignorance of God's plan. But in naturalism the implication is that there is no plan. Man refuses such a verdict, and appeals to the facts which he finds within himself. The self which can contemplate

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6. Cf. Augustine, CG, 3-11, 25ff., et passim.

7. An increasing number think that the course of history is determined by the economic interest. This position is that of economic determinism. (It is akin to materialism and naturalism.) Hocking regards his entire volume, The Spirit of World Politics, as a "running attack" on the illusion of economic determinism. (SWP, 520) It is well "to remember that neither economic change nor its consequences are inevitable. There is no such mysterious thing as an economic force apart from the conscious desires of men." (Hocking, Art.(1940)[3], 1068) Men determine history; they are not determined by it.

8. Just as is the case with theological determinism, adherents are not consistent throughout.

the chain of causes in nature refuses to be reduced to a link in the chain. The self recognizes its dependence upon nature, but it will not admit that the dependence is complete or absolute. From the point of view of causality events are determined from the past; from the point of view of metaphysical freedom and purpose they are determined from the future. Physical events represent a causal series, but mental events represent a purposive sequence; mind, wherever known, is disposed to choose, and to act accordingly. Whether these two, the causal series and the purposive sequence, be judged as mutually exclusive, it is a fact of experience that both do exist. It seems that purpose "has found some way of living together with the causes".[9] To account for this basic fact of experience is a metaphysical problem.

2. What it means to say that the self is free.

To say that the self is free means that in deliberating the self is faced with real alternatives; the self has the power of choosing between alternatives which are real; the self conceives its own alternatives; and then gives actuality to possibilities which it, itself, has first made or created.[10] For example, there was no possibility of

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9. Hocking, TP, 108.

10. Hocking, P6IC, 212.

Mozart's music until Mozart visioned it or imagined it. After the possibility came to be, it was actualized, and thus the music came into being: a new creation. The self "confers actuality upon the dream of its own making."[11] To say that the self is free means that it is not determined according to the laws of cause and effect. "The fate and character of each conscious act comes for a moment under the control of 'self'; and neither nature nor environment nor God decides what meaning that act shall bear."[12] The meaning is determined by the individual person.

The essence of self is hope; all the experiences of the self have meaning in terms of their relation to this hope. The activity of the self is inspired by the hope; it is not determined. Thus it may be said that the whole self is free: freedom is characteristic of the entire self of behavior.

The hope which is the essence of the self is the source of meaning; lasting influences in the life of the self bear a relation to it. They must pass the threshold of consent which marks the entrance of meaning.[13]

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11. Hocking, TDL, 90.

12. Hocking, HNR, 150.

13. Hocking, SIBF, 148.

The whole self is free, unlike for Descartes,[14] for whom the mind, as a purposive thinking substance, was free, while the body, as causal, was determined: the whole is free. One does what his body does. But for the sake of convenience it seems well to discuss first the freedom of the self as the self is aware of it, or from the internal point of view. Nature, however, is the sphere in which the self's free acts are performed. The body by means of which these achievements are wrought is an object of nature. It is necessary then to show how these free acts fit into the scheme of nature, or to discuss the self's freedom from the external point of view. After the self has been placed in nature it will remain, in the third place, to determine the degree of freedom.

(1) Freedom from the internal point of view. "The self is a new fact in the world; its perception of good is its own." (SIBF, 147) The meaning which the self has, or is, is a new creation: the self as artist has produced it. This new creation is self-created.

The self has its own tension of hope; it sets up its own hierarchy of control, which culminates in some personal but unique conception of a possible good, and which serves as the source of meaning. The self may increase indefinitely in its mastery of meaning, yet in this process of growth

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14. Cf. Descartes, DIS, Pts. V, VI.

the identity of the hope, which is the essence of the self, is not destroyed. The expanding self brings new materials into its organization of behavior, and thus furnishes itself with new problems to be solved as well as with new means of solving them. It is not possible to predict what reactions a man will make. There can be prediction on the basis of character, but exact prediction is impossible, either for a stage of history or for an individual. Given all the possible data there is still an unknown in regard to prediction. Bradley maintains that every experience, each self, and any particular stage of history represent something new and different.[15] Alexander claims that prediction is possible theoretically but not practically. Exact prediction is not possible because minds project new combinations and are creative.[16]

The time when the self is most aware of its freedom is in the act of reflection. Freedom from the internal point of view, as well as from the external point of view, depends upon reflection or self-awareness. The ability to make its own self an object of contemplation increases the self's awareness of its freedom. Reflective behavior is different from mere behavior. Reflection enables one to adapt himself

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15. Bradley, ES, 22-24.

16. Alexander, STD, II, 326.

to new and untried situations; it enables one to increase the alternatives open to him and to make them concrete.

Reflection gives rise to the power of hesitating, i.e., the withholding of decision. Hesitation before deciding enables the self to deliberate on the question at hand. Reflection gives rise also to the power of immediate acceptance, or of non-hesitation. These powers are poignant as evidence for freedom in the life of the self.[17] Deliberation does not occur, and indeed cannot occur, in a purely causal universe. When one billiard ball strikes another there is no hesitation; the movement is observedly definite, and is determined by cause and effect. According to the law of inertia any object continues in its present state until it is disturbed.

The power of hesitating involves an awareness of the causal process. If one is able to reflect on a situation, he must hesitate; and if one is able to hesitate the motive which finally wins is either admitted as stronger and acceded to, or else is made stronger, by the hesitating self. Nature is known as an object of thought; reflection on the field of natural causation is possible; and hesitation is necessary for this reflection and knowledge; therefore, the self, the knower, cannot be reduced to the place of a mere

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17. From notes taken in Phil 9, Harvard, 1939-1940.

link in the chain of natural causes.

On the other hand the power of immediate acceptance or non-hesitation enables the self to say readily: "This appeals to me; I will to join myself to it." This depends upon previous reflection during which the self has determined what it wants; otherwise the self would not know what appeals to it.

An objective consideration of the difference between the self as observed and the desired self intensifies the tension of hope, and increases one's freedom.[18] During this act of judging itself, the self has power to move in the desired direction. In fact one is already beyond the defect or limitation he perceives in himself; he must be beyond it before he can observe and judge it. This does not mean that the thief merely by recognizing that he is a thief actually becomes an honest man. Yet it is necessary for him to have some idea of honesty, and some appreciation of property rights, before he can recognize himself as a thief.[19] Thus

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18. Brightman speaks of three selves, or personalities, which are really "three stages in the movement of personality toward the idea: The empirical personality, the preferred personality, and the ideal personality." (ML, 249-250) These are legitimate distinctions which Hocking fails to make. The difference between the two positions is mainly terminological.

19. "The longest step toward cleanliness is made when one gains - nothing but dissatisfaction with dirt. Surely the work is not finished - but the obstacles that remain are material only." The big task was to get "the <u>idea</u> of cleanliness . . . the practical questions are all resolvable into this one, - the maintenance and development of that idea." (Hocking, MGHE, 198. Italics his.)

infinitude is possible for that self which knows itself to be finite. Socrates was wise because he knew himself to be ignorant.[20] If the self knows itself to be caused it is free. Spinoza was free because he knew that he was determined. "The mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as necessary."[21] The mind's power over the emotions consists in its knowledge of them. It is a paradox that Spinoza, an arch determinist in theory, was a deeply pious man and an ethical perfectionist.[22]

Psychologists are able to give a causal explanation of error, of why an individual goes wrong. But they cannot explain causally why an individual gets the right answer, or why he goes right. There is a cause for going wrong; but there is a reason for going right. Psychologists "cannot explain our reasonable deeds and thoughts."[23]

Picture a man to himself as a set of reactions; then show him the portrait; and the canvas will be destroyed. Through the aid of reflection man is able to and actually

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20. Plato, Apology, 21.

21. Spinoza, ETH, Part V, Prop. VI.

22. This paradox is paralleled by many Calvinists (for example, Presbyterians). Theoretically they believe in predestination, but after they get off their knees they work as though everything depended upon their own efforts.

23. Hocking, TP, 104. Cf. MAS, 202, P6IC, 205.

does free himself from every discovered causal series. The difficulty in predicting what a person will do is that if the person knows what the prediction is he will do something else. The most futile of all undertakings is that of applying a cause-and-effect psychology. (SIBF, 153) A cause-and-effect psychology cannot be applied to men, especially if they find out what is being done. Let them get an inkling of the scheme, and a new, secret one must be developed. (TP 105, 309)

It is an observable fact that men cannot be controlled by controlling their physical situations, or even by coercing their bodies. They cannot be determined; they can be influenced, but influence is not determination. The physical reactions of men, however, may be controlled by their conscious or reflective choices. Their reflective choices are just that: choices made through and after reflection. Reflective choices are made in terms of what is near and dear to the self, i.e., in terms of the hope which is the self. Men can be motivated only by value-thinking, not by causal-thinking. The leader of men must assume that they are free, rational, and responsible; he cannot cause them; he must reason with them by discussing reciprocal rights and obligations.[24]

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24. Hocking, TP, 309. This does not appear to be true of Adolph Hitler. Since the leader must treat men as "free,

Unless the reflection is a juggling of abstractions these choices issue in action; and this action takes place by means of the body in the realm of nature. It remains to show how this freedom can be possible in a world of law.

(2) Freedom from the external point of view. External freedom, or freedom from the external point of view, is not different from the internal freedom just discussed. To understand freedom from the external point of view, however, is the part of the topic which usually gives the most trouble. Kant was willing to grant a freedom from the internal point of view, which is purely psychological; but he could not attribute any metaphysical status to freedom because from the external point of view man is an object among objects, and is determined according to the laws of nature. A large part of this section is a discussion of Kant's view of freedom.

According to Kant freedom from the internal point of view and from the external point of view are different. It will become evident, in the course of the discussion, that the two are views of one and the same thing: of accounting for the pursuit and realization of value in a literally

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24. (continued)
rational, and responsible", Hocking would not think of Hitler as a genuine leader of men. By taking away their freedom he crushes them. According to the position here taken it is inevitable that Hitler's situation is a precarious one.

indeterminate future. It was noted in Section One of this chapter that the problem of freedom is a metaphysical one. The present question may be stated as follows: Is there any place for the freedom which has been described in the scientific view of man as a part of nature?

Much effort has been expanded in search of a mechanical explanation of freedom; but to explain it mechanically is to explain it causally, and so to deny it. Kant affirms freedom by conceiving of causal necessity as an external reading of sequences of internal acts which are free and purposive.

Freedom is the basic postulate, the most important of all. It is the keystone of Kant's whole system of pure reason, theoretical and practical. According to the former, man is an object among objects, and is determined. But according to the pure practical reason man is a moral agent, and thus is free.

Kant's fundamental problem was that of mediating the antagonism between the claims of science and the moral and religious consciousness. All of man's life, moral and spiritual as well as physical, was about to be included within the realm of nature and necessity; this would have meant the surrender of all the convictions which underlie man's higher life. Kant was awakened by the approach of this disaster, and bestirred himself to examine the presuppositions

of science, the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, and of morality, the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.

In the second edition of the first critique, KrV, Kant writes, "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith."[25] And in the second critique, KpV, he states that "when pure speculative and pure practical reason are combined in one cognition, the latter has the primacy",[26] provided always that in this extension of employment there does not arise a conflict of reason within itself. But the fact remains that there is a conflict between man as determined and man as a moral agent. The solution results from the primacy of the practical reason. In the third critique, KU, Kant assigns different fields to the laws of nature and to acts of free will; these fields are mutually limited in operation; the relation is one of interaction. The idea of freedom, however, still has to give way in case of a conflict.[27]

The realm of freedom, for Kant, represents a timeless realm; a free act is a timeless event. The free acts are timeless events which serve as the eternal basis of the temporal series. The timeless events are internal, whereas

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25. Kant, KrV, B XXX.

26. Kant, KpV, 155.

27. Kant, KU, XVIII-XIX.

the temporal series is external. The timeless is free, but the temporal is determined.[28] This theory may give inspiration and emotional satisfaction but it is intellectually untenable. In a world which is empirically determined, the first act leads directly to the concluding effect. How can the free act of a self be realized in a world which is causally determined and yet remain a free self? Neither the sense of duty nor the sense of responsibility can obtain in such a world. The peculiar concern of the mind is moral values, i.e., judgment of right and wrong. Physically, crimes are simple, e.g., lifting a purse. But if this act is mechanically determined there is no crime, and the idea of moral reproach is absurd. (TP, 100, 101) According to Kant's theory, empirical freedom, freedom that makes a difference within the field of fact, is impossible. (SIBF, 157)

Nature would not be dependable if freedom were an exceptional event, being made possible by a non-natural interference with the laws of nature. Freedom cannot be explained through science, nor can it be explained as being in opposition to the accepted truths of science. How then can an empirical, i.e., a metaphysical, freedom, the power of deliberate choice, the existence of real alternatives, be accounted for in view of the laws of nature?

Note the phrase, "be accounted for". It may be that

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28. Kant, KrV, B578-585.

the reality of freedom is inexplicable. But causality, as well as freedom, is a candidate for being understood. Both concepts represent only theoretical interpretations of the facts of experience. David Hume stands out in the history of philosophy because of his study of causality.[29] The causal axiom is that every event must have a cause. However, there is no way to prove this. The causal relation cannot be perceived. The causal axiom is a belief which arose through mental habit or custom. "Causality is imputed to the world order, rather than seen in it."[30] The third antinomy is concerned with this problem.[31] Kant develops a theory which has been rejected already. His error lies in his initial assumption; he assumes causality, and then tries to explain how freedom is possible.[32] If causality and freedom are put on the same footing perhaps a more tenable view of freedom can be developed.

The concept of causality involves the idea of law. Exponents of causal determinism usually resort to the field of physics for their support. Their stronghold is the

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29. Hume, THN, I, 375-383. Cf. ENQ, 26-31. His treatment of the problem is reported to have had tremendous influence on Kant. Authorities differ as to the extent.

30. Hocking, TP, 110. Italics his.

31. Kant, KrV, B472-479.

32. Ibid., B560-586.

irrevocability of physical laws. But physical laws are relative to more general laws. The basic law would be one that dealt with the ultimate physical units. Physicists, however, are unwilling to assign any definite limit to the analysis of physical events. They recognize that they may not be dealing with the basic law of the world; they have learned to assume that the laws with which they deal are only relatively true. Physicists disown the problem of freedom, and say that it must be solved in experience.[33] Arthur H. Compton, a physicist, writes as follows:

> My experience of the effectiveness of purpose is more direct and cogent than any logical argument based upon scientific generalizations. . . . That it pays to try is more basic in our psychology than is even the will to live.[34]

Unless purpose is effective, or if the power of reflection is ineffective and meaningless, it is extremely difficult for scientists to explain consciousness as a biological emergent. Professor Compton admits that "the evolution of consciousness itself is not to be expected if consciousness is ineffective."[35] Life, all of it, including

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33. "The new quantum mechanics . . . is not deterministic, in that it leaves open a range of possibilities, within which the actual event may occur." (Compton, HNS, 41) This statement does not imply freedom any more than it implies chance, yet it is "consistent with the postulate of true freedom." (Compton, HMS, 42)

34. Compton, HMS, 49.

35. Ibid., 50.

human life, has emerged out of nature. (TDL, 235) It is not known at what stage mind made its appearance. Its existence as an objective fact is perplexing to the biologist. He has no instrument for observing it or for measuring it. (TDL, 240)

In the process of evolution useless emergents are eliminated. If that is true then mind has earned its way. It is biologically useful. The biological utility of consciousness appears most clearly as the organism, the self, deals with new and unclassifiable situations. (TDL, 243) These situations are infinitely variable, and as whole situations they are such that a machine could not possibly solve.

Although physics is the favorite field of determinists, physicists disown the problem of freedom. It may be well to take the physicists seriously, and seek for an account of freedom in the realm of experience. Since they disclaim finality for physical laws, freedom may be the taking hold of, or obedience to, a higher and more ultimate law. Evidence for this view is strengthened in that nature is infinitely divisible. This means that the ultimate law is not a physical law.[36]

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36. There is an increasing number who think, or admit, that the course of history is determined by the economic interest or drive. Theoretical materialism and theoretical communism are characterized by economic determinism. (Cf. Engels, LF, 62) Closely akin to this, in theory at least, is John Dewey's position. It is characterized by social

The ultimate law as man finds it in himself is a law of meaning. Things happen in terms of what they mean to the self in its pursuit and realization of value. As hopes and meanings increase, the course of things is changed.

> The laws of physical nature are relative to the law of meaning; and so far as meanings do not change, these relative laws may be treated as absolute. Nature is a realm of common and steadfast ingredients of will: its reliableness is implied in the law of meaning. The steadfastness of the known laws of nature, so far as they apply to existing situations, is not at all incompatible with the utmost liberty of change, so far as they do not apply. (SIBF, 161)

Mind or the self is a tension of hope and the activity inspired by this tension of hope "eludes scientific measure, because it lies not within the world of nature, but plies between nature and the world of actual possibility." (P6IC, 213)

War involves a clash of physical forces. If that were all then the side with the greater physical force would win. But war involves also a conflict of wills. And morale is the element which largely determines the outcome of war. Morale is the human quality of enduring initiative and

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36. (continued)
or cultural determinism. (Cf. Dewey, LOG, III; Morris, STM, 322.) Hocking writes that his entire volume, The Spirit of World Politics, is "a running attack" on the illusion of economic determinism. (520) The fundamental tendency of human nature is to remake itself according to expectation. (Hocking, PLR, 64)

sacrificial loyalty. Morale does not win a war in and of itself, but it is often that last straw which breaks the opponent's back, or it gives to the men in the army that added strength necessary to prevent the breaking of their own backs. Morale cannot be tested by methods of the psychological laboratory, not only because the situation involved is irreproducible, but also because the logic of morale is the logic of human faith and hope.[37]

In his renowned essay, "Energies of Men", James writes of physical and mental energy. His thesis is that "few men live at their maximum of energy . . . anyone may be in vital equilibrium at very different rates of energizing."[38] The individual lives usually "far within his limits; he possesses powers of various sorts which he habitually fails to use. He energizes below his maximum, and he behaves below his optimum."[39] The emphasis throughout is that there is a mental energy which can and which should control, stimulate, and supplement the physical energy.

The body is admittedly a thing of nature. It is that object by means of which the self interacts with the world. It draws consequences, or rather suffers them, and in so

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37. Hocking, MIE, 8, 9, 23.

38. James, SPP, 42.

39. Ibid., 44. Italics his.

doing affords a stream of well-ordered events as data for action. But these events have subordinate places; and they are fitted into the hierarchy of action which is constructed by, and ruled by, the free choices of the self in its pursuit and realization of meaning and value. This is the experienced fact. "Nature, as world of law, is a subordinate and partly hypothetical fact, and must adjust its theories to our primary datum." (SIBF, 166-167)

(3) Freedom a matter of degree. Freedom is a matter of degree. The degree of freedom enjoyed by the self is determined by the body, and by the self's conscious choices.

Through bodily strain and mental fatigue freedom may be reduced so nearly to zero as to disappear. In such a situation the self becomes a part of nature; it becomes a link in the chain of natural causes; its movements are determined externally. Toward the end of a day's work the self becomes less free and more mechanical. This decline in freedom, however, is only temporary; the complete freedom can be recovered, unless the strain has been too hard or too long, through a period of rest and relaxation.

The major role in determining the degree of freedom is played by the self in its own choices. It is the self which recognizes the strain and fatigue, and chooses to rest as a means of regaining its efficiency and freedom. The ultimate freedom of the self is its freedom to control the degree of

its own freedom. This supreme privilege offers the opportunity for unlimited growth in self-control, but at the same time it affords the possibility for the disintegration of selfhood. This latter situation is so real that to speak of it as possible is hardly sufficient. It results from the free choice, which may be simply an unwillingness to do anything about it, of drifting "into that state of helpless control by habit and impulse in which it becomes literally true that we 'have no choice'." (SIBF, 169-170)

A self which cannot reflect, or which will not, is not free, but is subject to the causal laws of impulse, of habit, and of nature. It may be said that the degree of freedom depends upon the power of reflection. Mechanical reactions rule until one becomes aware of the process. The degree of freedom depends upon the degree of self-consciousness, and the power of self-survey. There is distance between a self and its recognized limitation or fault. "Self-consciousness deposes nature from master to servant of the free self." (TP, 295)

The self was defined as "a purposing system behavior which develops as a persistent hope is realized."[40] The tension of the self toward this hope constitutes the depth of selfhood. The degree of the self's freedom is determined and measured by the liveliness of the hope which is the self, by

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40. Cf. Chapter II, section 4.

the tension of the self toward it, and by the extent to which this hope, or vision of possible good, colors and enriches all the activities of the self.

But what if the hope which the self is seeking is illusory, and what if the hope represents actual evil? It is supposed, in the first place, that in the self-surveying and self-criticism contradictions will have been removed. The self should know and approve of what its hope involves; unless the self is to come on evil days its ideal must be a reasonable one.[41]

Again it may be noted that freedom is a metaphysical problem. One's view of freedom depends upon his metaphysics; or from the other side, one's metaphysical theory will determine his attitude in regard to freedom. If the vision of possible good is admittedly fictional, and if the hope is purely self-created and self-sustained, the freedom which the self enjoys is only an imaginary one. It is a house built on sand; when the storms come it will be destroyed; and the destruction will be complete. "Freedom can grow great only as hope can find its possible good an object of genuine belief." (SIBF, 173)

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41. In the preceding section morale was discussed as an evidence of freedom. But morale is not to be identified as a spirit which arises from true righteousness of cause. There is a relationship between these two, but it cannot be stated as a rule. Morale is inevitably low unless those involved are convinced that the cause is a worthy one. Such conviction, however, can rest on error as well as on truth.

3. The source of obligation, and conscience.

(1) The source of obligation. The feeling of obligation exists as a fact of experience. This feeling may be expressed in the phrase, "I ought". It cannot be defined or explained; it is known only in experience. Kant writes that obligation is "a fact which is absolutely inexplicable from all the data of the sense world and from the whole compass of the theoretical use of our reason."[42] In the experience of obligation, or the consciousness of duty, Kant is of the opinion that the practical reason deals with a level of reality which is deeper than that reached by the intellect. The truths of intellect are second to the truths of the practical will, of moral insight.[43]

Hocking is in essential agreement with Kant in regard to this experience of obligation, although he rejects Kant's theory of freedom. The postulates of the pure practical reason are assumptions which Kant makes in behalf of the convictions which underlie man's higher life. The postulate of freedom is first and most important. The basis for this postulate, and thus for all of them, is the consciousness of duty.

Professor Brightman allows objection to Kant's position

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42. Kant, KpV, 43.

43. Hocking, IK, 41-43.

that the autonomy of the will is the sole principle of moral laws, but states that Kant was right "in making it an essential principle."[44] In this sense it may be said that the source of obligation is the will itself. It is part of the natural endowment of the self.[45] The sense of duty is deeper than the psychological self. The feeling of obligation is "a strand of self-judgment which is original with every individual, and in this sense belong to original human nature." (HNR, 118)

But to say that a sense of duty is native to the human will is not to locate the source of this feeling of obligation. Is there any actual source? According to Alexander, "human nature is wholly empirical, and obligation arises within its empirical limits."[46] The consciousness of obligation, then, is a consciousness of non-conformity to the collective mind. Alexander seems to stop short of individual ideals and obligations. In his view there would not be any basis for one's obligation to correct the collective mind. Hocking rejects this empirical theory of the origin of obligation,[47] and insists that the true source "must be something that unites the living reality of fellow men and

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44. Brightman, ML, 110.

45. The whole of this section is related to the discussion on "The natural endowment of the self."

46. Alexander, STD, II, 331.

47. Cf. the following discussion of Conscience.

society with the totality and finality of the Kantian law." (HNR, 486) Kant's theoretical tentativeness in regard to the existence of God would not allow him such a conviction. It is in Thomas Aquinas that Hocking finds a historical basis for his position.[48]

The moral law exists for the sake of man's destiny; man's obligation is to it. His central instinct, the will to power, indicates this ideal to him. Sin is a failure to keep one's rendezvous with his destiny; and is an offense to the appointer of destiny, or God. God desires that man achieve this goal not only because he devised it, but also because he participates in man's destiny. The Psalmist, David, was of this same view, or at least he expressed it when he wrote, "He leadeth me in the paths of righteousness for his name's sake."[49]

This view of the source of obligation is confirmed in actual moral experience. The conception of moral obligation would lose much of the dignity usually ascribed to it "unless the universe has a central and unified life in which our destinies are involved, and which gives these destinies a higher importance than they can have for our own finite vision." (HNR, 487)

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48. Reference is to the Summa, I.

49. Ps. 23:3b.

The cosmic significance of the self will be discussed in a separate chapter. It should be noted here, however, that this destiny is not only in terms of some far-off event. It involves actual co-operation with this "central and unified life" in the creation of an unfinished world, and thus in the realization of the destinies of both God and man.[50] Man's feelingof duty toward his destiny is his conscience, which remains to be discussed.

(2) Conscience. Conscience is a consciousness of obligation to do this and to refrain from doing that. It involves the feeling of ought or duty, which has been described.

Some sense of duty and obligation is necessary if social relations are to exist. And it might be expected that society or social experience is the source of conscience. Certain dispositions would naturally emerge as permanent conditions for peaceful living. Conscience would then be a bunch of habitual dispositions representing the policy by which the self is related to its fellows. This social conscience resembles but is not identical with moral conscience. In fact the resemblance is superficial. "Custom which is taken up into the individual will and reissued as habit bears the mark of the issuer." (HNR, 194) There is a vast difference between the statements: "I ought to do this" and "It would be prudent

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50. Cf. Hocking, HNR, 488, 423.

for me to do it."

The "You ought" of society is addressed to a free individual, and unless it awakens in him an original "I ought", it accomplishes nothing. This inward ought is presupposed in the social expression; such an ought cannot be created by social pressure. Regardless of how earnestly parents, teachers, or judges say "You ought", unless the meaning strikes home the pleas are in vain. "Every new person must find this angle of vision for himself." (HNR, 118)

If conscience is not a social product but belongs to original human nature, is it an instinct? Conscience is akin to, and behaves like, the general instinct of sociability. Also, a universal trait of conscience is the disposition to seek for an object of devotion, and "to set this object up as authority in details of conduct", finding its ought from suggestions or implications of this object, "be it family head, totem, ruler, god, custom, or law." (HNR, 121) But this seeking is not as in the instinct of sociability. The hungering is for authorities, not for neighbors. Although conscience often finds its authorities in and through the social context, and although every neighbor may be in some sense an authority, conscience cannot be identified with the instinct of sociability. Nor can conscience be identified with this trait of seeking an authority, because the authorities are not merely

accepted: they are chosen.[51] There is originality in the choice of authorities; and each individual's authority calls forth his own moral originality. Authorities are often rejected from the same motive from which they were adopted. Conscience is often arrayed against custom. The role of heretics in the progress of civilization is evidence that conscience cannot be identified with its almost universal trait of seeking for authorities.

Thus it appears that conscience is not an instinct, and that it is set apart from all innate tendencies. It stands as a critic over against all instincts. It is a censor for every act of the self. But this does not mean that conscience is a different and particular consciousness which applies standards to behavior. Conscience represents an ideal which is the whole will to power in its completest or most inclusive realization; it is "a companionship, an intimation of destiny, a perception that human choices have some bearing upon an eternal order of being."[52]

Conscience is not an instinct; it stands outside instinctive life, not as distinct from it, "but as an <u>awareness of the success or failure of that life in maintaining its status</u>

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51. "Conscience resembles the aesthetic consciousness in being a continuous source of new requirements, not traceable to any 'lessons' of previous experience." (Hocking, Art.(1908)^2, 140)

52. Hocking, Art.(1935)^3, 43.

and its growth."[53] It is a conserving force of past achievement, a check against impending disintegration. Conscience is occasioned as a possible increase or decrease of being becomes an object of perception. Its voice is not heard but rather felt or thought. Its observation is: This course promises to increase, or to decrease, the hold on reality. It is the characteristically human capacity of being self-conscious concerning destiny. "It is the latest and finest instrument for the self-integration of instinct." (HNR, 123)

Hocking locates conscience on the "growing edge of human nature." (HNR, 124) Its outstanding importance is evidenced in the fact that the failures of conscience are recognized as the failure of man, and in the fact that there is constant warfare against man's moral errors. Moral error results in sin.

4. Sin.

(1) The idea of original sin, and the idea of sin. The idea of original sin, that man is born in sin, and is a sinner at birth, is a fiction, created by man's attempt to account for his own wickedness.[54] Professor Knudson calls

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53. Hocking, HNR, 123. Italics his. This is not in contrast to, but is more complete than, an earlier statement in which conscience is described as "the perception of flux in the awareness of the whole." (Art.(1908)^2, 141)

54. Ps. 51:5.

attention to the ingenuity of the biblical writer who sought to account for the fall of Adam, and thus for the origin of sin.[55] The stimulus offered satisfaction for a number of man's instinctive longings: a physical craving: "the woman saw that the tree was good for food"; a longing for aesthetic enjoyment: "it was pleasant to the eyes"; and the impulse of curiosity: it was "a tree to be desired to make one wise." Eve was burdened with a prohibition; in the face of it, especially since she was led to believe that she would not surely die, the self-assertive tendency took possession of her and she "did eat". And the instinct of sociability gained expression in that she "gave also unto her husband."[56]

The idea of original sin has been fostered by religion; it was given a place in the Catechism. Three questions, and answers to them, are given herewith from the shorter Catechism:

> XVI. Did all Mankind fall in Adam's first transgression?
>
> Answer. The Covenant being made with Adam, not only for himself, but for his Posterity, all mankind descending from him, by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him in his first Transgression.
>
> XVII. Into what Estate did the Fall bring Mankind?
>
> Answer. The Fall brought Mankind into a state of Sin and Misery.

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55. Cf. Knudson, DR, 260.

56. All the quotes, with italics as given, are from Genesis 3:6.

> XVIII. Wherein consists the sinfulness of that Estate whereinto man fell?
>
> Answer. The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption sin; together with all actual transgressions which proceed from it.[57]

The fictional character of this notion is generally recognized today. Professor Knudson, whose view is essentially the same as Hocking's, makes the following statement on this point: "The doctrines of original sin and of the fall complicate and confuse the problem rather than throw light upon it."[58] But merely to recognize the fictional character of this notion does not remove the fact of man's sinfulness. Man is a sinner despite the modern attempt to expunge the charge. As to why he sins will be discussed later; it remains just now to point out what, if anything, there is in its natural endowment which inclines the self toward evil. Hocking states clearly that "there is nothing in original human nature which taken by itself can be called evil." (HNR, 135) Although original expressions of instinct are crude, crudity and sin cannot be identified. There are many innate dispositions which may be called dangerous, but they cannot be called sinful.

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57. Questions 16-18. Quoted from Samuel Willard, CAT, 194, 201, 205.

58. Knudson, DR, 261.

Impulses, in and of themselves, are promises of satisfactions, and thus are good. That they cannot be taken as evil in themselves, however, does not imply that these crude impulses are good, nor does it mean necessarily that they are devoid of moral quality. If they are neither good, bad, nor indifferent, then what are they? Impulses are like atoms: they are hypothetical. No impulse is ever found by itself, except the first one, which is also hypothetical. They always have an environment.

The moral quality of impulses depends upon their mental environment; it is determined by their relation to this environment, which is consciousness itself. Each impulse has its own particular goal; but all impulses have a bearing upon, and no one of them is wholly independent of, the will to power. The moral issue arises whenever any particular impulse aims only at its own goal, and rejects all responsibility for the complete life of the self. For example, the sex impulse may seek satisfaction regardless of consequences to the whole self. The moral issue represents a conflict between the individual impulse or habit and the society of impulses or habits which is the self.[59] The particular impulse has a two-fold obligation to the central will. First, the particular impulse should aid in creating the supreme

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59. There is analogy between the individual and society.

ideal; and then it must subordinate itself and express this master sentiment. The ideal is the complete integration of instinctive behavior, and a completely rational interpretation of the will to power. Sin is the refusal to interpret an impulse in terms of this completeness. (HNR, 140)

The will, to begin with, is so feeble; the impulses are so strong and unruly; the ideal is so dim and appears so nearly impossible, it is not altogether wrong to say that man at birth is inclined toward sin. Although there is no such thing as original sin, every man is, indeed, his own Adam. (HNR, 161) If there is not that in their nature to make them do so, then why do men sin?

(2) Why men sin, and the moral requirement. Sin can be described; it cannot be explained. To explain it is to show how the moral error was determined, and thus to remove the guilt of sin. The concept sin is a misnomer apart from the type of metaphysical freedom discussed in sections one and two above. The topic for this discussion might better be "How men sin". The reason as to why men sin cannot be given other than to say that, apart from ignorance, they desired to do as they did, or were willing that the die be cast.

It bears repeating that there is no innate tendency in man by which he may be called sinful. As Knudson, in his empirical theory of the origin of sin, points out, original human nature is non-moral. The natural endowment includes

instincts or impulses and a capacity for activity. But ethically all these are neutral. Moral life does not begin until the arrival of a conscious will with a standard of values. Sin results as the will yields to or releases its control of impulses which are partial, the expression of which is not in keeping with the most complete realization of the whole self.

According to Knudson, the raw material of our emotional and conative nature, the power of self-direction, and a difficult goal to be attained - these are the only essential factors in the origin of sin.[60] Thus although man is not by nature sinful, the situation is nevertheless such that it is easier for him to sin than to do right. Right requires effort, whereas sin may result even from inactivity. Sin "has the advantage of the natural slope." (HNR, 150)

This is not to erase the term sin, however, and to allow indulgence on the basis of natural slope or natively stronger motive. It has already been stated that the master sentiment is represented by the will. Therefore the stronger motive is always made so by the self. (Even the law of inertia cannot be appealed to as an excuse, because the appeal to anything else implies the recognition of guilt.) Unless the right is within reach there is no obligation. Sin involves

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60. Knudson, DR, 261.

an abrogation of one's own abilities. Sin is a matter of personal experience. It is possible because the individual faces real moral dilemmas, or ones which he imagines are real, in the course of life.

Once entered upon the process of living, there is no stopping, short of death. The self meets new and untried situations constantly; each situation presents possibilities of error. Some decision must be made because time is real, and time marches on. The self must decide, but not too quickly; the self should deliberate, but not too long. Living well involves the task of combining theoretical relativism and practical absolutism. Men sin because this task is too difficult for them.

The moral life cannot be lived in solitude. Yet social relations involve alliances with the imperfect, because culture is a mixture of virtues and vices. It is almost impossible to be free from contamination in a world where there is so much evil. Life is a continuous series of compromises, not only from what one ought to be to what he wants to be, but also from what he desires to become to what he has to be. Men sin because it is too hard to do right.

The habit of conscience is to seek moral authority, and to use this authority as a guide for conduct. The tendency is to accept the authority completely. If there is more than one authority the self is split accordingly. In the case of a conflict of authorities the personality becomes dual or

neurotic unless the conflict is resolved. It is difficult to accept an authority half-heartedly. Yet the authority must be tested; the ideal must be evaluated critically. Thus, the individual must have only a tentative devotion for his ideal lest he be betrayed by it. "Moral disillusionment is the severest of experiences." (HNR, 155)

This does not mean that the self should reject all moral authority. It is to suggest that to live a moral life is exceedingly difficult. There comes often a time when the self must surrender its ideal or else fight for it.[61] This is particularly true in time of war. But it should be kept in mind that the effort to overcome aggression, or opposition, is apt to issue in moral wrong which will destroy the good aimed at, or at least so blind the devotees that they will be unable to appreciate the ideal which originally inspired them.

Hocking states that "the dangers of hostility are obvious; but those of peace are incomparably deceitful." (HNR, 157) The truth of this statement, though, is in practice, not in theory. The method of peace has been morally seductive, akin to the unclean person's method of dealing with dirt. The existence of cherished wrongs is not recognized,

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61. Hocking, HNR, 156. There is another alternative which Hocking does not suggest, namely, to suffer for the idea, in the belief that truth crushed to earth will rise again.

and thus left unsettled. The true lover of peace, like the clean soul, is diligent in ferreting out the unsightly and evil spots, and seeks to settle them without physical conflict.

This is added evidence of the difficulty with which the self lives a moral life. It helps to suggest that the moral life involves a moral risk. There is a moral peril to living. Although the instinctive activity is soon subdued and controlled by consciousness, this consciousness even with the help of conscience, is unable to perceive the evanescent line which so often divides virtue from vice.

According to this interpretation men sin, in large measure, because they are unable to help it. Sin seems to be necessary for moral growth, because the achievement of the moral life is a process of trial and error. The thing to keep in mind, however, and the thing which counts, is the total will, and the direction of the striving for power. It is this will which determines the moral character of an act. Provided this will to power is at the same time a will-to-good, the whole of life is a moral adventure, a genuine search for truth; and the contingent lapses become required by conscience. Innocence due to ignorance is not virtue. Morality must be original. Unless this will to power is also a will-to-good the individual is a sinner. But given the will-to-good there are two forces which make for achievement

of the moral ideal, one negative, one positive. The former is remorse, the repulsion of evil; the other is the intrinsic attraction of the ideal. The complete moral motive is two-fold, involving the "push of rue" and the "pull of the ultimate good." (HNR, 160)

5. The remaking of the self.

"It is human nature to change itself." (HNR, 17) Such is Hocking's attitude toward the position that human nature cannot be changed. In fact the fundamental tendency of human nature is to remake itself according to expectation.[62] This is not to go back on what has been said above about the freedom of the self; rather it is to emphasize it. The only thing known is that the self will be changed in the process of time. It is not known just what the new product will be. There are three factors in the remaking of the self, namely, experience, society, and the actual self involved. These factors will be discussed in turn.[63]

It is a literal truth that experience is the mother teacher. Experience in its broad sense includes contact with nature and with other selves in society as well as one's own thinking and dreaming; but here the term experience is limited.

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62. Hocking, PLR, 64.

63. The reader is referred to the section "The natural endowment of the self" as a preliminary to the following.

It means only that outcome of influence in one's behavioral response which tends to color the response in any similar situation, and indeed in all future situations. "To experience is to experiment and to read the returns of experimentation." (HNR, 180n)

A study of the role of experience in remaking the self involves a review of the dialectic of the will to power. Experience reveals what will satisfy the instincts, and experience reveals which of these possible satisfactions may be enjoyed. One never knows until he tries. The tools by which experience remakes the self are pleasure and pain.[64] The dialectic is a series of successive hypotheses. Pleasure is positive whereas pain is negative. Pain, however, is the more powerful implement in the remaking process. Pleasure is a type of experience which is inviting, and tends to produce more of the same. Change is at a minimum as long as life runs smoothly and is characterized by pleasure. As the self meets a problem, and suffers pain, changes will be made in the interest of relief. The self is stimulated to think and to reorganize its life.[65]

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64. The child is more amenable than is the adult, yet both are subject to the process.

65. This is essentially the position of John Dewey. Life is spontaneous and habitual until a problematic situation arises. But whereas for Hocking mind is present constantly, in Dewey's thought the mental makes its appearance when the organism "experiences" an obstacle. (Cf. RIP, 88; QC, 187; EAN, 245; LOG, 172.)

The pleasures and pains are definite sense experiences; they offer no reasons for their existence. The self which enjoys or undergoes them gives meaning to them. It is not until the self is able to assign the experience to the situation, and to interpret the experience in terms of its own desire that remaking begins. There is a mental after-image which is connected with the experience; it represents the self's comment on the whole situation. "It is the reaction of the whole will upon the partial impulse, when the full meaning of that impulse is perceived in the light of its results."[66] The mental after-image is the most important determinant of future conduct. If the image is positive the concern of the self will be to foster the stimulus. If the image is negative the self will seek to eliminate the stimulus or to avoid it: the self will develop a new hypothesis for dealing with any similar situation. The remaking of the self, as fostered by experience, consists in this continuous formulating of new hypotheses in the dialectical development of the will.

Society, as a factor in the remaking of the self, includes the state and its institutions; society represents

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66. Hocking, HNR, 186. Italics his. Dallière describes the mental after-image as the total reaction of the will which evaluates in a just measure the good that has been realized through the expression of some particular instinct. (Cf. Dallière, WEH, 42.)

the social will or custom, in contrast to the individual will. The tools used by society are called sanctions, rewards and punishment. These sanctions are not now as powerful as they once were. Yet they still play a part in determining the life of man. The instinct of sociability is so basic that man will not willingly exclude himself from society; he fears the disfavor of his fellows. (HNR, 201)

Individual experience, in large measure, is dependent upon the social will. In view of this it may be said that the social will provides the possibility for the remaking of the self; and that its own influence in the reconstruction is in that direction taken by individual experience. Knowledge is cumulative; through its records and histories society abbreviates the trial and error process of the individual self. Others have already done most of the things which the self will undertake; through a study of others' methods the individual may profit by both their successes and their mistakes. The cumulative nature of knowledge is the basis of progress. If the self is to achieve much it must draw upon society's storehouse of proven techniques. Besides this accumulated capital of wisdom society "preserves a common direction of growth, and at least a minimum level of achievement in a great number of individuals." (HNR, 205)

In spite of the advantages which society affords, however, the social will is actually repressive. The standards

and ideals of the social will are in terms of the interests of society; they represent primarily what is good for the group, and not necessarily the most desirable thing for the individual. The acceptable patterns of behavior are so fixed that life can hardly be lived outside these bounds.[67] Furthermore the means and equipment which society supplies are so limited that life in society is necessarily competitive. It is true that the social will which seeks to remake the self is not altogether altruistic.

Conflicts arise between the individual will and the social will. Principles regarding these conflicts will be discussed in the next section on the rights and duties of the self. It should be noted here, though, that although some form of the state is necessary the primary right is to the individual. (HNR, 212) The state exists for man, not man for the state. Whatever is required of an individual, therefore, must be for his own good also. This not only gives first place to the more basic rights, it is the most effective means of accomplishing the desired end. The ideal which the social will sets up for the individual must effect a favorable response. This can be done only as the ideal represents also what the individual desires or wants for himself.

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67. Cf. Hocking, HNR, 209. This is hardly the case now. Any sociable mode of life is acceptable; yet it must be sociable.

The most effective method which the social group has for remaking the self is education. Education effects social reproduction, but it does more. The type is communicated and a means is provided for growth beyond this type. Here the social will finds a means of remaking the self which includes what the individual should desire for himself. This is a type of equipment in which there is no competition. Persons compete for the opportunity of training; and they use their training in competing for other things. But the new ideas are free to all those who can conceive them or think them. (HNR, 231)

Experience, as a factor in remaking the self, helps to bring the will into existence. Education, as sponsored by society, should lead the individual in such a way that the will to power will be evoked and understood. In the process of education those stimuli should be supplied which will awaken the several impulses of the self. And with these stimuli there should be some indication of what they mean. The individual comes to make the accumulated capital of wisdom his own; he finds in the storehouse of culture examples of the goods and the evils of experience. And thus his own sojourn in the realm of illusion may be shortened.

In the effort to transform man, however, both through social sanctions and in the process of education, the work of society is superficial. The intention is only to civilize

him, to make him a polite member of the social group. But this is not enough. The practical attitude, of putting a man "on his feet by putting him where he works well"[68] is an inadequate basis of social work. It is necessary that social work begin with the concrete but the transformation just suggested is not complete; social regeneration is not possible until the delinquent has recognized the intangible nature of the trouble, and until the problem has been dealt with cooperatively through a re-orientation of ideas, i.e., through some new motivation. The unifying impulse in life has been called the will to power. The best effort of society fails to satisfy or to save the human being. "It fails to provide within its own resources the reality and independence which it demands, and in fact uses; it is living upon borrowed capital." (HNR, 313-314)

This defect is overcome through art and religion. Art and religion are fostered by the social will, and thus may be spoken of as resources of society for saving and remaking the self. Both of these, however, are personal interests; their appeal is directly to the individual. In art as well as in religion the role of society (in remaking the self) depends upon the role of the individual self.[69] These interests are

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68. Hocking, Art.(1925)[3], 361.

69. In the following, two of the three factors (society and the actual self involved) are being discussed together. They are inseparable.

in society but they are also beyond it. "Art is the region which man has created for himself."[70] In this region man can express his powers; he can achieve success in it; and thus gain a testimony to his own reality. "The work of art is the dream made objective, permanent, self-conscious, mutual."[71] The effect on the self is tremendous. The enjoyment of art enlivens one's wishes; it strengthens one's faith in their achievableness; and thus increases the meaning of life. "Heightened energies of action are transmuted into energies of creativity." (HNR, 345) The satisfaction, however, which art affords is not actual but only symbolic. Art is only an anticipated triumph of the will. The self must grasp its

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70. Hocking, HNR, 315. Italics his.

71. Ibid., 340. Italics his. Hocking disagrees with Freud, for whom art forms aremanifestations of repressed wishes. According to Freud, art is a path from phantasy back again to reality. The artist, urged on by instinctual needs (honor, power, riches, fame, love) which he is unable to satisfy, takes refuge in phantasy. In persons other than artists this might easily lead to neurosis. But the true artist is able to elaborate, to modify, and to express his phantasies in such a manner as to make them enjoyable to others and socially acceptable. "Then he has won, through his phantasy, what before he could only win in phantasy: honor, power, and the love of women." (Freud, ILP, 315) Hocking agrees that repressed wishes are expressed in art forms; but there are not particular wishes which receive such expression. Rather it is "the total wish of man - the will" that is expressed.

object through concepts. If this is to be done the art form must be transcended.[72]

> If you want to save social impulse, save the worth of men; and if you want to save the worth of men find the worth of the cosmos in which man breathes and thinks. . . . The thing that holds these two . . . together is . . . religion, the living thought-filled intercourse of man with the whole.[73]

The special province of religion is the sphere of the supernatural. The concern of religion is "with what is behind, beyond, beneath, and within the world"; the object of religion stands "in contrast with all that is apparent, finite, and controllable by systematic thought." (HNR, 351) The aim in religion is to unite the finite will with this power which is behind and beyond the world, and which is looked upon as the will of the world. Hocking runs dangerously close to pantheism as he speaks of the union of these two wills. The union does not obliterate the finite will, but rather prepares it and strengthens it for the further tasks of life. This union is a return of the self to its own real basis; it makes for an alliance with the source of all power. The history of great religious leaders is evidence that the devotee has a

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72. Hocking, HNR, 344. This is the position of Hegel. Hocking, however, doesnot go beyond religion to philosophy as does Hegel. But religion as Hocking conceives of it is philosophical. Indeed the subtitle of his magnum opus, MGHE, is A Philosophic Study of Religion.

73. Hocking, Art.(1935)[3], 39.

strength not his own. But not all devotees become great religious leaders, and what of them? In its union with God the self gains a perspective which may result in the desired transformation.

This transformation of the self is a part of all religions, of religion in its contrast with the other interests of life. Hocking finds in Christianity the religion which shows best "what religion may mean for the transformation of instinct."[74]

In the discussion of Christianity the role of the actual self involved in the remaking becomes even more prominent. According to the Sermon on the Mount[75] Jesus states that he departs from tradition in shifting the requirement; no longer is the requirement from outward appearance but from the heart. Christianity "intends to state its requirement in terms of a complete transformation of the instincts." (HNR, 367) As the self experiences union with the Christian God it comes back into the world with a prophetic consciousness;[76] it has a cosmic assignment to fulfill. The imperfect takes the perfect for its object; the perfect dwells in, and is realized by, the imperfect as it does the work of the

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74. Hocking, HNR, 359. Hegel regarded Christianity as the highest religion.

75. Matt. 5-7.

76. Cf. Hocking, MGHE, Ch. XXXII.

perfect. (HNR, 413) Thus the instincts come to be transformed and the self comes to be remade. "Mysticism, as worship, is only a moment of reflux in the movement of living: but in that moment human nature is dissolved and recreated, shattered and remoulded - a little nearer to the heart's desire."[77]

It is necessary, however, in the interest of freedom to point out again the exact role of the actual self involved. The Christian God invades the world, and seeks to win the self. God is forever restless in his pursuit of what is lost and in his effort to correct that which is wrong. (HNR, 422) But this divine aggression is not strong enough to determine the self's choice. Man can never be more than a consenting child of God. Although the self changes constantly in the process of time, the actual transformation of the will can be effected only by the individual self.[78]

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77. Hocking, Art.(1912), 61.

78. Hocking, HNR, 171. Karl Deschweinitz has written an excellent little book on The Art of Helping People Out of Trouble. One thing is lacking, however, and that happens to be the main thing. There should be a discussion concerning the art of awakening in people a desire to be helped out of their trouble, and helping them to see the vision of what they might become. There is indeed an art of doing this; and the ability to do it deserves the honor of being called an art. The first requisite, however, is the frank recognition that the individual cannot be helped permanently without his own co-operation.

6. Rights and duties of the self.

This section is a treatment of the self's rights and duties in social relations.[79] Hocking insists almost as strongly as Hegel on the social meaning of human duty. "Morality is too narrowly conceived when expressed either in terms of the rights of self and the duties of others, or in terms of the duties of self and the rights of others." The true conception of morality "is to be found rather in the over-individual laws of progressive common life, which afford a rule at once, of personal duty and of personal privilege."[80]

"The human being may be described as a set of ideas striving for control over a physical body and its neighborhood." (PLR, 86) The individual develops as the ideas become clearer and stronger, and gain mastery. Ideas develop and mature only as they are used by the person who has them. And unless one uses his own ideas in governing his undertakings he is not growing because this represents the permanent condition of growth.

Since there is not one individual only but a world of

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79. It is a discussion in ethics; therefore its proper place is in this chapter rather than in the following one, which is a study of the problem of social experience and communication. Placed here it serves as a transition between the two.

80. Hocking, UEA, 4.

them, their neighborhoods overlap. And since each human being is striving for control over his own physical body and its neighborhood for himself conflicts are apt to arise. Consequently it is necessary to determine boundaries for these neighborhoods, to determine for the self its station and its duties, or to formulate principles to govern its social relations. The self has certain rights in contrast to the rights of its fellows and to the society in which it lives, yet it has duties which correspond to these rights. A better statement might be, the self has certain rights in co-operation with the rights of other selves in society.[81]

Rights represent those conditions believed best conducive to the full development of human powers. (PLR, 72, 73) This includes the concept of duties also. Else it may be said, duties represent those conditions believed best conducive to the mutual development of human beings. Any scale of values among rights is determined by the bearing which the values have on the mental development of individuals. (PLR, 82) It is evident from this that the human self is of supreme importance in Hocking's theory. "The heart and

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81. The moral hope is a foundation stone in civilization; it is basic in human nature, if not by choice at least by necessity. "A moral hopefulness, i.e., a tendency to believe in the response-begetting character of the moral nature, is the most universal trait of mankind." (Hocking, SWP, 496. Cf. also 493ff.)

focus of all ultimate value is in persons not in such abstractions as society, culture, history."[82]

In sharp contrast to the views of Hobbes and Hegel, who sanctioned any pressure which the state might impose upon its members, Hocking sets up "the individual life, with its natural dialectic, as the standard to which social pressures must confirm."[83]

There are two necessities for any lasting state or union. In the first place there must be a commotive function, i.e., some cause for which men move together; this function must be continuous or else the union will dissolve. Regardless of how important the economic motive is, or even the desire for security, this function must include the social and ethical interests, for it is these interests which draw and keep men together.[84] "Economic facts become social powers only when they make connection with intelligence, moral vim, a degree of courage; their force comes wholly from the

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82. Hocking, MAS, 173-174.

83. Hocking, HNR, 209. It is interesting to note the surprising difference in the views of Hegel and Hobbes in regard to the state's priority. For Hobbes the social repression was a necessary evil, a tax on natural liberty; the state is really an unnatural or artificial construction. For Hegel, however, subordination of the will to the state is freedom. The value of an individual is in his social relations and loyalties. Cf. Hocking, HNR, 226; Brightman, ML, 212; Hobbes, Works, III, 160-161, 199-200, 308-322; Hegel, PR, Sect. 261.

84. Hocking, LEI, 114, Cf. 110-115.

imponderables." What are the imponderables? They "belong to the realm of values, and in this realm power is powerless."[85]

The second necessity for any lasting state or union is the incompressible individual. This is the lasting element in individualism. Man is prior to the state, and the principle of any lasting state must be the practice that "*every man shall be a whole man*."[86] Individual thought and conscience must be free. The state must produce its own critics if it is to last and grow.[87] "No nation can exist unless the idea of the nation finds an intelligent resonance in the minds of the individual citizens." (LEI, 13)

A man's right is to his own development. This is primary and original. "The right of society exists only where its own interest and that interest coincide." (HNR, 212) There is only one natural or absolute right belonging to an individual, i.e., "to become what he is capable of becoming." (PLR, 74) Hocking is consistent in his emphasis upon this point. "The form of the state's aim is the making of history; its substance is the making of men." (MAS, 123) The state may be spoken of as a self which seeks to exist for itself, but it is no mind nor does it have one. Its mind and conscience

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85. Hocking, Art.(1936)^2, 151-153.

86. Hocking, LEI, 133. Italics his.

87. Hocking, Art.(1934)^2, 86-88.

are only those of the persons who compose the state. If the minds and tongues of the people are cramped to fit a mold, then the mental life of the society is limited or destroyed. The most characteristic function of the state is as educator, and its outstanding contribution in history is the men it produces.[88]

This natural right of man, i.e., "to become what he is capable of becoming" involves freedom of self-direction as well as of self-control; it involves the right to use one's own ideas in governing his undertaking. Hocking calls this the "right of liberty".[89] It remains to point out the implications of this right of liberty in the three areas of

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88. A test for a nation's advancement or backwardness is the condition of the common people. (Hocking, SWP, 16) It is the spirit of this testing principle which causes Hocking, in The Spirit of World Politics, to be most emphatic in his discussion of "Forced Labor". (402-420) It is not economic first and ethical afterward, but is ethical first and economic afterward. The solution, if ever there is one, must follow this order. Man is different from the animal in that he is able to see a moral point; therefore he requires moral treatment. Forced labor, i.e., labor to which men are driven without regard to their wills, is immoral, and will defeat the end in view. The will of the worker must be enlisted, if not in the complete plan at least in the part affecting him.

In contrast to the view that the more primitive a culture the more freedom in exploiting the people, Hocking insists that this is the reverse of what is true. "In proportion as culture is primitive the ethical basis of dealing becomes momentous." (SWP, 419)

89. Hocking, PLR, 86. Italics his.

man's undertakings: control of self, control of others, control of physical things.

Man seeks to control and direct his own life; in this experiment others should respect his freedom of worship and the privacy of his inner life. This respect represents the right of liberty in self-direction.

In order to develop his life man needs associates, and contact with other minds. In these contacts each should respect the right of the other to propogate his own ideas. The right of liberty in undertaking social control involves the freedom of speech, of the press, and of association.

These two undertakings, control of self and of others, are dependent upon, or are effected largely through, the control of physical things. There is no principle of attraction between empty minds. "It is the other mind as knowing and mastering Nature that we first care about." (MGHE, 256) Aristotle observed the necessity of wealth and physical things for personal development and happiness.[90] All selves are undertaking to control physical things so that there must be reciprocal respect. The right of liberty in the control of nature represents the right of property.

All that the right of liberty implies is dependent upon the more fundamental right to security. Thus the right of

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90. Aristotle, Eth. Nic., 1099a ff.

liberty in self-management depends upon the right to security of one's person; the right of liberty in undertaking social control is based upon the right to security of one's agreements and contacts; and the right of liberty in the control of nature is meaningless without the right to security of one's property. (PLR, 88-92)

Such are the rights of man in the three areas of his undertakings. The basis of these rights is not in the fact of man as a psychological center; nor are they based in social utility.

> Rights are based in the last resort on a source of obligation which both the individual and his group are bound to respect. That source is metaphysical. When the individual conceives his desires and impulses not as psychological facts but as elements in a life-purpose which has been implanted in him by the cosmos, and which as a cosmic duty he ought to fulfil, then these desires and impulses acquire a sanction which both individuals and groups are bound to respect, irrespective of their immediate wishes.[91]

But to each of these rights there is a corresponding duty. Man's rights are inalienable only so long as he aims to develop his powers. Rights exist only in the presence of moral responsibility and ambition. The discussion of "Rights without Duties" (LEI, 51-57) is a vigorous one. The shirker is condemned mercilessly. Rights are not rights until they are looked upon as privileges and as responsibilities.

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91. Hocking, Art.(1931)^2, 495-496.

Liberalism has failed in that it has fostered, or at least has allowed to develop, the belief that there are inalienable rights apart from corresponding duties. "The conditions of all rights are moral conditions; without good will all rights drop off."[92]

Because "the heart and focus of all ultimate value is in persons" (MAS, 173f.), all these duties, just as is any scale of values among rights, are determined by the bearing which they have on the mental development of individuals. (PLR, 82) Such a determination of duties is manifested in the following statement with regard to the right of property. "The ultimate basis of all property right is power to use; but the chief of all uses is the making of men, as realized through systems of ownership."[93]

The liberal spirit belongs to human nature; it represents human nature's attack on its own natural selfishness. Selfhood involves selfishness or self-centeredness, because a self must live from its center. Every self, because of its unique vision of value, its individual point of view, is naturally self-centered. But the self must revolt and

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92. Hocking, LEI, 54. Cf. also 172ff.

93. Hocking, SWP, 524. Italics his. Cf. 520-532.

try to correct this perspective.[94] It is necessary, for the self's own development, that this revolution or reformation take place. As Professor Brightman notes in his "Proof of the Law of Altruism"[95], unless the individual acknowledges and obeys the Law of Altruism he "implies that others need not treat him as a realizer of value." Persistence of self-centeredness prevents the individual's own fullest realization, because he misses the needed associational values as well as those values which can be realized only in co-operative endeavor.

Immanuel Kant expressed what he regarded as a Categorical Imperative as follows:

> So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in any other, always as an end and never merely as means.[96]

Hocking goes beyond Kant in this regard, in that human beings

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94. Hocking, LEI, 39. This is especially true for the popular hero, for seldom does he escape with his sanity.
Hocking finds in Christianity a system of thought, or an ideal at least, which gives full satisfaction to the instinctive life of man. Christianity, however, "intends to state its requirements in terms of a complete transformation of the instincts." (HNR, 367. Cf. 362-439.)

95. Brightman, ML, 225. The law is stated thus: "Each person ought to respect all other persons as ends in themselves, and as far as possible, to co-operate with others in the production and enjoyment of shared values." (P. 223. Italics his.)

96. Kant, GMS, 54.

are to be treated not only as ends in themselves but "as ends which I am helping to achieve".

> Treat human beings according to what they may become with the best available aid, and our own.[97]

Every human relation involves an obligation, that of treating the other person not merely in terms of what he is but in terms of what it is possible for him to become, i.e., according to what he is capable of being. (MIE, 185-186)

Hocking's ethical principle shows influence from Kant, from Hegel, and from Royce. Yet he goes beyond them. It is stated as follows:"Universalize thyself."[98] Each human being represents a unique view of reality. The destiny of the individual is the universalized expression of this latent idea.

The simple command to "universalize oneself" includes the two most prominent and impressive statements of Kant's categorical imperative, which are:

> Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it shall become a universal law.

and

> So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in any other, always as an end and never merely as means.[99]

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97. Hocking, SWP, 514. Italics his.

98. Hocking, TP, 318. Italics his.

99. Kant, GMS, 44, 54.

It embraces also Royce's principle of loyalty to loyalty.[100]

> In so far as it lies in your power, so choose your cause and so serve it, that, by reason of your choice and of your service, there shall be more loyalty in the world rather than less. . . . In choosing and in serving the cause to which you are to be loyal, be, in any case, loyal to loyalty.[101]

Kant's ethics is admittedly formal; he sought to develop his formal principle in such a way that it would yield of itself the criteria of morality. But Kant had to forsake this principle of consistency, in order to decide the right and wrong of concrete acts, and appeal to the concrete end of human welfare. Royce did not intentionally develop a formal ethics. But his ideal of loyalty to loyalty affords no help concerning the concrete causes to which one should be loyal. Yet it is this particular insight which is most necessary to morality. Everett makes the following statement concerning the inadequacy of the formalism of Kant and Royce:

> Mere universality - Kant's test of consistency - affords no practical rule of conduct. . . . Nor is loyalty in a better position to tell us what causes we should serve. The claim that the spirit of loyalty will itself be able to 'furnish us the unmistakable answer to this question', is itself essentially a repetition of Kant's claim that the good-will can yield us guidance in the specific choices of moral life.[102]

It might appear that Hocking's principle would lend

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100. Royce, PL, Lecture III.

101. Ibid., 121. Italics his.

102. Everett, MV, 45-46.

itself to the same charge. But that such is not the case will become evident in the following contrast with Hegel and Bradley. For Hegel the world is a living process; human individuals are immersed in this process, and they get their freedom as well as their worth through participation in it. Hegel observes that there is a dialectical development of the individual's freedom and of his worth.[103] First there is the negative freedom of aloofness. The individual seeks to live his moral life in solitude because social relations involve alliances with the imperfect. There is so much evil in the world that the self wants to abandon it. This course of life is soon found to be empty and unsatisfying. Then the individual tries the positive freedom of eccentric self-assertion. But this path also leads to meaninglessness and despair. At last the self achieves a concrete and satisfying freedom in belonging to what he formerly looked upon with disdain: an individual member of an imperfect society. Whereas previously the defective means were thought of as chains, now, through an understanding and mastery of them they have become wings. The task is to perceive that which

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103. Hegel is often accused of <u>using</u> the dialectic as a tool for constructing a theory of reality. The accusation is not wholly unjust: He is a methodological dogmatist. His theory of freedom in which the will of the individual is subordinated to the state is an example. His ideal is the state, and all else mustmove in that direction. Cf. note 83 above. Cf. also Hocking, HNR, 209, 226.

is universal and to ally oneself with it. The ideal for Hegel is identification with objective Reason as it is realized in the institutions of mankind.[104]

Hegel's concern for the state and society caused him to neglect the individual.[105] Hocking admits with Hegel that the ethical life cannot be lived in solitude; the individual must ally himself with mankind or society. But this is the first step only. This alliance should not be too complete to prevent criticism. Alexander's view of obligation, a consciousness of what the collective mind wills, as well as his view of guilt, a consciousness of non-conformity to the collective mind, was rejected because he disregarded individual ideals and obligations. Alexander does not have any place for the individual's obligation to criticize and correct the collective mind.[106]

Hocking was influenced by Hegel, as was also F. H. Bradley, but in both cases the follower has gone beyond the

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104. Hegel, PR, Sections 260, 141. Cf. Hocking, TP, 316ff.

105. Cf. Hocking, HNR, 209, 226; Brightman, ML, 212. But, for Hegel, the individual finds his fullest realization in the state. Cf. Hegel, PR, Section 261.

106. Cf. Alexander, STD, 331; note 46, above, and ff.

leader.[107] They supersede Hegel in their emphasis upon the individual. Bradley's discussion of "My Station and Its Duties" almost parallels Hocking's treatment of his own ethical principles. The end is the realization of the good will (universal) which is superior to one's present outlook.[108] But good will is meaningless apart from the will of living finite beings. The duty to criticize affords the individual an opportunity to express what is unique in his own ideal; he is freed from complete subordination to the state or church. (TP, 319) But Bradley condemns as foolish the setting of the ideals of one's head over against the reality of the world. For the individual to insist that he knows better, or that he is better, than the moral organism smacks of youthful self-conceit; it is actually immoral. One's duty, as Hegel recognized, is to take the best there is and live up to it. But one's duty involves more. The individual must stand on the basis of what is, and while incorporating in his own life the best of what is, he must

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107. This does not mean that in Hegel's theory there is no place for the criticism of society. The individual's duty is to identify himself with only that which is universal. This is an effective means of correcting the institutional life of mankind, and of eventually re-creating it. But the fact remains that the will of the individual is subordinated to the will of the state. Cf. Hegel, PR, Sec. 261.

108. Bradley, ES, 162.

seek to make himself and his world better. Right is the assertion of the universal will in relation to the particular will; duty is the assertion of the particular will in affirmation of the universal will; good is the identity, not merely the relation, of both.[109] In contrast to Hegel, it is not in alliance with the institutional life of mankind, nor in criticism of it, "but in the remaking of ideas and thereby of institutional life" (TP, 319), that the individual realizes his highest good. His worth is not so much in the psychological fact of personality as in that good will which leads him to effect a desirable change in the "universal current of life." (TP, 320)

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109. Bradley, ES, 212.

CHAPTER V

THE HUMAN SELF AND OTHER SELVES

1. The problem of social experience.

There are three fundamental classes of the substantive objects of human experience. Nature is thought of as all physical objects and their relations; the self consists of psychical objects and their relations. Society is made up of minds, social objects, and their relations. This third class may be called the Spiritual World; in a general way the self is included in it, as a social object or as a member of society. There are sciences pertaining to each of these classes of objects, the natural sciences, psychology, and sociology.[1]

The immediate problem is to answer the question how is social experience possible, how can the self know and communicate with other selves? It is a consideration of the relations between the self and society.[2]

Locke suggested that there is an inner sense for knowing one's own mind, and an outer sense for perceiving objects of nature. But he did not suggest any sense for discerning

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1. Hocking, MGHE, 241f.

2. In the course of the chapter, however, it will become evident that relations between these two are dependent also upon their relations to the first class of objects, nature.

other minds.[3] The nearest thing to this social sense that the sociologists are able to offer is a "consciousness of kind" or some other social instinct. But this consciousness of kind is not an actual organ of knowledge whereby the self can perceive other minds. There is no such perceptive organ known. Strictly speaking, social experience is a misnomer; there is no such thing in the literal sense of the term. There is social knowledge but it is of necessity built on hypothesis.

Just how is the hypothesis built? One person experiences the physical presence of another; he sees the other's expressive signs and hears his words. All that is experienced directly is the presence and expressive signs of the other person both of which are physical. Each infers the reality of the other. The inference is so completely confirmed in experience that each becomes as convinced of his social environment as he is of his physical environment. In this way the self becomes practically certain of its social world.

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3. Locke, ECHU, Book II, Chapter i. He simply assumes the reality of minds and of external things. The matter is inquired into in Book IV, Chapters iv, ix, xi. But nowhere does he prove the existence of these two classes of objects. He writes in Section 8 of Chapter xi that the certainty is as great as is necessary. Our faculties are not suited to give a "comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but . . . they serve our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those things, which are convenient or inconvenient to us."

There are wide and constantly varying extremes in regard to social experience. At times experience is oppressively social: the self seeks for privacy but finds only fragments of other characters and echoes of others' opinions; its own individuality is almost obliterated. On other occasions the self may experience aloneness in a crowd: it seems impossible to bridge the chasm between self and other selves, even in a practical way.

To try definitely to know one's neighbor is to realize the impossibility of such knowledge. The self experiences social relations but is at a complete loss in trying to understand the relationship. Experience belongs, somehow, to individual selves. There is an inevitable self-centeredness in selfhood. Sensation is of the not-self, but sensation appears as self-stuff, and to go further it always appears as particular-self-stuff.[4] It becomes evident, therefore, that in the nature of the case the other mind, as a thinker of objects, must be beyond the reach of direct experience. As a thinker of objects the other self is <u>subject</u> also; thus it can be thought only; it cannot be sensed. Otherness is assured by virtue of the fact that the thoughts of no two persons are the same. This would be true even though both were thinking the same object, because each would

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4. Hocking, DIS, 150.

have his own thoughts. One self may conjecture the thoughts of another self; but each self has an infinite thought-fund which is inaccessible directly to other selves, and which is accessible to itself only as it masters ideas. (MGHE, 244)

The difficulty in understanding how social relations are possible has been intensified by the "presupposition that the S-object is to be known after the same general scheme as is the T-object, or not at all."[5] Since the other self is intrinsically subject it cannot become such an object nor can it be cognized as is the thing-object.

But if this is the only genuine knowledge, self-knowledge is impossible also. The self cannot achieve any physical knowledge of its own mind; it cannot quit being subject in order to become object. Any explanation of self-knowledge might account for the possibility of knowledge of other selves. Locke's suggestion of the inner sense, reflection, as a means of knowing the self, is misleading; "of special organ there seems to be none for self-knowledge, any more than for knowledge of other minds." (MGHE, 252) In fact, knowledge of all three classes of objects, nature, the self, and other selves, stands on the same footing. It just happens that social knowledge was the last one to be critically investigated, and so was the last of the three to be declared impossible. It remains to examine the possibilities.

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5. Hocking, DIS, 99. S-object means social object and T-object means thing object or object of nature. Cf. p. 2.

2. Solipsism.

To raise the problem of social experience is to be confronted with solipsism, the thesis that "nothing beyond my self exists",[6] or that "nothing but my experience exists."[7] The question of social knowledge arose with Descartes in his determination to find out what he could know.[8] His finding represents the solipsistic position: the only certainty was that of his own immediate existence.[9] Descartes did not consider the problem of social experience as a primary demand on thinking. Nor did Leibniz, who also touched upon the matter.[10] But it was considered as such in the thought of Berkeley.[11] Berkeley wrote as follows:

> It is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them, excited in us. I perceive several motions . . . that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them, and concur in their production. Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is

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6. Bradley, AR, 248.

7. Hocking, TP, 268.

8. Descartes, DIS, pt. iv.

9. Unless Descartes had chanced upon the ontological argument for the existence of God he would have remained in bondage within himself, because it was God who guaranteed even the existence of the self, and who provided the self with its fellowsand external nature.

10. Cf. Hocking, MGHE, 246.

11. In his study of the principles of human knowledge.

> not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs.[12]

Berkeley's escape from the prison of the self is not unlike Descartes's. Both depend upon God; they view experience as the result of an external activity. Berkeley knows that he is passive in sensation, and God is postulated as the efficient cause of this sensation.[13]

Professor Perry condemns idealism, and especially Berkeleian idealism.[14] Idealism is established through fallacious arguments. Idealists are guilty of what Perry calls initial predication;[15] and they suffer from the "ego-centric

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12. Berkeley, Works, I, 339. Italics in text. Thus Berkeley's belief in the reality of other minds is based upon the argument from physical causes, and by analogy. His view is stated again in Section 148, as follows: "A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea. When therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves. . . . It is plain we do not see a man, if by man is meant that which lives, moves, perceives and thinks as we do: but only such a certain collection of ideas, as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and represented by it." (Works, I, 341)

13. Berkeley, Works I, 341, 342. Cf. 270, 286, 290.

14. Perry's interpretation of Berkeley is not accurate. It is false to attribute to him the theory that "to know is to generate the reality known." (PPT, 119) That is not what Berkeley meant by the statement esse is percipi.

15. Perry, PPT, 126ff.

predicament."[16] But how can an idealist, or anyone else, escape from his own experience? There is even danger that the loneliness of the ego-prison will lead to the conviction that "nothing but my experience exists." (TP, 268)

Leibniz was convinced that the "monads have no windows through which anything can enter or depart."[17] According to Perry, this presupposition that minds are accessible only to their possessors, is "as ill-defined and unreasonable as it is universal."[18] The notion arises, he says, from the fallacy of exclusive particularity. In Perry's realistic theory other minds are known by general observation. "Mental action is a property of the physical organism. . . . elements become mental content <u>when reacted to in the specific manner characteristic of the central nervous system</u>."[19] But this course leads to more questions than answers. Perry comes later to admit that this method of general observation "obscures" the content factor of mind, and so must be supplemented by the method of introspection.[20] Thus even Perry finds himself imprisoned.

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16. Perry, PPT, 129-132.

17. Leibniz, PWL, <u>Monadology</u>, 7.

18. Perry, PPT, 286.

19. Ibid., 298-299. Italics his.

20. Perry, PPT, 204f.

Solipsism cannot be refuted simply by refusing to believe in it. But once considered the problem arises from time to time until it is refuted. How can this be done? Miss Calkins believes that personal absolutism constitutes an escape. The self is immediately certain of itself and its experiencings. But among the self's experiencings are those of being hindered and of being thwarted, against its will. Being limited is a transitive experience. Knowledge of limitation involves an awareness of a limiting something.[21] But is not this awareness of a limiting something an idea in the mind? And might it not be only that? The self's certainty is in its experiencing only and not in its interpretation of experiences.

Solipsism can be refuted best by showing it to be a self-refuting position. In order to prove the position direct experience, i.e., the given, must be transcended. But to transcend the given is to go into the universe at large, and so to refute solipsism.[22] For one to insist that he can know only his own ideas is to imply that he has an idea of knowing something else. Until one transcends his own experience he

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21. Calkins, PPP, 452f. This is not far different from the escape suggested by Berkeley. (Cf. note 12 above.) Sensation is a transitive experience, according to Berkeley; but the idea of passivity and the idea of a causal agent might still be only in one's mind.

22. Bradley, AR, 250.

cannot assert that minds are confined within themselves. For example, Leibniz had to be standing outside before he could observe that the monads had no windows. To make such a statement about other selves involves a knowledge of them. (TP, 269) There remains the problem of finding out how they are known.

3. Knowledge of other selves.

The purpose of this section is to examine critically several theories of how other minds are known. The ground has been prepared by the foregoing. The rest of this chapter is a presentation, by contrast, of Hocking's theory of how social experience is possible.

It is not possible to formulate a set of infallible criteria or signs whereby one may discern the presence of, and enter into relations with, an other conscious being. This suggestion is better than the method of analogy.[23] Yet it is impossible, because there are no such criteria. James's description of the self as a "fighter for ends" serves as a basis for the suggestion that the recognizable pursuit of

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23. In the method of analogy the self infers the presence of other mind because of expressive movements analogous to its own actions. The difficulty is that a knowledge of one's own self must be presupposed. But self-consciousness is a late development; it is a product of social experience, rather than serving as a basis for it. (Cf. Hocking, TP, 288; Royce, SGE, 194, 196, 201; Alexander, STD, II, 32.)

ends with choice of means is an adequate test.[24] Such a test is helpful in social judgment but is not sufficient. These criteria are but physical signs; they do not arise from any direct experience of other mind. "Every physical change must and may be referred to a physical cause." (MGHE, 247) Given a consciousness of the social object these signs would be of great help in continuing the investigation. With the aid of these criteria the self would be able to pair off states of mind with sets of actions; but they would not enable the self to determine whether or not there were a state of mind.

Professor Royce suggests that other minds are "known to be real, and to have their own inner life, because they are . . . the endless treasury of more ideas."[25] The self finds a needed supplement for its fragmentary meanings. The self attributes mind to those things which respond to it, and which help the self to develop its own thought. The more consistent and integral the response, the more convinced the self is that it is dealing with other mind. Practical certainty is achieved through the continuous and successful social intercourse. The self becomes as convinced of its social environment as it is of its physical environment.

Yet this method does not lead to an original experience of fellow minds. Royce's criterion of response may serve to

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24. Cf. James, PSY, I, 140-143.

25. Royce, WI, II, 171. Italics his.

answer the question, "How do we know that we know other minds?" But it lends little help as to how other selves are actually known. It is based upon the presupposition that there are minds which can be known, and which will respond. The reality of other mind is only an inference; "a faith . . . not a knowledge in experience." (MGHE, 249)

Alexander goes beyond Royce and speaks of the double aspect of the experience of sociality. Other selves "excite in us the social or gregarious instinct, and to feel socially towards another being is to be assured that it is something like ourselves."[26] The reciprocal response of mind to mind gives rise to the mutual apprehension of kindred otherness. Alexander's view depends upon the instinct of sociability or the consciousness of kind; but this consciousness of kind is not an organ of knowledge for perceiving other minds. In fact there is "no such organ". (MGHE, 242) The futility of this instinct of sociability for knowing other minds is recognized even by Alexander. It offers no help as to what sort of mind there is. The nature of the other mind must be divined "sympathetically on the basis largely of analogy."[27] Although Alexander insists that assurance of the other mind is "not invented by inference or analogy", he goes on to

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26. Alexander, STD, II, 32.

27. Ibid., 37. Yet he has rejected the method of analogy. Cf. STD, II, 31ff.

speak of this assurance as "an act of faith forced on us by a peculiar sort of experience."[28] It is necessary to seek elsewhere for the knowledge of other selves.

4. Social experience and experience of nature.

Unless the other mind can be located in nature there can be no individuality and particularity. Minds, as pure minds, are so much alike that there is no attraction between them. In fact the only mind that is of interest is "a mind which has its own objects, and is at work upon them." (MGHE, 255) An empty mind is no mind at all. It was pointed out in Chapter II that the characteristic activity of mind is that of actualizing possibility, of making determinate an undetermined future. Yet the other mind cannot be known simply by knowing its objects; they must be known as being common objects, as being known by the other mind. The material for experience is found in nature; thus it may be said that the only mind which can be known is mind-in-union-with-nature. This is not to identify the mind and nature, because the mind is that which is united with or deals with nature. Nature is brought into the equation only for the sake of gaining knowledge of the mind which is manifested.

The possibility of mental telepathy, even if it were real, would not remove the necessity of knowing mind-in-union-

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28. Alexander, STD, II, 37.

with-nature. The value of telepathic communication would depend upon the possibility of its being verified. The self would not depend upon its strong impressions until it could verify them. Communication must be carried on indirectly, and through the medium of external appearances.[29] The other mind must be known as it is: in its conceiving of possibilities, and in its deeds which make them actual. Nature is the field wherein definiteness of position or location is possible, and in which individuality may be characterized. It is not necessary that a man enter one particular profession in order to gain a livelihood; but it is necessary that every man shall live in the world, and that nature shall serve as his material-for-experience. (MGHE, 259)

It follows, therefore, that other mind is experienced, if at all, in and through nature. Social experience and experience of nature seem to be inseparably united. Nature tends to separate one mind from its fellows, but whatever separates also connects, and hence nature, though separating minds, makes possible their knowing relationship. In separating, nature fixes and defines the other-ness of the other. At the same time nature provides a more tangible knowledge of the other than could be had through an experience of its thoughts alone. This becomes evident in considering the

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29. Bradley, AR, 346f.

value of the body in knowing other selves.

In Chapter III the body was spoken of as language of the self; it is the means whereby the self actualizes its possibilities. The body is that with which the self handles nature, just as the idea is that with which the self thinks nature. The body may thus be spoken of as a symbol of the idea; but it is more. "The body is an incredibly intricate and exact metaphor of every inner movement of that Other Mind."[30] As with Schopenhauer the body represents the objectified will.[31]

> The surface of the body is the shore-line where outgoing and incoming purposes meet, conflict and cross; and one tale confuses the clarity of the other, - yet adds the data without which the other were less than true. (MGHE, 263n)

But for the body other minds which are known would be obliterated: The experience of body cannot be dismissed from the idea of social experience. Such knowledge is not a literal knowing of other mind, nor does it afford any direct experience of the other mind, but it is a necessary constituent of social experience.

Social experience involvesthe world of nature. It remains, now, to show that an experience of nature is dependent upon social experience. The first statement is

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30. Hocking, MGHE, 262. Italics his.

31. Schopenhauer, WWV, Sections 18, 60.

granted more readily than is the latter, because nature-consciousness is constant whereas social experience is intermittent. Therefore, to show that an experience of nature depends upon social-consciousness is to make the latter continuous also. But as was noted in Section One of this chapter all three types of knowledge (of nature, of self, and of others) stand on the same level. Self-consciousness is recognizedly intermittent; yet it is reckoned as persisting. In like manner nature is an object of direct awareness only occasionally, but nature is always present. So also does the social consciousness persist. Although this persistent awareness of other mind is not as ready to hand as is the nature-consciousness it is "inseparably bound up . . . with the continuous experience of Nature." (MGHE, 269)

The persistence of this social-consciousness is more evident if, instead of considering only the body of the other, one takes thought of the world of nature which is common to both. It is through a known common world that the other is first known. Though his body disappear the objects, known as common objects, as his objects, never cease to be his objects. If any experience of nature has ever been a social experience it never loses its social reference. (MGHE, 271)

This seems to suggest that social experience has a beginning after and apart from physical experience. But such is not the case. It may be of help to consider the infant

and his social environment. His earliest experiences of nature are apparently social experiences. He begins experiencing nature as though it were animated, ready to respond to his demands. Knowledge of nature and consciousness of other mind are inseparably related from the beginning. A time cannot be found when nature was regarded as other than common. The self does not first know the physical world as a world of objects, and then as a world of shared objects. Physical experience acquires objectivity through a prior recognition of other mind. (TP, 288ff.)

Communication would be impossible unless two minds had something in common. Communication may build from little to more and more, but never from none to some.[32] Thus, if experience is ever actually social, the condition for it has always been present, and is present continuously. The position may be stated thus: social experience is either never present or is always present. If it can be shown that the self ever has an experience of other mind it will be proven that such experience is continuous.

These two things may be proven at the same time. To suppose that experience is never social is to contrast supposed non-social experience with supposed social experience. To conceive experience as limited to the self and its objects

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32. This common object is the world of three-dimensional space. (Hocking, TP, 290)

is to imply an idea of experience as being not thus limited, is to imply a conception of what social experience is, or would be like. On the other hand, an idea of social experience would not be possible unless social experience were actual: to conceive an experience of other mind is to have such an experience. It takes a non-subjective experience to judge one that is merely subjective. If Leibniz knew that the monads had no windows, that they did not actually experience each other, he knew their relations to be other than they seemed. Therefore Leibniz, at least, was an intermonadic mind.

Objection may be raised. It may be claimed that such an idea of social experience is an ideal construction, a conception produced by the imagination. But such is not the case; there is no way in which it can be constructed. It cannot be derived from physical ideas in physical relations, nor from psychical ideas in psychical relations; nor can it be derived from any combinations of these. "To reach the idea from these, we must use the special relation of Other-self-hood, which is the idea itself." (MGHE, 276) The idea of social experience, of other minds, is given; it is innate. This may be justified in Kantian fashion by saying that such an idea is "a native and necessary form by which the Self orders the material of its experience, as otherwise given." (MGHE, 276) There is no possible test for this idea save

in social experience. If it be only an hypothesis the idea is nevertheless a genuine social experience. Even as the idea of self is simultaneously an experience of self, so also the idea of other mind is simultaneously an experience of other mind. To realize what is meant by other mind is to find an other even as the self is found.[33] Social experience is real in whatever sense its reality can be thought, imagined, or denied. (MGHE, 279)

5. Social experience as experience of another's experience.

Other mind cannot be known simply by knowing its objects; the objects must be known as being common objects; they must be known as being known by the other mind. (MGHE, 261) This knowing of the other's known objects is an experience of the other's experience. In sharing identical objects the mysterious isolation of self from self is obliterated: Minds which are sharing objects are experiencing each other's experience. Nature is one, and is a common object; thus in sharing nature minds share each other's experience, and so share each other.[34]

This is a refutation of subjective solipsism; but might it not represent a mutual subjectivism? No, because empirical

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33. The meaning of other mind will be discussed in section 6 of this chapter. (Cf. also "God as the initial Other" in the chapter following.)

34. Hocking, CAP, 391f.

knowing is a sign of dependence. To observe or to experience the world of nature is to be acted upon from without.

> That objectivity of the physical world whereby we consider it as not-ourselves is due to its source in this active non-ego, not to the fact that it is shared by . . . equally passive or receptive knowers. (CAP, 392)

Each sees of the other only body and physical objects, but each is within the other's world; each is within the mind of the other; they meet and share identical things. Neither is behind the mask of body but in front of it, pressing with his consciousness upon the mind of the other, containing him and that which is his; and in turn, being contained. In so doing each experiences the other's experience; and thus each experiences the other. (MGHE, 265-266) But in contrast to this reflection it should be noted that "no experience can lie open to inspection from outside; no direct guarantee of identity is possible."[35] The knowledge of the identical objects, as well as communication itself, depends upon inference. One must presuppose the other, as well as his particular experiencing, in order to experience the same objects.

6. Experience of God as basis for social experience.

By other mind is meant "an Other-knower-of-physical-Nature." (MGHE, 261) The initial Other Mind cannot be some fellow finite mind because all finite selves are equally

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35. Bradley, AR, 346.

dependent. The primary and continuous social experience must be with this Other Mind, because intercourse with other finite minds has a beginning, and may have an ending. Indeed, the big obstacle to finding social experience is a natural realism. Human selves come and go, but nature goes on forever. John Dewey assumes "a natural world that exists independently of the organism."[36] Unless this Other Mind is, social experience, as presented herewith, is not possible. It is an experience of this Other Mind which serves as a basis for social experience.

No one can deny that nature has an independent priority. Nature is obstinate, and those who wish to live must learn her ways. But the obstinacy of nature is not blank mystery; to man it is an invitation to investigation. Why is man so dependent upon nature? Is nature completely independent or is there some further source? Regardless of nature's priority and obstinacy physical experience is dependent upon the self whose experience it is. The thing most completely independent of self is other-self.[37] It follows then that "the independence of Nature hangs from this more fundamental independence, and not vice versa." (MGHE, 285)

It was stated in the section above that to experience

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36. Dewey, LOG, 33.

37. "The only thing that can limit or act upon a self is another self." (Hocking, TP, 270)

the world of nature is to be acted upon from without.[38] In this connection experience may be described as "an interplay between an active Self and an active External Reality." (MGHE, 285) It may be spoken of as "a meeting between a self and a world."[39] This represents a realistic theory of knowledge. But it must be remembered that the mind is not a mere wax plate upon which impressions are made: the mind is active, and creative, for it responds in kind to the impressions received. The receiving and responding is communication. (CAP, 392ff.)

This External Reality is active; the self receives impressions from it. The experience of obstinate nature is characterized by coercive sensation, and by ruthless defeat if the self is in error about her. The disciplinary experience of correcting errors about nature results in a making over of minds by nature. To experience nature in the sense of being made over by her is to experience her as a manifestation of an other mind. The self's knowledge of the external world increasesthrough direct communication, through its experience, with this other mind. It is this social experience which is as continuous as is the experience of nature. The two experiences,of nature and of

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38. See note 37.

39. Hocking, Art.(1939)[1], 36f.

other mind, begin together and are inseparable. The obstinacy of nature is indeed the objectivity of the other mind.

It remains to answer the question, What is this Other Mind? It was pointed out at the beginning of this section that other mind means other-knower-of-physical-nature. But it was also noted that this initial Other Mind cannot be some fellow finite mind because it too is dependent. Nor can it be all finite minds because all of them are transient and empirical knowers of nature, and are thus dependent upon the Other Mind.[40] "The entire individuality and permanence of Nature implies a corresponding individual permanence in the Subject whose communicated being . . . Nature is." (MGHE, 293)

Since "other mind is experienced, if at all, in and through nature",[41] social experience is not possible "until the objectivity of Nature . . . is found as an intentional communication of a Self <u>wholly</u> <u>active</u>."[42] This self is God. It follows, therefore, that the basic social experience is not the experience of other men, but is the experience of God as directly revealed in the experience of Nature. This

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40. Cf. Chapter VI, 4, (3).

41. Cf. section 4, above.

42. Hocking, MGHE, 295. Italics his. Nature is divine language.

is the Other which is found even as the self is found.[43] Thus it is that Hocking says of Bergson: "It is Bergson's greatest service to have shown that Knowledge of reality is possible in concrete experience."[44] The Kantian thing-in-itself is brought into the world of immediate experience. "It is through the knowledge of God that I am able to know men; not first through the knowledge of men that I am able to know or imagine God."[45] Experience of other human selves is not direct, but is through analogy of inference, through the medium of their bodies or of expressive behavior requiring bodily activity. But these bodily movements could not logically be interpreted as communication, unless there were some constant and pervasive experience in which the self has an immediate awareness of Other Mind; and that provides the self with a category by means of which social relations become intelligible. The initial and persistent experience is with God; other experiences are derivative.

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43. Cf. note 33 in section 4, above.

44. Hocking, Art.(1914)[1], 326. Cf. Hocking's article on "The Knowledge of Independent Reality" (MGHE, Appendix III, pp. 558-573).

45. Hocking, MGHE, 297-298. Italics his.

CHAPTER VI

THE COSMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SELF

1. An analysis of the problem.

The problem of the cosmic significance of the self involves two questions. First, does the world in which the self lives have any meaning? Second, does the human self have any part in this meaning?

Whatever answer is given to the question, "Is there a God?", will serve also as a solution of the enigma, "Does the world we live in have any meaning?"[1] If the world has no meaning its meaninglessness infects the self and all its doing. In such a case human beings are but "cultivating a garden in the midst of a desert which in all likelihood will eventually cover both garden and gardeners; while it, the desert, will never know what it has done."[2] On the other hand, if the world as a whole has a meaning the self,

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1. Hocking, Art.(1933), 329. This article is a review of the book, Is There a God?, by Henry Nelson Wieman, Douglas Clyde Macintosh, and Max Carl Otto.

2. Hocking, Art.(1933), 329. This is akin to the position of Bertrand Ruseell in "A Free Man's Worship". But Hocking's own position is parallel to that of Pascal, who writes of the greatness of man that though the universe were to destroy him, man as a conscious being, capable of thought, would still be greater than the universe because he would know that he was dying but the universe would not know what it was doing, and so would know nothing of its advantage. (Pascal, PEN, 49)

as a part, may have. Persons would then be freed of worry about the cosmic concern of values because God, as the One who entertains this meaning, would be a trustworthy Overseer.

But the question of man's cosmic significance is not answered if God is granted to exist, or if the world is judged as meaningful. All the meaning may belong to God, so much so that man is insignificant. The prophet Isaiah wrote that "all nations before him <u>are</u> as nothing." God is so high above the earth that "the inhabitants thereof <u>are</u> as grasshoppers."[3] Job and the Psalmist were bothered by the question of man's worth, although they were apparently sure of God. "What is man, that thou art mindful of him?"[4] The Psalmist was overwhelmed by the immensity of nature.[5] He introduced the question after considering the heavens, the moon and the stars, as ordinations of God. God has so much to be concerned about, how can he be concerned with the finite individual? The cosmos is so big, how can man have any cosmic significance?

It should be noted, in passing, that man's humility and seeming insignificance developed as he gained more knowledge of himself and about the world in which he lives. Man became

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3. Isaiah 40:17, 22. Italics in Bible.

4. Psalms 8:4a.

5. Doubtless the shortness of the span of life intensified the wonder.

interested in the truth; and his love of truth led him to banish his earth from the chiefest place in the network of the cosmos. Thus in coming to know himself as physically small, apparently insignificant, man has demonstrated his mental greatness.[6] Man is awed by the quantity of the universe; yet through the quality of his own reason he comes to reckon himself superior to mere bigness.

But even so, if there is a God, "he is something as much greater than the human mind as the human mind is greater than nature in its mechanical immensity."[7] God, however, would be such a being as to estimate things rightly, therefore the quantity of nature would not blind him to the quality of the human mind. He would certainly be more interested in those things which have life than in those which do not; and of these living things, man, with his ability to respond to the world and his determination to master it; man, with his eagerness to find out if there is a God, and to know what his will is, would surely be of interest to any such being.

In the process of evolution new interests arise as higher levels of life are reached. "Man, with his hungry and curious mind, is the most interested of animals, the most insatiable."[8] This same increase of interests may be noted

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6. Hocking, Art.(1916)[4], 751.

7. Ibid., 751-752.

8. Ibid., 752.

in a comparison of levels of development among human minds: The greater mind has more interests. But God is something which is greater than the greatest human mind. Let it be so. Remove all limits! Let God be a mind which is great beyond all limits, then this mind would necessarily be interested in all objects, including man, because to exclude any object from its interest is to limit the mind. To say that God is too great to care for man is a contradiction.

In his presidential address to the Philosophical Association, Professor Hocking pointed out that there are three presuppositions upon which philosophy is based. Two of these are pertinent to this discussion. They are:

> First, that things have a meaning;
> Second, that . . . human beings are competent to grasp that meaning, or some of it.[9]

From this it may be said that the human self has cosmic significance because it grasps, or can grasp, the objective meaning of the universe. Human existence is not only meaningless but is mockery if the self's highest valuations are ruled out of order by the world Mind.[10] The self lives on the presupposition that it is cosmically significant. Religion may be defined as "a passion for righteousness, and for the spread of righteousness, conceived as a cosmic

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9. Hocking, Art.(1928)[1], 141.

10. Hocking, TP, 296.

demand."[11] It may be profitable to examine the origin of man's religious ideas.

2. The origin of religious ideas.

In contrast to the theories about the source and origin of religious ideas, Hocking speaks of the three roots of these ideas, and designates them as the speculative, the emotional, and the ethical. (TP, 29-37)

(1) The speculative root of religious ideas. Wonder begins close at home, but is not complete in its beginning. The play of wonder or speculation is limited as far as possible to factual relations of natural phenomena. But speculation really begins where this boundary ends. Speculation, as employed here, means adventuring in the realm of ideas; it stands in contrast to empirical investigation. Speculation involves an imaginative approach to the mysterious or unknown. The mystery of the why of the seasons, and of birth and death, as well as of the stars in their courses, has doubtless bestirred the minds of every people.

Dreams and hallucinations contributed little, if anything, to the origin of religious ideas. Seldom, if ever, is there anything completely new in a dream. Besides, the

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11. Hocking, LRWF, 26. Italics his. Cf. Hocking, RML, 350-351. This is akin to Kant's view that "religion is (subjectively considered) the knowledge of all our duties as divine commands." (Kant, RIGV, 229)

gods of the early man are impersonal, and they operate in his awakened life as well as in sleep.

The God-idea does not arise in abstracto; God is not first connected with unseen effects. Rather, he is posited as being the invisible cause of effects which are very evident. But for these effects the idea of a cause would not have arisen. Men begin with life as it is lived. "They are impressed by powers which actually operate in Nature and society; they attribute to these powers substantial, that is metaphysical, being."[12] In the course of time, as speculation becomes more critical, these various powers are looked upon as manifestations of only one power; and if the powers have been called gods, the power is called God. Natural phenomena imply some basis of reason; even so the world and man suggest the idea of a creator or sustainer which is ineradicable in the human mind. "To the natural man everywhere, the world is fact but also mystery; and to the same natural man this mystery is no final blankness but an invitation." (LRWF, 32) Such is the speculative root of religious ideas.

(2) The emotional root. The deity is not only a power or force; it is also a quality. The idea of the quality of the divine arises not from reflection, but in feeling. Fear played a part, of course, but it was a lesser and later part.

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12. Hocking, MGHE, 216.

The quality of the divine arose first through the feeling of awe and wonder. Speculation on this emotional experience led early man to conceive that there were powers back of nature which really controlled all things, including nature herself.

Man's own experience, then as he reflected on it, led him to believe that these powers might be either friendly or unfriendly. Accordingly, he worshipped through love, or sought to appease with sacrifice. Man came to assume a supernatural supplement which conserved life, and added completeness to it. Robert Marett implies an emotional root of religion, based on the speculative, as he writes:

> The end and result of primitive religion is, in a word, the consecration of life, the stimulation of the will to live and to do. This bracing of the vital feeling takes place by means of imaginative appeal to the great forces man perceives stirring within him and about him.[13]

Religion, through the emotional root guided by the speculative, became for man "a systematic defiance of the pretense of nature to be his master." (TP, 32) Objection may be raised that this discussion but continues that of the speculative root of religious ideas. Such is not the case; the idea of quality arises in feeling, but the feeling element is emotional; it represents a kind of instability in consciousness making for continuous transformation. Hocking

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13. Marett, Art.(1930).

is convinced that "there is no such thing as feeling apart from idea . . . and that it is the whole meaning and destiny of feeling to terminate in knowledge of an object." (MGHE, 64)

(3) The ethical root. Not only may the divine be friendly or hostile; it is looked upon as moral, and as requiring morality. The question is, how did the idea of the divine's relation to morality arise?

There are those who view the connection as artificial. The appeal to the sanction of the divine is but a necessary device of rulers for compelling obedience to laws. Rousseau writes concerning the legislator, "It would require gods in order to give laws to men."[14] Although it is a recognized fact that early codes, as well as statements by the Hebrew prophets, usually begin with a "Thus saith the Lord", Hocking does not think of it as basically necessary. The moral attribute of the divine arises or is found in human experience. Life is lived in the face of many restraints and tabus; man's desires are curbed and hindered from expression. It is true that to be told, "Such is God's will", made self control easier, and so made progress more stable, but it is more surely true that social life is utterly impossible without certain restraints. This is so evident that the individual recognizes

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14. Rousseau, CS, 34.

the necessity of self-restraint in behalf of his own welfare. "There is something in personal affection which naturally limits selfishness and sensuality, apart from all lawgivers." (TP, 34)

To say that there is an ethical root of religious ideas means that unless man were sensible to something in the nature of the universe which urges him to order his own life, and to respect his fellows, the pronouncement, "Thus saith the Lord", would have no meaning, or would have met with no response.[15] "There is in every man a dim sense of obligation which refers outward, and naturally connects with his notions of the divine if he has them, or may even be strong enough to beget such notions." (TP, 35)

J. H. Leuba confirms this view that there is an ethical root of religion.

> Morality and religion do not need each other in order to come into existence, but, when they have appeared, religious beliefs are speedily called upon for the gratification of moral needs.[16]

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15. Moses had a long debate with the Lord about this matter. There is no record as to how Moses came to be aware of the moral nature of God. He was conscious of it before he left Egypt for the first time. (Cf. Ex. 2:11-12) But before he was willing to undertake the task assigned to him, Moses wanted every assurance of divine sanction. He could not believe that "Thus saith the Lord" was enough to persuade his people. Cf. Chapters II, 1, IV, 3.

16. Leuba, PSR, 202-203.

Höffding's position is much stronger than Leuba's.

> Values must be discovered and produced in the world of experience before they can be conceived or assumed to exist in a higher world. . . . Religion in its historical development, as well as in its motives, its content, and its value points back to ethical presuppositions, even when it has all the appearance of serving as a basis for ethics.[17]

(4) Criticisms of the origin of religious ideas. There are three outstanding criticisms concerning the origin of religion: first, that it arose from fear; second, that it results from a rationalization of desire, i.e., wishful thinking; and third, that religion was created, and came into prominence, as a social tool or economic device.[18]

What answer does this view of the origin of religious ideas supply to these criticisms? It is admitted that fear played a part, but it was a lesser and a later part. It is denied that fear serves as the source of religious ideas. But for man to merely assume a supernatural supplement is akin to wishful thinking. Certainty cannot be had, so that this assumption may be called a rationalizing of desires, yet it is a rationalizing of his highest desire, and of one which meets a felt need, as well as one which aids in the integration of experience. To view religion as a tool of the ruling classes, as an artificial social requirement, is out of

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17. Höffding, PR, 330, 331.

18. Cf. Brightman, PR, 461-477.

keeping with Hocking's opinion. The ethical root of religion is intensely personal; the religious person must order his own life, but also respect his fellows. Religion may be used as a device in class struggle, but such does not account for its origin; it represents rather the perversion of a natural impulse.[19]

(5) Hocking versus Leuba on religion and theology. Leuba, an arch critic of religion, affirms the emotional and ethical roots of religion; it cannot be established by reason. He assumes that theism is logically impossible.[20] Religion is to be validated by its meeting the needs of human feelings for comfort, and by its support of man's moral aspirations.

> The psychological study of contemporary religious experience makes it evident that the God of Christianity continues to be an object of worship, not because his existence is rationally established, but because he affords ethical support and affective comfort.[21]

Such being the case, Leuba would reject metaphysics; theology would give up its intellectual basis to become a branch of

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19. This view seems to be a cross between the theory of natural religion and the religious a priori.

20. Hocking does not claim that it is logically valid. He does insist that the theistic position, arising from speculation, is ineradicable in human nature. Cf. ante, "The speculative root of religious ideas."

21. Leuba, PSR, 201.

psychology. Religious experiences would be produced, and understood, by scientific methods.[22]

Hocking would not limit the realm of psychology, and he would accept gladly and use psychological findings, but psychology has nothing to say of total and ultimate causes.[23] The peculiar concern of the mind is meanings, and these elude the grasp of psychology.

> While the psychologist is tracing a sensation to the work of a ray in the retina, the mind is seeing a star. . . . Our physical sensations belong to psychology; but to the active mind these sensations mean a world of nature, and a science not of psychology, but of physics. Our moral feelings belong to psychology; but to the active mind these feelings mean a present social environment and a science not of psychology, but of ethics. So of these religious experiences; whatever their causes, their meaning breaks out of the circle of consciousness and presents the mind with certain objective facts of its spiritual environment.[24]

The basis for these objective facts is God. The next section is a study of "God as the Initial Other".

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22. Leuba, PSR, 242, 268, 269. Leuba's earlier book is entitled The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion. London: Archibald Constable & Co., Ltd., 1909.

23. In the face of the claims in psychology, man is the psychologist. (Cf. Hocking, IK, 42.)

24. Hocking, Art.(1913)[1], 331-332. Italics his.

3. God as the initial Other.

This section is a discussion of the priority of God in man's experience. It is closely related to the treatment of the "Experience of God as basis for social experience."[25]

It was pointed out in the preceding section that religious ideas arise within the experience of the individual. The speculative and emotional roots of religious ideas belong to man's experience of nature, while the ethical root is in social experience. Thus there are two realms of experience in which men come to know of God. Yet it is impossible to separate these sources of religious knowledge. Neither can be assigned as prior to the other, because they are inseparably related.

> The religious experience of Nature means nothing if not finding Nature living, even personal, thereby socializing that experience. Whereas the religious meaning of social experience arises in the first place only as birth, death, and the like are regarded as the work of that same inexorable power displayed in Nature.[26]

At the same time, it must be remembered that neither of these realms of experience (nor even both of them as one) is itself the original source of religious ideas. Nature-fear and social-deference may be religious attitudes, but they are not the source of religion, because they are based upon

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25. Chapter V, section 6.

26. Hocking, MGHE, 231-232.

the operation of apperceptions already present. "If the phenomena of experience . . . call forth startled reactions, it is because man has already begun to consider and judge the Whole." (MGHE, 233)

Man is limited by the world of nature and he fears it; but what he worships is more than the world which limits him. Man's greatest limitation is his ignorance. He recognizes that he is not independent even before he can appreciate the meaning of this dependence. The human being fears because he does not know. But man's knowledge of his ignorance is not religion; such knowledge becomes religious only as it is clothed with mystery.[27] Nevertheless a true realization of ignorance involves a consciousness of mystery: the negative side of one's experience "is made possible by some prior recognition of a positive being, on the other side of his limitation."[28] From this Hocking concludes that "the original source of the knowledge is . . . an experience of not being alone in knowing the world, and especially the world of Nature."[29]

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27. The difference between a knowledge of ignorance and a consciousness of mystery may be expressed as follows: "I do not know, but it is known." Perhaps the strongest element in Eve's temptation was the desire to know good and evil, and thus to be as the gods. (Genesis 3:5-6)

28. Hocking, MGHE, 236. Italics his.

29. Hocking, MGHE, 236. Italics his. The consciousness of mystery characterized by the "I do not know, but it is

Man's basic social experience is with this other knower of physical nature, as an other mind.[30] This other knower or other mind cannot be any one finite self, or even all finite selves, because the original source of knowledge is the same for all human beings. It is through the development of religious ideas[31] that this initial Other becomes man's companion, and his God. Hocking's position on the initial Otherness of God may be expressed in the words of Berkeley. After proving that other minds are known only through inference from "certain sensations . . . excited in our own minds", Berkeley goes on to say that God is known in the same manner, except that

> whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity; everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men.[32]

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29. (continued)
known", may give rise to religious experience; but with such a basis religious rites become a celebration of inferiority. It is only as the expression can become "I do not know, but he knows" that man can achieve a self-respecting reconciliation with the mysterious world in which he lives. This is achieved gradually through the development of man's religious ideas.

30. Chapter V, section 6.

31. See section above.

32. Berkeley, Works, I, 341, 342. God, as the efficient cause of all things, is the initial Other. Nature is divine language. Cf. 270ff., 286f., 290ff. (Cf. Hocking, MGHE, 300.)

4. <u>The One and the many</u>.

God as the initial Other represents the One, and all human selves represent the many. This treatment of "The One and the many" is a discussion of the ways in which the many are dependent upon the One.

(1) The many are dependent upon the One for the unity and identity of the world in which they live. In discussing the speculative root of religious ideas, it was noted that as speculation becomes more critical various powers come to be viewed as manifestations of one power. This one power is here spoken of as God or the One.

i. Hocking points out that the unity of the world has significant bearing on the possibility of optimism. (MGHE, 167-179) Unless the world is one it cannot have the character of dependability. In a universe there is some basis for confidence in prediction and there is some foundation upon which man can build his hopes. The true optimistic outlook "involves a judgment about a Reality, which has a character, and is therefore One." (MGHE, 168) This Reality is behind mere appearances. Yet a place for the apparent must be made. Unless the Real can account for, and accommodate, the appearances, the individual is justified in holding on to them. Hocking is in agreement with Bradley in insisting that appearances are real because they are real appearances. To deny their existence is nonsense. All that exists must belong

to reality.[35] "If monism is to be of service to our expectations, it must affect the apparent as well as the Real." (MGHE, 172) Monism tends to such a solution as the actual processes with which man is acquainted, as well as the processes of man, are recognized as being cases of one process. But optimism requires more than a unity of the conscious processes of the world. A further judgment is necessary, namely, "that the Real is the good, and not the evil: i.e., that evil is . . . conquerable . . . not a reality co-ordinate with the purpose that is against it."[36]

ii. The many are dependent also upon the One, as a changeless Ultimate, as an Absolute, for the permanence and identity of the world in which they live. Apart from this identity of the world man would not be able to find himself at home in it. "These two things, self-identity and world-identity, go inseparably together." (MGHE, 187) This is not to suggest that the world is static. Far from it; the world is in constant process. Yet there is something by means of which the sameness of the world is recognizable.

World-identity was not suggested as one of the bases for self-identity; the identity of the self, however, would not be possible but for this sameness of the world. And this identity is dependent upon the One or God.

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35. Bradley, AR, 132.

36. Hocking, MGHE, 174. Italics his.

(2) The need of the One or God is most evident perhaps in religion.[37] "The only possible justification of the act of adoration is the existence of an object of adoration."[38] Religion, to be significant, must be about the cosmos, about the whole of things because the meaning of the part is derived from its relation to the whole of things.

"The centre of religious thought must always be <u>the conception of God</u>. In a dead world, man is already dead. Unless he has a living universe, he knows himself to be ultimately lost."[39] The center of religious thought is the

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37. Answer will be made later to those who ruling out religion thus rule out the need of God, and also to those who would say that the group spirit is equivalent to God. The extreme importance of religion for Hocking may be noted from his evaluation of Bergson: "It is Bergson's greatest service to have shown that knowledge of reality is possible in concrete experience." (Hocking, Art.(1914)[1], 326) This statement, by itself, is not so significant. Its importance is emphasized, however, by recognizing the place which Hocking gives to those who do know reality in concrete experience, i.e., to the mystics. He considers mysticism as the concluding type of philosophy. (TP, 379-421; Cf. also MGHE, 341-441; P6IC, 215.) Gabriel Marcel, Art.(1919), page 19, writes that the philosophy of Hocking may be described as a dialectic of instinct which finds its fulfilment in a philosophy of mysticism. Dallière, another French writer, agrees with this characterization. (Dallière, WEH, 49) Hibben writes that Hocking's big task is that of rationalizing immediate religious experience, and calls his philosophy an "idealistic mysticism." (Hibben, Art.(1913), 206) Hocking speaks of mysticism as a possible savior of idealism in the Preface of the book which Professor Hibben was reviewing. (MGHE, xviii-xix) Cf. also section two of this chapter, and part three of this section.

38. Hocking, Art.(1922)[2], 439.

39. Hocking, RML, 358. Italics.his.

conception of God, but the center of religion is a perception of God. (RML, 362) Religion cannot be identified with metaphysics. Religion must be true, but to make it consist in truth is to cut the cords which bind religion to history and to personalities. And to separate religion from history and from personality is to kill it. "Religion, as the perception of God, is the ability to say 'Thou' to the universe, as God is the 'Thou' of the world." (RML, 365) Man's conception of God is an abstraction apart from a personal intuition of him. Genuine religion depends upon the individual's perception through immediate experience of God. It is through such experience that the self gains its cosmic appointment; and becomes able to give a reason for its faith.

The commission, however, has implications for the self as it lives in the world, as <u>one among the many</u> who also may bear cosmic appointments. The self must remember that it is only one of these many. There is danger that in centering attention on the One the awareness of the many will be lost. There is danger also that in the process of dealing with the many the vision of the One, the definite appointment, will fade. The exclusive direction of the mind toward either is self-destructive. The self develops through alternating attention from one to the other. "God and the world . . . must be worked in with one another forever: forever they must be pursued in alternation." (MGHE, 407)

This principle of alternation is applied constantly but only in fragmentary fashion. The lack of its complete and intelligent application accounts for much of the ineffectiveness of human living. Aspects of life apart from alternate parts become mechanical. Its full usefulness is found in

> doing with the whole self, and consciously, that which in blinder and more fragmentary fashion we are doing at every moment of our waking lives, and especially in the moments of partial return. (MGHE, 422)

It means to pursue the world and God in alternation. As this is done "the whole of human existence falls into two phases, work and worship; the domain of duty and the domain of love, respectively."[40]

Worship has two functions which are increasingly important in human life, namely, "the continual restoring of a continually declining freedom and of a continually declining power of making genuine connection with fellow-minds."[41] Worship cannot perform these functions unless it is in very

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40. Hocking, MGHE, 426. Cf. Cabot, WMLB. Cabot speaks of four things: work, love, play, and worship. Hocking means more by worship than the word usually connotes. "Worship naturally allies itself outwardly, as well as inwardly, with recreation, social enjoyment, and beauty. Worship uses these, and goes beyond them: it recognizes in them the absolute which is its own and discards the rest; puts behind its back all but the One which is in all, and is the condition of them all." (MGHE, 421)

41. Hocking, Art.(1923), 578.

truth what it pretends to be: "a worshipful contemplation of things as they are; and this implies that it attains a metaphysical knowledge of reality, and finds it good."[42] Worship requires God; and unless God is, then worship will cease, perhaps gradually, but cease nevertheless.

(3) God meets a need in the life of man that cannot be met in any other way.[43] Man reaches out toward a metaphysical foundation; his values can survive only if he finds it. The vital energy of man's values droops unless there is a vital attraction from outside man's own creations.[44] The true basis for optimism involves "belief in an individual Reality not-ourselves which makes for rightness, and which actually accomplishes rightness when left to its own working." (MGHE, 177) The real need of God, the way in which he is of most value to man, is not as a miracle worker, or as a vindicator, but as an

> intimate, infallible associate, present in all experience as That by Which I too may firmly conceive that experience from the outside. It is God in this personal relation . . . that alone is capable of establishing human peace of mind, and thereby human happiness.[45]

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42. Hocking, Art.(1923), 581.

43. This is a continuation, in large part, of the discussion of the need of God for religion, but the particular aim is to make answer to those who think that the group spirit, humanity, is equivalent to God.

44. Hocking, HNR, 436.

45. Hocking, MGHE, 224. The problem of evil will be treated in the three sections immediately following.

In answer to Edward Scribner Ames[46] Hocking insists that the group spirit is not equivalent to God for all practical purposes.[47] It is more nearly true to say that society, rather than serving as an object of worship, is made possible through worship. The human self as an empirical knower of its world is a dependent being; it is dependent upon what is presented to it. On the other hand the world is limited by and is dependent for its being known upon the conscious self. In the same way the whole of society is related to the world, as an empirical knower of the world, as limited by and as limiting the environing world. But society is more dependent than is the individual self: "It depends upon the prior being of its members."[48] Society is an organization of persons; and this organization becomes possible only through a "prior relation of individual minds to that which is true; and that which is true is, in its most obvious aspect, the world of nature."[49] But the world of nature is not itself independent; rather it is dependent. Thus "society depends ultimately on the relation of individual

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46. Cf. Journal of Religion, 1 (Sept., 1921), 462-481.

47. Hocking, Art.(1921)^2, 482-496. Cf. MGHE, 293ff.

48. Hocking, Art.(1921)^2, 494.

49. Ibid., 495.

minds to that upon which nature itself depends."[50] Such a series of dependencies point to something which is independent. In religion the independent being is God. In religion the worshipper seeks for a personal response from this ultimate reality. Thus it becomes more evident, not only that the group-spirit is not equivalent to God for all practical purposes, but that society itself is dependent upon the relation of individual minds to God: God, as the One, is the object of common adoration which makes the unity of the social group possible;[51] he insures the objectivity of the values which the social group seeks. The teleological interpretation of the world remains to be examined.

5. Teleology in metaphysics.

Teleology in the organism is evident in the fact of freedom. The organism lives towards ends. All thought is teleological. But does the cosmos move toward an end?[52] Is there a metaphysical teleology? This question has been dismissed largely in the effort to interpret the universe in terms of science. The work of a philosophy of nature consists in pointing out the causal relations existing

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50. Hocking, Art.(1921)^2, 495.

51. Hocking, Art.(1922)^2, 439ff.

52. I.e., can the things of nature be regarded as purposed, and as reciprocally instrumental in achieving a common end?

between phenomena. Apart from the causal series intelligibility is impossible so far as the explanations of science are concerned. According to Kant, to expect to gain objective knowledge of nature through any teleological explanation of phenomena deals a death blow to natural science.[53]

This section becomes then a contrast between the concept of purpose and of mechanical causality. In both cases the causation is from the past, but in the former the causation is in terms of some future end. Mechanical causality is represented by the nexus effectivus, whereas purposive causality may be described in terms of nexus finalis. Mechanism operates without motive, and without end; there are no termini for such causation. Teleology operates from motive, and stops when the end is reached.[54]

It is the duty of man to find out whatever truth he can. If, however, in the interest of science he rejects teleology, it is the task of natural science and the theoretical reason to provide an intelligible explanation for the whole system of experience. If this cannot be done, then at least for the remaining items of experience the way is open to appeal to teleological explanation. Hocking suggests three empirical conditions which must be met in order to make a

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53. Kant, KU, 315f.

54. Hocking, Phil 9, 4/11/40. (Cf. (3), ii, below.)

teleological judgment necessary. First, there must be a discovery of an objective end or value. Second, it must be shown that the pattern of the universe led up to this end causally, and that the universe has tended to preserve this value. Third, it must be shown through calculation that the achievement of this end by chance was highly improbable, i.e., its coefficient of probability must be low.[55] The resort to teleology does not replace mechanical explanation; it only supplements it. But if there are items of experience which can be explained only teleologically then there is a metaphysical teleology.[56]

(1) Life as an evidence for teleology. Mechanical explanation fails in regard to the living organism. Life can be explained only by an appeal to other life. The permanent form of life, as organized matter with a capacity of reaction, is an irreducible fact which can never be explained through the mechanism of inorganic matter. The reciprocal causality in the living organism, through which

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55. Hocking, Phil 9, 4/18/40.

56. Causality is only a postulate with no more verification than the postulate of teleology. (Cf. IV, 2, (2), above.) The idea of teleology leads to fruitful discoveries, whereas the notion of causality fails to explain too many things, for example, the quantities involved, the proportioning of elements, the pattern of things, or their quality, and even the concept of causality itself. In any causal theory all these things are taken for granted. (Cf. Hocking, Phil 9, 4/18/40.)

the whole is determined by the parts, as well as the parts by the whole, makes inevitable the impression of purpose, and of conformity to purpose. Kant admits that the organism cannot be understood through mechanism; but Hocking insists that it can be understood only through teleology.[57] The world must be viewed as an organism producing world. The possibility of the organic form must be injected into the original arrangement, or configuration, of the world: there must have been a pointedness toward organic life. "The assumption on which the naturalistic emergentist relies is unfounded: form has no inherent tendency to rise."[58]

(2) Value and consciousness as evidence for teleology.[59] Among the facts of the world is the fact of value. This fact is an unaccountable mystery in a mechanical world. The episode of value is an important one; apart from the fact of value and of the valuer the whole universe is meaningless, just as the organism, apart from consciousness, has no meaning whatsoever. The advent of mind[60] bestows meaning on the

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57. A teleology which includes mechanism.

58. Hocking, TP, 114. Italics his. (Cf. 107-116; Phil 9, 4/16/40. Cf. also Kant, KU, 283ff., 292f., 298ff.)

59. This is in part a continuation of the previous discussion. The experience of value belongs to the living organism; and this experience is the evidence for belief in teleology.

60. The advent of mind is scientifically inexplicable.

organism, and is the means whereby the organism enjoys value.

In bestowing meaning and in discerning value mind has the role of servant. It has; but mind serves only as it masters. Consciousness has outwitted nature. Arriving as a servant it has become master of the house. It has usurped the place of nature, out of which it came; and even dares to effect changes in nature through using her own powers. Mind may be the handiwork of nature, but the compliment is being turned around.[61]

The whole world-picture becomes colored with mind's interests and ends. The conscious being begins to feel that nature existed to produce him, and continues to exist for his sake. One of man's eternal questions has to do with the objectivity or subjectivity of his values. Unless they are objective, i.e., not illusory or temporary, then nature must be bifurcated into mind and matter.[62] The dialectic drives the biologist beyond biology in his search for the meaning of human life. Consciousness is biologically useful, and thus serves nature. Yet any ends of nature achieved by the aid of consciousness are pseudo-ends unless nature is the expression of a purpose. The permanent validity of man's values depends

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61. Hocking, TDL, 249f.

62. After consciousness arrives, as in man, it seeks its own ends, which are not identical with the ends of nature. (Cf. TDL, 246ff.) Professor Compton writes that "the evolution of consciousness . . . is not to be expected if consciousness is ineffective." (HMS, 50)

upon their status in an objective mind apart from nature. This represents a transition from biology into metaphysics, "from which follows an ancient intuition, that in the nature of things life is deeper than matter, and mind deeper than life." (TDL, 255)

The future influences the present, not only in the case of human beings but in the universe; final causes are determining events throughout the world. "It seems . . . incredible that the course of events in the universe is merely drifting, or merely impelled from behind, that interest in what emerges is foreign to its nature."[63] Hocking is of the opinion that "wherever there is process, there also is finality, the quest and the achievement of value."[64]

The basic assumption of philosophy is that things have a meaning. This means that "there is nothing meaningless in the world (taking things one by one) and (taking them collectively) the world as a whole is not meaningless."[65] This is not mere subjective idealism, because to postulate that things have meanings is to put "the meaning on the same plane of objectivity with the things."[66] Therefore the meaning

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63. Hocking, Art.(1925)[1], 822.

64. Ibid., 822-823.

65. Hocking, Art.(1928)[1], 142.

66. Ibid., 148.

which the philosopher sets himself to seek is the meaning which is really there. The meaning is not invented; it is discovered.[67]

(3) The specification of nature and the infinite particularity of the universe as evidence for teleology.

i. The human mind can comprehend, to some extent, the structure and order of the cosmos. Nature is intelligible. That the physical universe is compatible to the mind of man is a presupposition in all scientific inquiry. Kant suggests that we must look upon the world als ob it had been arranged with specific reference to our needs of knowledge. Although man cannot know that the world-order has been so arranged, he does know that were it not thus arranged the world would not be intelligible. Even though it may have been an accident man is forced to look upon it as having been determined by design.[68]

ii. This given universe is not a necessary one, because there is an infinitude of possible arrangements. The coefficient of probability for this universe is extremely low; its degree of particularity is infinite. Therefore if it can be said that this is a desirable universe the teleological

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67. Hocking, Art.(1928)[1], 151f.

68. Kant, KU, XXXVII, 291, 335, 374; Hocking, Phil 9, 4/23/40.

judgment may be applied to it.[69] One cannot say legitimately that this is the best of all possible worlds, because there is no such class as all possible worlds. Yet the description of a desirable universe usually fits this one.

Particularity is accidental, i.e., it is the result of an arbitrary act. Desires are universal, but after desiring one must act or particularize. Individuals as part of a particular world are accidental. But there is a coherence of the accidents. Persons are co-accidental. And there is a coherence of accidentality and particularity between man and the physical world.[70] This coherence of accidentality leads to a dramatic teleology in which there is unlimited continuity and infinite growth. Each thing exists as an accident, but is co-accidental with every other thing. Nothing has meaning in and of itself; but everything is potentially significant in that it coheres in or serves the whole.[71]

Teleological explanation is necessary as a supplement to mechanical causality in understanding some items of experience. But there is also the fact of dysteleology which is more

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69. But with no more certainty than in the above, because this universe may represent simply one of the infinite possible arrangements, by chance.

70. Cf. Chapter VI, 5, (3), i.

71. Hegel interprets the meaning of life as the putting off of particularity and the putting on of universality. (Cf. Section 8, below.)

nearly explainable on the basis of mechanism. Metaphysical teleology cannot be affirmed until some settlement is made with the problem of evil.

6. The fact of dysteleology.

Cosmic dualism is not easily refuted. "After every synthesis of the cosmic opposition, the fundamental struggle and restlessness of the world have led some new thinker to hazard another form of duality in metaphysics." (TP, 243) This struggle and restlessness constitute the fact of dysteleology. No monism will ever be accepted as final until the cosmic drag is overcome or at least understood.

It may be well to catalogue the evils to which man is subject as a means of defining the problem. There are four types: (1) Natural evil, which arises from nature's extravagance, from physical disorders, earthquakes, hurricanes, storms, etc., as well as from disease and pestilence.[72] (2) Evils of fortune and circumstance that result in failure and frustration. (3) Moral evil which originates in the free choices of man. Hence come misunderstandings and wars. (4) Constitutional evil, i.e., evil without which there could be no good. For example, hope is dependent upon the

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72. John Stuart Mill speaks of nature as bestial, cruel, and unjust. Nature commits crimes, mercilessly, for which man is hanged. The course of natural phenomena is replete with those things which if man were to do he would be most wicked. (Mill, 3ER, 64, 65.)

determent of satisfaction. Restlessness of the will is desirable and necessary.[73]

Of these four, constitutional evil, and moral evil, must be set down on the credit side of the ledger. The universe is not to be blamed for them but thanked for them. Inherently, contrast is necessary for quality. Evil must be in the presence of possible good to be known as evil. In like manner good can be realized only within the presence of possible evil. (TP, 239) Moral evil arises by means of man's greatest blessing, the freedom of will. Although this is the source of most evil not even for life itself would man forego his freedom to persecute his fellows, and to relieve their suffering. The fact of dysteleology is thus limited to evils of fortune and circumstance, and to natural evil. It is with these that the account must be settled.

Religious feeling and thought has tended toward some form of dualism, as a means of freeing the Divine of responsibility for the evil that is in the world.[74] Hocking rejects this tendency. "In such a view, the Good is simply not the supreme being . . . and the mind seeks some more ultimate reality which may account for the existence and contact of both." (TP, 238) On this basis the idea of a finite God is rejected as

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73. This is the psychological refutation of Schopenhauer and of Buddha. (Cf. Hocking, Phil 9, 5/2/40.)

74. Witness the role of the devil in Christianity. (Cf. Matt. 4.)

of no worth. It involves "a danger hardly less seductive than the danger from atheism." (MGHE, 225) And a finite God loses his significance as creator, "for there is something else in the world which can exist by its own right as well as he." (TP, 238) But finitism need not necessarily result in a dualism. For example, it does not in the theory of Professor Brightman. Brightman speaks of The Given which is not external but internal to God. The Given represents "the eternal necessities of reason" and the "eternal experiences of brute fact." It is "an aspect of God's consciousness which eternally enters into every moment of the divine experience and into everything that is, either as obstacle or as instrument to the will of God."[75]

In this view the power of God is reckoned as finite, but his will for good is infinite.[76] It is a reasonable explanation of the fact of dysteleology. But a full explanation of the evil does not relieve the suffering endured. Relief depends upon the possibility that the evil may be transmuted, upon the possibility that seeming defeat may become a genuine victory.

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75. Brightman, PR, 300.

76. Ibid., 319. God's goodness is greater than his power. No other type of God would be worthy of worship. God is relieved of the responsibility for evil, yet there is no dualism. God is seeking eternally to overcome the evil with good. And there is the incentive for "<u>eternal co-operative moral endeavor</u> - a co-operation between God and man." (Brightman, PR, 314. Italics his.)

7. The transmutation of evil.

Human happiness is "inseparable from confidence in action", and this confidence involves "poise of mind with reference to everything I may possibly encounter in the chances of fortune." (MGHE, 218) Thus it may be said that human happiness depends upon the transmutability of evil. The transmutability of evil, in turn, depends upon a monism of the good, in which it is held "that evil is an essentially conquerable thing, not a reality coördinate with the purpose that is against it." (MGHE, 174)

The fact of dysteleology is the chief hindrance to a general acceptance of the theistic hypothesis. It must be noted, however, that the problem of evil arose prior to theology. It arose in nuclear experience. It was because life was reckoned as good that evil became a problem. (LRWF, 218) Choice has to be made in the original nuclear experience between regarding it as subjective or as objective. To say that experience is objective means that experiences must be referred to objects, whereas to say that it is subjective implies that experiences are wholly of the subject. Objectivity is the course which leads to development and maturity, but it is the harder one to take. It involves the idea that experience is to be understood, and that although it may not be now, experience is intended to be good. Life presents the self with a varied fare of casual values. But no one wants to live at the mercy

of an ununderstood circumstantiality. Life must be understood if it is to be truly good. There is an original value prejudice that life is good, the more awareness the better; evil becomes a problem because of this prejudice, not because of the theistic hypothesis. The problem of evil represents the challenge which life makes to the experiences that threaten it.[77]

The realistic view of evil is that things are what they are found to be; evil and good are thus both real; it is insisted that "evil is evil, and not something else."[78] Realists oppose any delay of the value judgment; time makes no difference in quality. Evil is to be expunged; good is to be increased. Hocking agrees that evil and good must be taken in this realistic attitude, as phenomena to be considered.

Biologically the realistic attitude is self refuting. Every basic impulse or instinct tends toward some environing condition to be conquered. The impulses aim at or lead to goals, and thus to satisfactions. First there is the recognition of peril, and then the personal or racial achievement of safety and satisfaction. If there were no hunger there could be no enjoyment of food. Life without risk and evil would be a blank world. An adventure may and usually does involve the evil of peril or danger. There is a joy of fighting for

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77. Hocking, Phil 9, 4/30/41 ff.

78. Hocking, Art.(1923), 582.

fighting's sake. Games involve risks. The major sources of satisfaction are in dealing with the major evils; and the great satisfactions are impossible apart from evil. In this light evil is an element in good: it is a necessary part of a good world.

This dialectic, whereby the realistic view of evil is refuted, is present also in social conflicts. Opposing sides condemn each other mercilessly; but then there develops the brotherhood of battle. Before there can be any real contest the opponents must meet. Genuine fighting is doubleminded. The reason for the conflict is the determination to secure an affirmation, to expunge an evil. But to do this the winner must go where the opponent lives; and show him where he is wrong; thus the winner must enter into the opponent's life, and so become his brother. This represents the true situation whether the fight be a Kentucky feud or a war between England and Germany.

Hocking insists upon a doubleminded attitude toward evil. To maintain that evil is evil, and nothing else, is an instance of what Professor Perry calls "the fallacy of initial predication."[79] It is an observable fact that many evils are also something else. A kindness for a beloved friend may involve the evil of disagreeable labor, or suffering. Every

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79. Cf. Perry, PPT, 126ff.

experience, while maintaining its identity, becomes something else in a different context. "If according to the advice of Solon we will call no man happy until he is dead, neither can we safely call any man unhappy until we know we have the complete account."[80] Pain has a way of blunting its own edge as it reaches extremity. This is not proof that evil is unreal, or that the universe is good; yet it does prevent a universal negative: evil is evil, but may be also something else. Some evil is transmutable.

There are four things by means of which much evil is transmuted: it is made something else besides just evil.

(1) Time. Time is real; it makes a difference in the lives of all living things. It is with truth that the young lady, hardpressed by her suitors, makes answer: "Time will tell". Mountains of sorrow are often whittled down to mole hills by the healing hand of time, and past evils become precious memories. Time, as a healing agent, may be likened to the Nisus in the thought of Alexander.[81] Time, coupled with the original value prejudice, makes for a song where once there was weeping.

(2) Aesthetic reflection. This involves a detachment from life. Life is beautiful from above. Men are good when

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80. Hocking, Art.(1923), 583.

81. S. Alexander, STD, II, 38ff., 362.

looked at from a distance. Basically this method is sound: it makes for an objectivity which enables the evil to be viewed in its true perspective. There is a possible danger, however, in transmuting evil through aesthetic contemplation. It may become an apology for crime. The sublimity of the storm may blind one to the suffering. One may stand and appreciate the beauty of the fire while the forest burns. Schopenhauer looked upon art as a means of salvation from the bondage of life, of the will to live, primarily because the aesthetic reflection means detachment from relations.[82] But this is the beginning of non-being and of death.

(3) Ethical consideration. Evil is looked upon as a means of character growth. It is an observed fact that many of those who suffer most have developed the finest characters and the most congenial dispositions. But since this is not universally the case it seems more nearly the truth to say that the noblest characters maintain congenial dispositions in spite of the suffering. There is so much more suffering than is necessary for moral gymnastics, and it is so unwisely distributed that this moral apology for evil has little real

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82. Schopenhauer, WWV, Section 34.

value.[83]

(4) Social consideration. Companionship is one of the greatest of all values; and complete ennui is one of the worst evils. Any and all evil which can be shared is alleviated. "The evil that admits companionship is neither devoid of hope nor devoid of meaning." (RML, 361) This is the Buddhist apology for evil. Suffering makes men social, and co-operative.[84] It makes men religious, in that they are driven to philosophize about the whole of things. The solidarity of society is due, in large part, to the fact that all people suffer. It is a common human experience; but one whose disagreeableness is alleviated largely through companionship.[85]

Thus much suffering is transmuted, but there are so many evils which are not transmuted and which are not transmutable. The sickly infant may never know relief from pain;

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83. It must be admitted that suffering often deepens a person's life; he has so much more time to think. And sometimes an accident saves a person from moral ruin. But these cases are offset by the fact that many people are embittered by suffering, and that so many "good" people suffer. Job is something of an ideal representative in this regard. His faith was strengthened in the experience. "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him." (13:15a) Job's bitterness, for the most part, was against his would-be comforters.

84. For better or for worse the evil of the war is a great levelling force among the social classes in England.

85. Schopenhauer made pity his fundamental ethical law. (Schopenhauer, GE, 208-209) St. Paul interpreted Christianity in this light as he advised the Galatians: "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ." (Gal. 6:2)

and what of the lingering death of the wounded soldier? Too often the transmutation is cut short by death. In such cases the doubleminded attitude is not possible. "Evil is evil, and nothing else." There is so much of this suffering that contemporary society is characterized by the attitude of "get your own happiness now", and is thus unfriendly to the attitude of a vicarious transmutation. Evil is evil, and nothing more, to the self which does not live to experience the good. According to this logic, however, past evil is past. The problem of that past evil was not solved, but the question disappeared with the questioner. The account was not only closed but it was cancelled.

Although the problem of evil antedates theology, if the theistic hypothesis is to survive, the charge against the universe for past evils as well as for all evils must be settled. Those past sufferers have a claim upon the future. But to grant this claim a status is to assume a responsible Arbiter, and to assume that evil is transmutable: it represents the doubleminded attitude toward evil. If evil were only evil, "it could not become at the same time an object of concentrated attention. The fighter of evil must define it as something else . . . and as such an object . . . so far something else than evil."[86]

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86. Hocking, Art.(1923), 586-587.

Ultimately one's view of the transmutability of evil depends upon his view of God, and of man's relation to God. Such is the case in the philosophy of Hocking. The possibility of survival will be discussed in a section;[87] it remains here to examine as nearly as possible, to try to discern, what God's attitude must be toward man's burdens. Royce is credited with having brought the principle of vicarious transmutation to its philosophic fulfilment. (MGHE, 498) Royce says that comfort in the self's struggle with evil does not consist in the temporal attainment of a goal. The self, as a servant of God, must have a goal which cannot be attained in time. When then comes its comfort?

> In the consciousness, first, that the ideal sorrows of . . . finitude are identically God's own sorrows, and have their purpose and meaning in the divine life as such significant sorrows; and in the assurance, secondly, that God's fulfilment in the eternal order - a fulfilment in which we too, as finally and eternally fulfilled individuals, share, - is to be won . . . through the very bitterness of tribulation, and through overcoming the world.[88]

Thus for the self to view its existence <u>sub specie aeternitatis</u> brings an emancipation from evil. But the happiness is a vicarious one. The comfort comes after the fact. The attitude involved is passive. Before the quality of genuine happiness can be enjoyed the attitude toward evil must be an

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87. The concern will not be to suggest immortality as a solution to the problem of evil, but to examine the logical possibilities involved.

88. Royce, WI, II, 407ff.

active one: the self must be prepared to go out and meet the ills of its destiny. "No man . . . can be wholly happy in defeat unless he foreknows and goes to it, not as Napoleon to his island, but as Socrates to his death. Not resignation, but renunciation."[89] Renunciation in the face of life's troubles, "made significant by some consciously known purpose which in the midst of defeat is not defeated", is the culminating virtue. (MGHE, 501) In sharp contrast to Royce's pantheistic view, positive happiness depends upon a conscious control of one's own fortune, such that "in whatever sense God is to triumph in history, in that same sense must I triumph also." (MGHE, 502) This requires what Hocking calls the prophetic consciousness, a conviction on the part of the self that its acts will succeed and hold their place in history. (MGHE, 503)

The self gains its prophetic consciousness through experience of God. It is a consciousness of personal worth, and a challenge to speak for the Ruler of the world. As an interpreter of the Divine the self finds its worth in life. And in companionship with God, as an "intimate, infallible associate" (MGHE, 224), the self finds relief from most of its suffering and strength to endure gracefully that which cannot be alleviated.

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89. Hocking, MGHE, 501. Italics his.

8. The meaning of life.

(1) Does life have meaning? This question is not an idle one[90], notwithstanding the fact that the normally sane person is one who has an unquestioning assurance that his life and deeds are meaningful, and notwithstanding the fact that the individual is most sure that life has a meaning when he is not reflecting about it. The question most frequently asked of psychiatrists, according to C. G. Jung,[91] is, what is the meaning of life? and, what is the meaning of my life?

Sanity will be restored as the individual comes to be possessed of a sense of mission, to be possessed of the idea that life has meaning. If the question were raised in normal life from time to time, while life is reckoned as meaningful, the conviction that life has meaning might become stronger, and thus serve as a stabilizing factor. Once gone, the assurance that life has worth cannot be restored easily, and least of all by reason alone; indeed, there is danger in

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90. The phrase, the meaning of life, may be either definitional or valuational. The former has to do with defining the meaning of life, with the meaning which life has. The latter has to do with meaning in life, with the meaning enjoyed in life or in living. A recognition that life has a meaning is basic for the continued experience of meaning in life. Yet to find meaning in life is a step toward finding the meaning of life. The definitional meaning of life and the valuational meaning of life are closely related.

91. Jung, MMSS, 267.

trying to make every aspect of life rigidly reasonable. To find the meaning of life is a difficult problem; yet the difficulty is exceeded by the importance.

(2) The dual reference of meaning. In the search for meaning in life or for the meaning of life, it should be kept in mind that meaning is a twofold thing; and to understand the meaning it is necessary to seek in both directions. Universals can be explained only in terms of particulars, and particulars have meaning through reference to universals. Failure to recognize this dual reference of meaning has given rise to a great deal of one-sided thinking in philosophy. From one side the meaning ascends from the particulars to the universal; if there are many particular pleasures or satisfactions they color life and give meaning to the whole of life. But from the other side, meaning descends from the whole to its parts. The life of the self has meaning only if there is a meaning in the world which the self shares. And particular satisfactions add meaning only as the whole has meaning.

Philosophers have too often arrayed themselves on one side or the other throughout the course of history. In Greek ethics the Cynics as extreme relationists condemned, and were in turn condemned by, the Cyrenaics who were extreme hedonists. The intensity between these extreme positions lessened during the next century. But still the formal Stoics sought

the meaning in the universal, the whole, while the Epicureans found the meaning in particular, though permanent, mental pleasures. In modern ethics the utilitarians and the pragmatists have supported the actual and particular satisfactions while the formalists have found life's meaning in the universal.[92]

The dual reference involves a recognition of the significance of both particulars and universals. Pleasure forms an important part; it is integral to the meaning of life. "The animal meaning is a part of the meaning of life." (TDL, 160)

This part, however, is not all. Meaning comes also from the universal to the particular. To view the particular experiences from the point of the whole life is to gain perspective. The detached self is most free, and is thus most capable of free attachment. The pursuit of pleasure, or happiness, is self-defeating because values are falsely attributed to specific objects. All experiences must form a unity. Unless this unity is real, life has no real meaning; it is only a disorganized aggregation of experiences.

Lack of attention to this direction of meaning, i.e., from the universal to the particular, accounts in large measure for the epidemic of meaninglessness in life. Meanings

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92. Cf. Brightman, ML, 289-295.

do not constitute a problem for science; and man has given himself over too completely to the findings of the indifferent scientists. The world, so far as the scientists go, is meaningless. And "a meaningless whole implies a meaningless part." (TDL, 161) There must be a re-evaluation of the particular satisfactions in terms of the universal toward which they point; and also there must be a renewed attachment to some worthy universal or ideal which will add meaning to the struggles of life and will give confidence in the face of seeming defeat.

(3) How the meaning is to be found. Supposing that life has some meaning, how is it to be found? To know what it is will add to the meaning, and if there is none it is still the duty of the honest man to search for it. F. H. Bradley writes that "where all is rotten it is a man's work to cry stinking fish."[93] It is as difficult to prove demonstrably or to disprove that life has meaning as it is to prove or disprove the existence of God. The truth is that the two, genuine meaning in life and the existence of God, go hand in hand.

There are four possible methods of investigation: action, intuition, psychology as a science of mind, and philosophic reflection.

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93. Bradley, AR, xv.

Action is a suitable method for beginners, or in special cases, but action of itself is dumb. Action seems to have lost its savor. There is an abundance of action but not much understanding of life's meaning.

Bergson appeals to intuition in contrast to intellect, as the way to understand life.[94] The intellect raises too many questions, while to interpret life through intuition is to view it from within, and to be free of the questions posed by intelligence. But since intuition does not raise any questions to be answered there is no genuine understanding of life's meaning.

Man has looked to the field of psychology as a science of mind for help. But for the most part he has come away empty-handed. Psychologists profess to give a true or realistic description of human nature; man, however, in view of his own self-consciousness, disowns the portrait. (P6IC, 204) Psychologists seek to establish their field of investigation as a natural science. To do so the self with which they deal must be an object of, or at least within, nature. (TDL, 64) Psychologists present man not with mind but with "systems of objects which are equivalent to mind only for certain restricted purposes." (P6IC, 203)

Psychologists, as natural scientists, deal only with

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94. Bergson, EC, 191ff.

causal series. But the self engages in activities or processes which are also rational. These two series cannot be identified: causes are not reasons nor are reasons causes. "A causal system can at best be but a Near-mind." (P6IC, 205) Consciousness, as an explanatory factor, is looked upon as an intruder by the psychologist. And since meaning involves consciousness meaning is eliminated also. "Thus a natural-science psychology is, by necessity of its method, a description of the meaningful in terms of the meaningless." (TDL, 165) Therefore the naturalistic psychologists offer little help in trying to find the meaning of life, and still less hope in fostering it. The candid psychotherapist, C. G. Jung, admits that he does not know what to say to the person who has lost his assurance that life has meaning.[95]

But the psychotherapist does know what is needed. It is necessary for the patient to find meaning in life as well as a meaning for life. It is here that faith or imagination is often brought into play. Faith is better because it provides a more secure basis for conviction. But if the resources of faith cannot be tapped and developed, resort is made to an imagined meaning. This is an admitted fiction; yet it is a "healing fiction", and is thus a true instrument. John Dewey, a naturalist, despairs of finding the meaning of life

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95. C. G. Jung, MMSS, 267.

through science and also turns to the realm of imagination.[96] This is a strange field for a naturalist. Hocking suggests that Dewey was brought here by "the sterilities inherent in physical naturalism." (TDL, 171)

The resort to imagination by Jung and by Dewey is only half-hearted. The effort to provide life with a meaning in this way is circular. "The self must first of all, in imagination, constitute that outside value, and lend the incommunicative environing world the character of a universe." (TDL, 172)

Reason is not left a free hand. This method is suspected because of the generalizations arrived at, and because the analytic inspection tends to dry up the springs of meaning. But the meaninglessness of life does not result from reflection; it results rather from a lack of it. There is activity enough; the need is for a different kind of activity, for action which is guided by and understood by better thought. (HNR, 35-36) Hocking proposes "a remarriage between vitality and intelligence" (TDL, 154) in this search for the world of life.

The meaning of life cannot be found or understood apart from raising questions and seeking answers. This is the task of reflection. Philosophy is the attempt to understand and

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96. This position is developed in Dewey, CF, 43ff., 49.

integrate all the experiences of life. The basic assumption in philosophy is that the universe has a meaning; the great task of philosophers is to discern this meaning. Therefore, though the aid of philosophic reflection may be suspected, philosophers cannot avoid the question of the meaning of human life. The task of philosophy is to help one find his meaning in life.[97]

This basic assumption that the universe has a meaning is the counterpart of, yet gives concreteness and objectivity to, Jung's and Dewey's resort to imaginary and imaginated meaning. Meaning for life involves an integrated life; this in turn involves a harmonious integration of life's satisfactions or values. This integration is more nearly possible if there is an objective ideal or meaning which serves as an inspiration. The ideal becomes then not pure invention but a discovery made as the self is living in the world. (TDL, 190) And the meaning of life is increased as this objective ideal is embodied.

(4) <u>The meaning of life</u>. That life has a meaning or does not have meaning cannot be proven. That the greater majority, however, have found or do find meaning in and for life might well imply that the evidence is affirmative. Then the one who has not found meaning should not declare

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97. Hocking, Art.(1937)^2, 217.

that life has no meaning but simply state that he has not yet found it.

Just where might this meaning be found? And after all, what is it? The fact that the normal person has an unreflective conviction that life has meaning might signify that the meaning is in merely being alive. Living does afford intrinsic satisfaction. Few persons really want to die or even to surrender their state of being conscious. The first law of nature, reputedly, is the law of self-preservation. The self maintains itself because it enjoys, i.e., finds worth in, selfhood. Although one may reject this position especially when he thinks of the drifter, the parasite, or the misfit, it represents the basis for all other values in life and achieved meaning for it. Unless some self exists there can be no meaning in the world. (TDL, 215)

It does seem, though, that the value in static life is purely potential. Meaning for life must depend on participation in life, in doing and in things done. This is akin to Dewey's theory of art. Not only must the artist be esthetic, the perceiver must be artistic if his appreciation is to be genuine. The perceiver "must <u>create</u> his own experience. And his creation must include relations comparable to those which the original producer underwent."[98] Meaning comes through activity. The degree of agency on the part

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98. John Dewey, AE, 54. Italics his.

of the self is determined by the intensity of work. Life is lived for its high moments and these come often in times of intense activity. In contrast to James' idea of a moral equivalent of war, Hocking thinks that in order to maintain peace "we need an intensity-equivalent of combat." (TDL, 125)

But this cannot be the whole story. Many who do not know achievement find even greater meaning for life in love and appreciation. Love is a key to the quality of meaning. True meaning comes in perceiving value and in appreciating or enjoying such value. The hunger for a deeper appreciation is a stimulus for study. Learning is instrumental to an increased sensitivity to value and meaning. Yet love is often selfish; and may be even self-defeating unless there is a relation to something outside of and beyond the individual person.

There must be a synthesis between the intense activity and love. This results in a union of love and power in the service of a cause. The bounds of self-interest overflow in the concern for an objective ideal. The self goes beyond itself; and finds its meaning through serving the interests of humanity. Albert Schweitzer gave up several promising careers as a concert organist, author, teacher and preacher, because he found the meaning for his life as a medical missionary in Africa.[99]

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99. Schweitzer, LT. Cf. also Regester, AS. Schweitzer does writing even now but his time for it is limited.

The dialectic of meaning for life, however, does not end in altruism. Altruism usually involves an assumption or at least a hope concerning the ultimate destiny of the cause and those represented in it. The basis of altruism, or at least for endeavor in particular fields, is often traceable to a sense of mission. The individual finds his meaning for life in fulfilling a destiny, assigned by whatever powers that be. With some the assignment is clearly outlined. For others the task is hardly discernible. These search for it, however, and their assurance that life has a meaning depends upon their conviction that they have a mission to fulfill. Many persons are wholly unaware of any cosmic appointment; and these view the idea as a superstition. Might it not be said of these, as it was said of those for whom life is so far meaningless, that they have not yet found it? At any rate many people are possessed of a sense of mission, and their evidence must be considered. The prophet Jeremiah was convinced that his appointment was made before he was born. (Jeremiah 1:4-5) Josiah Royce lays great stress on this sense of mission, of fulfilling a destiny. He writes that "to regard the life of our most fragmentary selfhood as the divine life taking on human form . . . is of the deepest essence of religion."[100] This is the position also of Hegel,

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100. Royce, WI, II, 429.

in whose thought meaning for life depends upon the laying off of particularity and the putting on of universality, i.e., freedom from illusion and wilfull attachment to the rational whole.[101]

As has been admitted throughout this section, whether or not life has meaning cannot be demonstrated. The evidence, however, points to an affirmation of life. What is this meaning? That depends. But if human life has any adequate meaning life must be viewed as an invitation to become real, real in the sense that God is real.[102]

9. Immortality as an achievement.

The problem of immortality is an empirical problem for which there is no empirical evidence; it is "a non-speculative question which depends for its answer on speculative questions."[103] One's view of immortality depends upon his metaphysics. A metaphysical theory may exclude survival; it may require it; or it may show it as possible.[104] In no case is certainty to be had. Conviction is often attained, both affirmative and negative. The negatives, however, usually

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101. Hegel, PR, Sec. 131, Sec. 132.

102. Hocking, TDL, 217. The writer of Genesis 1:26-27, in trying to account for the dignity of man says that he was created in the image, the likeness of God.

103. Hocking, TDL, 30. Cf. p. 3.

104. E.g., impersonal realism, theistic personalism, and dualism or idealism, respectively.

consider an absence of positive empirical evidence as a demonstrative decision in their favor. But this is not a reasoned certainty. The belief in immortality is evanescent; it fluctuates, passing from one extreme to the other, from certainty at one time to absurdity at another. Hocking states it thus: "It seems to me at times that a man is a fool to believe it, at other times that a man is a fool not to believe it." (MGHE, 144)

The self is empirically dualistic. It is an observer which observes itself in reflection. This reflective self is relatively "potential, infinite, time-inclusive, time-continuous, creative". The observed self is the excursive self which is relatively "actual, finite, time-limited, time-discontinued, created." (TDL, 85) Now, in the case of survival or immortality which self survives? The excursive self is dated, and death is the end for it: there are no more excursions. But the reflective self apart from this empirical self is nothing. It is apt to be thought of as a transcendental self, or as an indestructible idea. The two selves are one in the whole self; the empirical duality is all the while a unity. And if survival is a fact the whole self survives. There must be at least a kinship to the present empirical dualism.

There are some objections to immortality which must be considered. First, as to the cry of selfishness, it may help

to note that the desire for survival is not necessarily selfish. In the first place it is a claim of right, not a personal wish. It is based upon the view that that which has been produced should not be snuffed out. (TDL, 7) And in the second place, it is not a desire for an object, but for a subject. (TDL, 8) It is akin to the will to live. It is no more selfish to desire survival than to desire to live or survive tomorrow. It is a fundamental tenet of life that survival ought to be. "For unless there is a way for the continuance of the human self, the world is full of the blunt edges of human meanings, the wreckage of human values, and therefore of the failures of God." (TDL, 111)

The most important objection to survival, it seems, is the view of science in which it is held that the mind is dependent upon the brain. This is part and parcel of the mind-body problem. In scientific theories of the mind-body relation, it is held (following Aristotle) that the two are working parts of the same thing. Mind is the living principle of body. And the body is for the mind a footing in the universe. The two are so closely related that changes in one involve changes in the other. But this does not mean necessarily that the brain is the mind, or that this functional co-variation depends altogether on the brain. It may mean either that mental-events are images or brain-events, or that brain-events are images of mental-events. (TDL, 46) This situation demands

an answer to the question, which is primary, mind or body? The answer which offers the completer explanation is that mind is "the original reality, and the body-and-brain system is its derivative or representation within the natural context." (TDL, 49) The mind is more concrete, and can come nearer explaining the body-and-brain system than can this system explain the mind.[105]

Another major obstacle which must be overcome pertains to the spatial order or orders of existence. Investigation has left not even standing room to the heavenly mansions which were anticipated as residences. "If there is another life, there must be another nature. And if there is but one space-time order, there can be but one nature: for nature is defined as the system of all events in the space-time universe." (TDL, 36) Two or more co-existing spaces must be such that there is no point in common. If there are relations between them they are spatial relationships. In mathematics, in art, and in dream, there is at least the possibility of other space worlds. "The structural relations, the intra-mental transition from world to world, present the logical qualities which may enable us . . . to use the notion of an 'other' world without confusion." (TDL, 40, 41)[106]

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105. Cf. Chapter III, where the relation between the mind and body is treated more fully.

106. Does the possibility of other space worlds have any relation to or dependence upon other time worlds? Could there

Regardless, though, of how many the objections may be, and how strong, the issue concerning survival is a metaphysical problem, and one's answer is determined by his metaphysics. In an impersonal realism, personal survival is impossible; in dualism or idealism, it is possible; and in theistic personalism, it is necessary. It is hard to discern just what Professor Hocking's view is. It is idealistic. He insists that being is primary; this tends toward theistic personalism. But he maintains that immortality is an achievement, which is akin to a pragmatic idealism. The following statement seems to be against the view that it is achievement:

> Our deepest instinct would suggest that what a man has not yet attained may be vastly more important than what he has performed; and that what he is, is more important than either. (TDL, 214)

Then is survival an achievement?

> In the proposal we here make we have assigned a place to pragmatism, since active attachment is necessary to a sound detachment, and one must work in order to be real. But we make being primary. (TDL, 215)

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106. (continued)
be another time world? No; because time is continuous; and all time is of the same. Any division between time worlds would be itself temporal. Is not the same true as regards space? There is just one actual space which can or does accommodate real existents. Any other space, it seems, would be part and parcel with this space. The possibility of survival might better depend upon its being non-spatial than on the reality of other space worlds.

The view that immortality is an achievement adds zest to life. The more achievement the more nearly immortal. It is a reversed application of pragmatism: "It is true if you work." This is close enough to orthodoxy to be acceptable, but is wholly different therefrom. Just as in orthodox tradition, heaven and hell, there is here the possibility that one may win immortality or that he may lose it. Professor Hocking insists strongly on this point. Justice is on his side.

> If there be any immortality beyond this present scheme of things, it is not in abstraction therefrom; the destiny of our own deeds, great and small, is an integral part of whatever future there may be for us. To deserve to endure is the only guarantee of enduring. I have no faith in an intrinsic indestructibility of the substance of consciousness. One life is given us; another may be acquired. (MGHE, 513, 514)

It seems natural for men to be sinful, and mortal; mortality seems natural; the idea of immortality, strange. But justice and rationality give assurance that the range of one's existence will be as the range of his effective wishes. Then those who care for immortality must take the pains; others, will have only a finite reward. "Let each have the degree of life which his own status - by its natural hold on reality - commands." (HNR, 166) "Human life as we find it <u>is</u> not free, sacred, immortal. It must be made free; its sacredness must be conferred upon it; its immortality must be won." (TP, 450)

> Survival of death is a possibility but not a necessity of destiny. We have begun this present existence without our prior consent. . . . But being here, we constitute ourselves judges and administrators of

> the worth of living; and what we come to conceive as fit tends . . . to come to pass in each one's personal destiny. . . . In any event, the quality of the human self . . . is not immortality but immortability, the conditional possibility of survival. (TDL, 106-108)

The reality of the self is not a fixed quantity. It may well be, and justice requires that it shall be, "that survival may be a matter of the degree of reality which the self attains." (TDL, 109)

> I strongly doubt whether immortality is any such predetermined reality that it exists for any person apart from that person's will to make it real. The future life may well be such an object as my decision can make real or unreal, so far as my own experience is concerned. (MGHE, 141, 142)

The justification for viewing immortality as an achievement is in the existence of metaphysical freedom. Trouble arises, however, when one considers those who would have achieved reality and immortality, had their lives not been taken, as in war, or in plague, or in natural disasters, or had their lives not been crippled by poverty or some other handicap. The calculus of justice concerning immortality as an achievement is exceedingly intricate. It is difficult to know just which is more important, being or activity. Being must be primary. (TDL, 215) There could be being without any great achievement. Being is the basis for activity, whereas activity is the test for being. Professor Hocking's emphasis on the importance of development and achievement for survival is warranted, although its importance is not in determining

immortality itself but only in determining the degree of immortality.

In the position that "being is primary" (TDL, 215), it seems that survival is not a matter of achievement, but that it is a characteristic of being. Since "we care for being more than for achievement, because being, in this sense, is an enduring potentiality; and this can only signify potentiality for further life", why not say that every person is immortal, and that his achievement determines his degree of immortality? Survival in this case would depend upon capacity (being, plus potentiality) and achievement. In the next order individuals would develop in accordance with their present tendencies, and capacities. "Whatever meaning life may come to possess hereafter must be simply the ampler interpretation of the meaning which it now has." (TDL, 226) This theory takes care of those whose lives happen to be snuffed out, or who may not have opportunity for the development of their lives, i.e., for the achievement of reality, during this period of probation. Professor Hocking holds that the universe has a meaning, and that man shares in this meaning. Therefore unless part of the meaning of the universe is to be destroyed or annihilated survival is necessary.

CHAPTER VII

EVALUATION OF HOCKING'S CONCEPT OF THE HUMAN SELF

To have studied Professor Hocking's writings, and to have sought to interpret his view of the self is to have earned the right to evaluate it. To write a dissertation based on his philosophy is to be required to do so.

1. Characterization of his philosophy.

Hocking is definitely not anti-intellectual. Although feeling is recognized as the basis of selfhood (MGHE, 44), "there is no such thing as feeling apart from idea; . . . it is the whole meaning and destiny of feeling to terminate in knowledge of an object." (MGHE, 64) Nevertheless one is led to believe, from time to time, that Hocking's philosophy represents a justification of his intuitions rather than the development of an idea. They may be ever so profound, but still they are intuitions. Metaphysics becomes for Hocking a giving of reasons for what is believed through intuition or on instinct.[1] Marcel and Dalliére, French followers of Hocking, were right in their interpretation of Hocking as Bergsonian. They characterize Hocking's philosophy as "a dialectic of instinct which finds its fulfilment in a philosophy of mysticism."[2] Hocking states that Bergson's

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1. Cf. Bradley, AR, xiv.
2. Cf. p. 196n.

greatest service was "to have shown that knowledge of reality is possible in concrete experience."[3] Mysticism is considered as the concluding type of philosophy.[4] The danger in a philosophy of mysticism is that feeling will be given precedence over reason, and when this is done objectivity becomes impossible.

2. Ambiguity in his view of the self.

Hocking is justified in his emphasis upon selfhood as the basic category. For without consciousness the world is unintelligible and meaningless. The self represents the most ultimate entity which can be discovered. So far his position is acceptable. But when he insists that the self includes the body as an integral part of its being, that "all the categories of the body are required in the structure of the self" (SIBF, 96), his thinking becomes ambiguous, if not unreasonable. The body is an object of nature, so that nature along with the body must become an integral organ of the self. (SIBF, 141)

The essence of the self (the basis of selfhood), even according to Hocking, is feeling (MGHE, 44), feeling joined with thinking, and willing or acting. (MGHE, 64-65) There is no question about the importance of the body for the self's

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3. Hocking, Art.(1914)[1], 326.

4. Hocking, TP, 379-421; MGHE, xviii-xix, 341-441; P6IC, 215.

being;[5] it may even cause the self, but still the body, as known by the external senses, is not a part of the self, i.e., of its essence. The essence of the self is consciousness; and consciousness is not an object, such as the body is and such as nature is, but consciousness is an intuition of, or an act of reference to, an object; it is not just an act of reference, but of reference <u>to an object</u>.

But is not this the real interpretation of what Hocking means? (It is certainly not what he says.) There is no individuality or distinctness "apart . . . from a world of things."[6] The only mind that is of interest is "a mind which has its objects, and is at work upon them." (MGHE, 255) The mind is <u>that which</u> has its objects and is referring to them and working on them. The body is that <u>with</u> which the mind handles its objects. And nature provides the objects; nature is the material for experience. Thus both nature and the body are essential to the self's being; they are so essential that the mind or self cannot be understood adequately apart from an understanding of the whole universe; but this intimacy of relationship does not mean, and cannot mean, that they are of the essence of the self.

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5. Cf. pages 76-78, above.

6. Hocking, MGHE, 256; Cf. Chapter V, 4.

3. The category of social experience.

Again, Hocking's emphasis upon the category of selfhood is justified, but his deduction of the category of social experience is questionable.[7] Hocking's theory of social experience includes or is his argument for the existence of God. The Kantian thing-in-itself is brought into the realm of immediate sense experience. This is deduced from or justified by two premises. First, that sense experience is a common ingredient of all selves, which coalesce in nature. (MGHE, 298) Second, a necessary part of nature experience is the recognition of its being known by some other mind. (MGHE, 231, 232, 261) But this other mind cannot be all other finite selves because all finite selves are dependent upon nature, as empirical knowers of nature. Therefore this other mind or other knower of nature must be God. (MGHE, 293) It is the prior knowledge of God, as the Other Mind knowing nature, which supplies the category of social experience and thereby makes social relations intelligible. The basic social experience is with God; this experience supplies a principle which enables the self to interpret his relations with his fellows.

Hocking maintains that the idea of an other mind involves (or is at the same time) an experience of other mind. (MGHE, 278) This reduces the concept of objectivity to social

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7. Cf. Chapter V, 6.

agreement. Social experience is an original datum of experience if the objective means what selves agree in knowing, because the objective cannot be derived from pure subjectivity. In this way, God as the other knower of nature must be present in experience from the beginning. (MGHE, 281, 288) But why must objectivity be defined in terms of social agreement? Since nature exists independently of the self's knowing it why cannot the self start with an experience of nature, and why cannot the sense of reality arise from experience with the world as a physical environment instead of from the intellectual perception of shared ideas? (Does the Other Knower's experience of nature likewise depend upon an other knower of nature?)

The idea of social experience may involve social experience itself (MGHE, 278), but this social experience does not necessarily involve the actual experienced presence of a further self. The idea of social experience means only the cognitive acceptance of some self, which need not be directly experienced but may be only implied in ideal terms.

But there is an even greater difficulty. Even if God, as the Other Mind, does exist, how is it that in the case of God the self does experience an Other Self, while in the case of other human selves such social experience is deemed impossible? The activity of God must enter the life of the self through its results, as is true with other human selves, and

social experience is equally possible in either case or neither.

Alexander's is a more tenable view of social experience. Since instincts or traits are not outlawed why can not the instinct of sociability play a part in making social experience possible? Alexander writes, "It is because we are social beings and have the social instinct that we become aware of others as like ourselves and the possessors of minds."[8] There is a spontaneous and reciprocal recognition of kindred otherness. Hocking says that the consciousness of kind is not "an actual organ of knowledge differentiated for the perception of other minds" (MGHE, 242), but recognition is the beginning of knowledge. This mutual apprehension is the minimal core which two minds have in common. And from it communication may be built from more to more. (MGHE, 272; TP, 290)

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8. Alexander, STD, II, 35.

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HOCKING'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN SELF

Abstract of a Dissertation

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The purpose of this dissertation is to present a critical interpretation of the human self, based on the philosophy of William Ernest Hocking. The terms self, soul, mind, and person are used as synonyms. The word self is preferable; it includes what the other terms include but does not dictate the road which the discussion must follow. The self is a purposing system of conscious and subconscious behavior which develops as a persistent hope is realized.

The self may be spoken of as a will to power. This will to power, which is akin to but not as revolutionary as the Nietzschean will to power, is the undiscovered unity in life. It may be described as a craving for potency. Partial satisfaction is realized in the feeling of present worth as a self among selves; but there is also the longing that the exerted influence will be permanent. The self as a will to power becomes the self as a hope. This hope represents an actual hold on a possible good. Self-identity is realized through the persistence of this hope as a feeling of value-strain.

The natural endowment of the self is discerned through a study of the mature person, as well as through a study of the development of the individual. Findings from the fields of biology and physiology are necessary for any adequate understanding of the self. The best way to refute the claims emerging from biologists and physiologists is to accept them, and to let them prove their worth and their inadequacy. The natural endowment of the human self involves three things: First, and most obvious, there is the body as a storehouse of energy, of impulses to act, of instincts. The second basic characteristic is conscious will, which becomes the will to power. The third initial property is conscience or moral sensitivity.

The body is integral to the mind or self. It enters into the mind's experience as a visible, spatial object to which are referred certain needs and wants, certain powers and capacities, as well as the mind's steady sense of being. The body makes possible a distinction between abstract thought and concrete deed; it serves as a storehouse of power and of habits; and it is the means whereby mind interacts with the world beyond. But the body is an object of nature, and if it is integral to the mind, then either the self goes into nature or nature comes into the self. Upon examination the self-sufficiency and independence of nature come to be recognized as an illusion; nature is also dependent; its independence and objectivity are relative and derivative. The givenness of sense-data, the orderliness of nature, as well as nature's impartial publicity, are evidence that nature is fitted for taking part in the life of the self.

Hocking's theory of instincts or necessary interests is the counterpart of Allport's theory of traits. There are two differences. First, while Allport is psychological only, Hocking is primarily metaphysical. This leads to the second difference: Hocking identifies the all-pervasive and dominant trait with the self, but Allport denies that they are identical. An exact listing of instincts is impossible because all are aspects of one fundamental instinct. The moment of self-consciousness is that period in the life of the organism when the will to power is recognized, and owned.

Selfhood is recognized as the basic category. Although Bradley insists that selfhood is too full of contradictions to represent reality, selfhood is the

most concrete category which can be discovered. The discovery of one supposedly more concrete would reveal the discoverer as one stage more concrete still. Selfhood is the perfect example of a concept which applies to a part of the world and also to the whole of it. The world is a self, for the mental life within it is a unity and all the meanings of things cohere in a single will. The human self is an imperfect image of the cosmic self.

The problem of freedom is a metaphysical problem. It arises only for beings who act as a result of choices of will. To say that the self is free means that in deliberating the self is faced with real alternatives. The most poignant evidence for freedom is the power of reflection. If both causality and freedom are recognized as postulates, and as candidates to be understood, freedom will not seem so impossible. Physicists disclaim finality for physical laws, so that freedom may represent taking hold of, or obedience to, a more ultimate law.

The source of obligation is God. Conscience is native to the self; it represents a feeling of obligation which is occasioned as a possible increase or decrease of being becomes an object of perception. Sin results as the self yields to or releases its control of impulses which are partial, the expression of which is not in keeping with the most complete realization of the whole self. The primary and original right of every man is to his own development; yet this right is inalienable only if man aims to develop his powers. Rights are not rights until they are looked upon as privileges and as responsibilities. The destiny of an individual is the universalized expression of his own unique view of reality.

Strictly speaking, social experience is a misnomer. There is no such experience in the literal sense of the term. There is social knowledge, but it is of necessity built on hypotheses. The basic social experience is not the experience of other men, but is the experience of God as directly revealed in the experiences of nature. The Kantian thing-in-itself is known in immediate experience. The experience of God provides the self with a category by means of which social relations become intelligible.

There are three roots of religious ideas which may be designated as the speculative, the emotional and the ethical. The speculative and emotional roots belong to man's experience of nature, while the ethical root grows in social relations. But all these roots spring from man's experience of God as the initial Other. The group spirit is not equivalent to God. God meets a need in the life of man that cannot be met in any other way. Man's values can survive only if he finds a metaphysical foundation for them.

Teleological explanation is necessary as a supplement to mechanical causality in understanding certain items of experience, for example, life, value, and the intelligibility of the world. But there is also the fact of dysteleology to be reckoned with; it represents the struggle, the restlessness, and the suffering in the world. Hocking rejects finitism as a means of accounting for this fact. He insists that to raise the problem of dysteleology is to imply a double-minded attitude toward evil, i.e., the possibility of its transmutability. Time, and companionship, are the two chief means for the transmutation of evil. Through companionship with God as an intimate and infallible associate the self finds strength to endure that evil which cannot be alleviated. Certainty cannot be had concerning immortality: it is an empirical problem for which

there is no empirical evidence. The question of survival must finally be decided in metaphysics. But in any case the reality of the self is not a fixed quantity. Justice demands that the matter of survival be determined by the degree of reality which the self attains.

The main conclusions regarding Hocking's view of the human self may be organized as follows:

1. The self is to be defined as a will to power; it is a purposing system of conscious and subconscious behavior which develops as a persistent hope is realized.

2. Metaphysical freedom is a matter of degree; the tension of the self toward a coherent hope determines the depth of selfhood and the degree of the self's freedom.

3. The body as a sphere of empirical particularity is integral to the self.

4. Moral sensitivity, along with conscious will and the body, is a natural endowment of the human self; conscience may emerge last, but the feeling of obligation cannot be imported into the life of an individual from without.

5. Selfhood is Hocking's most basic and meaningful category, although he does not incorporate it into a system of categories; it represents a principle without which the world is unthinkable, and by means of which the world can be most coherently understood.

6. The focus of all ultimate value is in selves, yet man's original right to his own development is inalienable only if he aims to develop his powers: freedom involves responsibility.

7. Since God is known in sense experience as an Other Knower of physical nature, this experience of God provides man with the category of social experience whereby social relations become intelligible.

8. Meaning is to be found in human life by the fulfilling of what Hocking calls a "prophetic consciousness", or a "cosmic appointment"; if there is an immortality, it is an achievement in the process of fulfilling that appointment.

9. Hocking's view of the self as including the body is questionable, because the body is a part of nature; this means that the self includes a part of nature, whereas Hocking holds the essence of the self to be consciousness (which is always an intuition of, or an act of reference to, an object).

10. Hocking's conclusion should be revised to read as follows: The human self as a purposing system of behavior is dependent upon the human body and thus upon nature for its present empirical existence; it cannot be understood completely apart from an understanding of the whole world.

Additional copies may be obtained on application to
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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL

SKETCH

Neal Bond Fleming was born June 18, 1910, in Canon, Georgia, the tenth of twelve children, to Tinie Bond and James William Fleming. After graduating from Marietta High School in 1929, he was at Emory University for seven years, being awarded the A.B. in 1933, and the B.D. in 1936. During 1935-1936 he served as Director of Young People's Work in the North Georgia Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South.

In 1936 he came to study in Boston University, with Professors Albert C. Knudson and Edgar S. Brightman. He was awarded the S.T.M. in 1937. In the fall of 1937 he entered Boston University Graduate School as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. For three years he served as an assistant in the Department of Philosophy. During 1939-1940 he had a course with Professor William Ernest Hocking at Harvard.

In 1929 he was licensed to preach, and in 1940 was ordained as a local Elder in the Methodist Church. Since 1938 he has been serving as minister of the Methodist Church in Charlton City, Massachusetts.

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